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ABSTRACT 
Railway RAMS is an engineering discipline that integrates reliability, availability, 
maintainability and safety characteristics appropriate to the operational objectives of a railway 
system into the inherent product design property through railway systems engineering. In the 
recent years it has become a rapidly growing engineering discipline because it can achieve a 
defined railway traffic service timely, safely and cost effectively. It also has a great potential 
to improve the competitiveness of railway against other transports, especially road transport. 
Therefore, RAMS management becomes a significant issue in today’s global railway projects 
and it is gradually being expanded so far as to domestic railway projects. 
 Railway organisations have addressed the study for a long period to integrate RAMS 
managment into railway systems engineering, but yet only a few have implemented the 
RAMS management with the railway systems engineering. The major challenge of this study 
is to establish a systematic approach of RAMS management for railway systems engineering 
from the system concept phase through the establishment of the engineering concepts, 
methods, techniques and tools. Therefore, this research focuses on developing a systematic 
method for the integration of RAMS management into railway systems engineering.   
This research is conducted for three research subjects and a case study. Firstly, this research 
provides a railway RAMS management systems so that railway organisations can decide a 
strategic policy, control functions and coordinate activities related to RAMS management in a 
systematic aspect. This research thus establishes two processes, RAMS management and 
railway systems engineering, to provide a fundamental basis of the RAMS management 
systems. Secondly, this research provides railway risk assessment methods, based on the 
combination of FMEA and FTA, to assess all of the potential hazards that threaten the 
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railway’s operational objectives and control them within the possible acceptable criteria. 
Thirdly, this research provides the method that develops RAMS performance specifications 
appropriate to the RAMS requirements and operational contexts to develop RAMS design and 
its acceptance criteria for the detailed system design and/or contract. Finally, this research 
presents a case study for the risk assessment of rail vehicle pneumatic braking unit, using the 
field data collected from the railway industry to demonstrate the proposed assessment method 
of railway risks and investigate the RAMS performance of the pneumatic braking unit and 
their major failure causes. 
This research provides a comprehensive approach for the application of RAMS management 
to railway systems engineering. The proposed models, methods and techniques for RAMS 
management will support the railway organisations that need the optimal solutions for the 
current issues and challenges related to RAMS management. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation of the Research 
The present form of railways, in which rolling stock is guided by the metal contact between 
rail track and rolling stock wheels, made an appearance in the mining industry of the United 
Kingdom in the early 19
th
 century. The high technical effectiveness of rolling stock’s metal 
contact and its exclusive running on the rail track without any interruption provided many 
excellent competitive advantages, compared to other forms of transportation, for example, 
high speed operating, long distance driving, large capacity transport, low energy consumption, 
environmentally friendly impact, high safety, consistent punctuality etc. Thus, the advantages 
of railways have provided a great opportunity for the massive growth of railway transport all 
over the world (Profillidis, 2007).  
On the other hand, with the continued development and enhancement of the road and aviation 
transport industries, such as buses, trucks, private cars and airplanes, the role of railways in 
the transport sector has rapidly declined and eventually railway organisations, in most 
countries, have been nationalised to keep their rail traffic service. This is due to the 
importance of the role of railway in the population movement and national economy. As a 
result, the nationalisation of railways brought many negative effects to the railway 
organisations, for example, inflexibility, non-cost effectiveness, low quality of rail service, 
lack of punctuality at operation etc. However, railway organisations have brought about the 
turning point which has improved the above railway problems as well as cost effectiveness, 
availability and safety expectation in the technical and management aspects (Profilliids, 2007). 
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Railway organisations have been in a long search for their competitive advantages as a unique 
transport. For this purpose, railway organisations are now entering a specific restructuring 
period for the innovative improvement of their management and the application of the 
advanced technologies, which focus on availability, safety and cost effectiveness, for instance, 
the gradual liberalisation and deregulation of transport activity, the vertical separation of 
infrastructures from operation, the introduction of intra-mode competition, and inter-
operability of railway operations for horizontal railway integration (Cantos & Compos, 2005; 
Profilliids, 2007).  
Safety, availability and cost effectiveness are the most important issues in today’s global 
railway business and domestic railway environment as well. Therefore, the requirement for 
the railway system, capable of achieving high safety, availability and cost effectiveness, 
should be continuously increased in the railway industry. Accordingly, railway organisations 
have considered the introduction of specific engineerings in their railway design and 
development project. For example, RAMS management with systems engineering have been 
attempted by many railway organisations to establish the engineering concepts of safety, 
availability and cost effectivenss from  the early railway project stage (BS EN 50126-1, 1999).  
RAMS management is an engineering discipline that integrates reliability, availability, 
maintainability and safety characteristics into an inherent system design property through 
systems engineering process to achieve a defined railway traffic service successfully (BS EN 
60300-1, 2004). In recent years, it has become a rapidly growing engineering discipline 
because of being able to provide a defined rail traffic service timely, safely and cost 
effectively. It also has a great potential to improve the competitiveness of railway against 
other transport sectors. Therefore, RAMS management has risen as a significant issue in 
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today’s global railway businesses and it is being gradually expanded into the domestic 
railway businesses (BS EN 50126-3, 2006). 
The European railway organisations have already applied RAMS management to their railway 
systems engineering projects. However, most railway organisations are still at the infant stage 
in implementing the RAMS management and systems engineering. Although the systems 
engineering in the railway design and development project has been applied, RAMS 
managment has not yet been performed in the systems engineering as a major part of the 
engineering management. Consequently, RAMS management has not been fully implemented. 
Therefore, it becomes a very significant challenge to integrate RAMS management into 
railway systems engineering process (Ju et al., 2011). 
Many efforts have been made over a long period of time to integrate RAMS management into 
railway systems engineering process; however, only a few organisations have performed it 
due to the lack of the systematic approach of RAMS management for railway systems 
engineering, based on the established engineering concepts, methods, techniques and tools 
(Valkokari et al., 2012). Therefore, this research project focuses on the development of the 
systematic approach for the effective integration of RAMS management into railway systems 
engineering process, based on a survey of current problems and challenges of railway 
organisations related to RAMS management.  
1.2   Railway RAMS Management 
The technical performance of railway systems, such as high speed running, long distance 
driving and high capacity transport in the railway traffic service, has been dramatically 
improved over the recent years. However, the operational performance, such as availability, 
safety and cost effectiveness, have not made significant progress. Such low operational 
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performance has had an adverse influence on the quality of railway traffic service and the 
improvement of the railway’s competitiveness in the transport sector, for example, the 
frequent delay of the railway service, the increase of total ownership cost, and even the 
continuous increase of the potential damage for humans and environments caused rail 
accidents. Thus, RAMS management becomes a significant decision making factor in today’s 
global and domestic railway business. Many railway organisations have continuously 
addressed the introduction of RAMS management in an effort to improve the operational 
effectiveness (Profillids, 2007).  
RAMS management optimally allocates the limited resources to the system products through 
the railway systems engineering process. Accordingly, much attention has been paid to 
RAMS management from the early system concept phase. RAMS management is a 
professional engineering discipline which was originated from reliability and safety 
engineering for the improvement of the operational objectives of system. It was first 
introduced as part of an overall engineering discipline by the aerospace industry to evaluate 
the reliability and safety of aircrafts. It has continuously been further developed and applied to 
many industrial areas, especially in the mission and safety critical industries (An, 2005). 
Since the 1980s, RAMS management has been widely adopted with the rapid development of 
systems engineering to effectively define, identify, assess and control all potential threats 
affecting the achievement of the operational objectives of a system. RAMS management in 
the mission and safety critical systems, such as aircraft and railway, has been developed as a 
distinct engineering discipline, which has established the engineering concepts, methods, 
techniques, measurable parameters and mathematical tools (Villemeur, 1992; An, 2005).  
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In particular, railway organisations have applied RAMS management in the long term 
operational aspects to achieve the defined operational effectiveness. The RAMS management 
has generally applied three aspects in the railway systems engineering project: (1) the 
definition of RAMS characteristics, such as reliability, availability, maintainability and safety, 
proper to RAMS requirements and operational contexts, (2) the assessment and control of the 
potential threats, such as faults, failures and errors, that affect the quality of rail traffic service 
and (3) the provision of the controlling means, such as failure prevention, fault tolerance, fault 
removal and fault prediction (BS EN 50126-1, 1999; Ucla et al., 2001; Lundteigen et al., 
2009). 
The railway risks that affect the quality of the defined rail service adversely and directly are 
the major focus of RAMS management in the railway systems engineering. Many inherent 
risks identified within railway systems, and the challenges which have been posed from 
railway systems design and development projects should require their continuous 
improvement from the early concept design stage throughout the whole system life cycle. The 
railway risks have a great potential to cause injury and/or loss of life of staffs and passengers, 
environmental degradation, damage to railway property or freight, and adverse economic 
impacts. Therefore, railway risks may require a systematic approach as a major mangement 
part of the railway systems engineering (BS EN 50126-2, 2007; BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007). 
The risk management approach of railway systems engineering in this context may be 
considered in the aspect of RAMS management in order to reduce or eliminate railway risks 
effectively and continuousally. The RAMS management should be established from the early 
system concept design stage and it should be required in the technical aspect to define, assess 
and control all possible risks. It is also necessary to be implemented in the management 
perspective to enable the quick responses to the changes of the engineering, technology, 
- 6 - 
 
policy and/or objectives and to improve the RAMS performance continuously (BS EN 60300-
1, 2003). 
The risk based RAMS management for the railway systems engineering could be achieved 
through the development of an appropriate management systems. The RAMS management 
systems requires the optimal process and various techniques to ensure that RAMS 
organisations decide on a strategic management policy and objectives, control the 
management functions, and coordinate the manangement activities. The systems approach to 
RAMS management is necessary to achieve the following objectives: (1) to integrate RAMS 
management effectively into the railway systems engineering process, (2) to perform RAMS 
management consistently as an integrated part of the overall railway systems management, (3) 
to achieve RAMS requirements and operational objectives successfully and (4) to improve the 
system product and organisation’s performance continuously. Figure 1.1 describes the basic 
concept of RAMS management for railway systems engineering that will be addressed 
through this research project (BS ISO 9000, 2005; BS EN 60300-1, 2003). 
The RAMS management systems shall be rquired to establish the policy, functions and 
activities of the RAMS management and to implement them through RAMS management 
process. It is also required to measure, assess and improve the effectiveness of RAMS 
management systems and the achievement of RAMS requirements as shown in Figure 1.1. 
The RAMS management systems shall be always performed in the system engineering project 
to meet the needs of customers and their expectations effectively and even to exceed them. 
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Figure 1.1 Concept of Railway RAMS Management  
1.3 Major Approaches for the Research Subjects  
In the previous section, the necessity of introducing RAMS management into railway systems 
engineering project and systems approach to RAMS management are discussed in detail, 
which clarify the need of further research associated with RAMS management based on the 
principle of systems engineering. As stated in Section 1.1, this research focuses on the 
effective integration of RAMS management into railway systems engineering process. For 
this purpose, this research pays great attention to the application of the following three 
principles in the study of RAMS management: (1) systems based RAMS management, (2) 
risk based RAMS management and (3) life cycle based RAMS management.    
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1.3.1  Systems Based RAMS Management  
Systems approach to RAMS management is the study for the policy, functions and activities 
of RAMS management coherent to the overall systems engineering project; it allows 
allocating the management structure and environment of the RAMS organisation. The 
systems approach is thus becoming a key factor in the railway system management due to the 
rapidly growing complexity of railway system. It implies that RAMS organisations provide 
more adequate decision making and information flow. To accomplish such expectation, 
RAMS organisations should have an overall management system, which shall become a 
process to solve the management issues effectively. However, many RAMS organisations are 
not equipped with the management structure and environment as a system and they have 
implemented RAMS management without any established process. Therefore, this research 
addresses an attempt to apply the systems approach for the policy, functions and activities of 
RAMS management (Jenkins et al., 1968; BS EN 50126-1, 1999; BS EN 60300-1, 2003; BS 
ISO 9000, 2005).  
1.3.2   Risk Based RAMS Management  
Railway systems are always exposed to many potential threats affecting the successful 
achievement of the defined rail traffic service. Many inherent risks identified within the 
railway system require the continuous improvement from the early concept design stage due 
to a great potential to lead to injury and/or loss of personnel, environmental degradation, 
damage to railway’s property or freight, and adverse impacts to revenue. Thus, the railway 
risks need to be defined, identified, assessed and controlled in the systems engineering design 
process. However, railway organisations have not focused on the risk management in their 
railway systems engineering and RAMS management has not been conducted in the risk 
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management aspect. Therefore, this research implements the study of RAMS management 
focused on the management of the railway risks (BS EN 50126-1, 1999; Nichollis, 2005; 
Lundteigen et al., 2009). 
 1.3.3  Life-cycle Based RAMS Management  
A system life cycle consists of sequential stages, which cover the whole life of a system and 
provide a framework that plans, assesses, controls, monitors and reviews RAMS management 
functions and activities for engineering a system. Thus, the life cycle management provides a 
conceptual basis to ensure the high feasibility of the system in the operation and maintenance 
phase. The life cycle management is more commonplace in many different industry sectors. In 
railways, customers are highly interested in the life cycle management and the requirements 
have been increased continuously. However, railway organisations have not applied the 
concept of the system life cycle to RAMS management. Therefore, this research focuses on 
the establishment of life cycle functions and activities in the RAMS management (BS EN 
50126-1, 1999; Hankins, 2007). 
In this research, the above three approaches for RAMS management will be studied and 
further developments will be made, which will provide a fundamental basis to find and 
resolve the major RAMS management issues through systems engineering. 
1.4   Research Outcomes  
This research focuses on three subjects and a case study as well as theoretical background for 
establishing railway RAMS management. The major research outcomes are as followings:  
• Literature survey of the current best practices for systems engineering, systems RAMS 
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management, systems risk assessment and RAMS management techniques.  
• Railway RAMS management systems framework, including railway systems 
engineering and RAMS management process for integrating the issue of RAMS 
management into railway systems engineering.  
• Railway RAMS risk assessment framework, providing a cornerstone where all potential 
risks related to railway system can be defined, identified, analysed and evaluated 
effectively and efficiently.  
• Railway RAMS performance specification framework to facilitate the detailed design 
and contract to both customers and suppliers.  
• A case study that demonstrates the risk assessment model and identifies the risk level of 
railway vehicle pneumatic braking unit.  
In addition, three research papers have been presented in the international railway conferences 
and a journal paper is being prepared. They are:  
1. M. Park, M. An, and Felix Schemid (2009), A Study on decision of rail vehicle 
maintenance policy: Proceeding of the 10
th
 International Railway Engineering Conference, 
Theme 1: Railway Vehicle Technology & Maintenance (RVT), London. 
2. M. Park and M. An (2010), Development of a framework for engineering RAMS into 
rolling stock through life cycle in the operator perspective. Proceeding of the 10
th
 Korean 
Railway Conference, Seoul, pp. 2179 – 2194.  
3. M. Park and M. An (2011), A methodology for rolling stock RAM target setting 
demonstration. Proceeding of the 11
th
 International Railway Conference, London, CD: ISBN 
0-947644-69-5. 
(Please see Appendix) 
- 11 - 
 
4. M. Park and M. An (2013), A railway vehicle RAMS risk management - The FMEA-FTA 
approach and RAMS Management  process approaches: a case study.  
1.5   Outlines of Research Thesis  
This thesis comprises eight chapters to discuss a methodology for the introduction of RAMS 
management into railway systems engineering. The main contributions of this research are 
included in Chapters 4 to 6. The main formulation of this research are discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3. Chapter 7 provides a case study and the main achievements of this research are 
concluded in Chapter 8. Brief summaries of each chapter are given below: 
Chapter 1 presents an overview of this research as an introduction. This chapter firstly 
discusses the background of this research project. This chapter also presents railway RAMS 
management for the successful achievement of the defined rail service objectives and the 
systems approach of RAMS management to railway systems engineering. Three approach 
principles are defined as the basis of this research project. The major issues and challenges of 
RAMS management are discussed as well. Finally, the subsequent chapters are summarised 
briefly. 
Chapter 2: This chapter presents the research methodology adopted to conduct this research 
successfully. This chapter begins with the identification of the current problems and 
challenges related to RAMS management; thus, the research questions are developed, and the 
research purpose and objectives are established. The research methods adopted to find the 
solutions related to the major research issues are described in detail. The research process and 
plan are finally discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter 3: This chapter presents an extensive literature review to provide a conceptual review 
of systems engineering and to investigate the engineering concepts, methods and techniques 
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related to RAMS management. This chapter firstly reviews the engineering and management 
concepts of successfully realising a system. The concept of systems RAMS management in 
three aspects is discussed. The definition of railway risks and their assessment methods are 
presented, and the important techniques for RAMS management are briefly investigated for 
their substantial objectives, advantages and disadvantages.   
Chapter 4: In this chapter, the concepts of systems approach to RAMS management for 
railway systems engineering are enumerated and a management systems is provided to 
establish the foundations for organising the management structure and environment of RAMS 
organisation. This chapter describes the two management processes: systems engineering and 
risk based RAMS management process. The systems engineering process is to provide a basic 
foundation of the functions and activities related to RAMS management, and the risk based 
RAMS management process is to provide the appropriate control of all possible railway risks. 
Chapter 5: This chapter presents the development of railway risk assessment method based on 
the integrated FMEA and FTA techniques and its application process. The principles of 
FMEA and FTA approaches for the definition of railway risk are described in detail and two 
FMEA-FTA combination models are developed to apply them to the system engineering 
design phase. The FMEA-FTA based risk assessment process is demonstrated with phased 
descriptions providing several examples to explain the FTA mathematically. 
Chapter 6: This chapter presents a precise performance specification method for resolving the 
RAMS design and acceptance issues to be solved by the system design. This chapter 
discusses a framework for the performance specifications of railway RAMS requirements and 
operational contexts, including the definition of railway RAMS elements and the principles 
and process of RAMS performance specifications. The specification process that can specify 
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the RAMS performance for operational requirements at different system design phases are 
also discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter 7: This chapter provides a case study for the risk assessment of rail vehicle pneumatic 
braking unit in order to illustrate the practical application of the proposed FMEA-FTA based 
railway risk assessment method. This includes identifying the major failure causes that lead to 
a full service braking error in the operational situations, and evaluating the risk level and 
operational reliability performance. This chapter begins with the detailed description on the 
pneumatic braking unit and then describes how FMEA and FTA analysis, using information 
and data collected from the railway field, is used in the risk assessment process.  
Chapter 8: This chapter provides the research results for how the purpose and objectives of 
the research are accomplished by the research methodology selected in the research project. 
Recommendations for implementation of further research work are finally given in this 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter explains the research methodology adopted to conduct this research project 
effectively. This chapter commences with the definition of this research through the survey of 
the current problems and challenges related to RAMS management investigated from the 
railway industry. The identified problems and challenges are subsequently analysed to 
establish the research questions and determine the research purpose and objectives. RAMS 
management and systems engineering in the railway project are a relatively new engineering 
discipline. Accordingly, the industrial approach for their issues and challenges is greatly 
limited. Thus, this chapter secondly presents the several research methods adopted for 
identifying the issues and challenges of RAMS management and finding their solutions from 
railway organisations. Finally, the research process and schedule planned to achieve the 
research objectives are designed effectively.  
The subsequent chapters will be dedicated to the study of the research subjects and a case 
study through the effective application of the research methodology adopted. The research 
methodology is applied to identify the research issues and challenges to be considered and it 
is conducted for the assessment
1
 of the research issues to continuously improve the major 
issues associated with this research subject. This chapter consists of five sections to discuss 
the research methodology adapted. Section 2.2 defines the research subjects through the 
analysis of current problems and challenges related to RAMS management. Section 2.3 
                                                          
1. Assessment is a process that needs the activities of definition, identification, analysis and evaluation.  
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presents the research methods adopted to perform the research subjects and the research 
process and scheduled plans are provided in Section 2.4. This chapter finally gives a brief 
summary in Section 2.5. 
2.2   Research Definition 
2.2.1  Problem and Challenge Statement  
Railway design and development projects have been conducted in a complex engineering 
environments where many interrelated, typical engineering disciplines
2
 are worked in an 
integrated engineering process simultaneoulsy. However, RAMS management and systems 
engineering among the railway engineering disciplines have been mostly tacit engineering 
disciplines in spite of the high requirements and expectations of the railway industry. 
Although RAMS management has been implemented in the railway engineering project, it 
was highly dependant on the individual and organisational experience, perception and know-
how. The RAMS management has not implemented systematic approach to railway systems 
engineering. Therefore, due to such railway situations RAMS management cannot help 
including many challenges and problems to be improved (Carretero et al., 2003).  
Several examples which was failed in the introduction of RAMS management into railway 
systems engineering have existed in the various lines of the railway projects. Some of the 
reasons why RAMS management was problematic or failed were down to technical issues in 
essence, but, as a matter of fact, the majority of the reasons were confirmed from the railway 
organisations that implement RAMS management (Carretero et al., 2003). RAMS 
management supports the operational decision making, such as availability, safety and cost 
effecctiveness, of the railway systems engineering. Accordingly, the introduction of systems 
                                                          
2. Mechanical, Electrical, Electronics, Civil and Software Engineering 
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engineering in the railway project is essential to implement RAMS management. However, 
RAMS management have not been completely integrated into the railway systems 
engineering project or even it have not been included. Therefore, the introduction of systems 
engineering in a railway project is a prerequiste condition for the implementation of RAMS 
management (Fiet, 2010; Morfis, 2009). 
Railway organisations should have formal processes for sharing and assessing information 
and data related to railway risks to enable the implementation of RAMS management timely 
and to avoid the repeated management activities. However, the information and data related to 
railway risks are not processed into information sources by appropriate methods and most of 
which are also statistically inadequate. In particular, the risk information and data related to 
human errors and their assessment techniques are not yet established. The data and 
information sources are not systematically collected in the perspective of system engineering 
and RAMS management (An, 2005; Valkokari et al., 2012).  
RAMS management requires the knowledge of system sciences and engineering, appled in the 
stages of the system life cycle. It currently demands the adequate perception of risk and 
systems approach. Furthermore, systems thinking and life cycle management are also 
essential for RAMS management. However, these are not included in the RAMS mangement. 
Customers have had difficulty in expressing their requirements, for example, availability and 
safety of the system and its life cycle, based on the accurate numerical values where possible. 
Also, on occasions, suppliers have not provided the precise technical RAMS design criteria 
(Blanchard, 2012; Valkokari et al., 2012). 
These challenges and problems that have affected RAMS management call for a more 
coherent and structured approach for the systems engineering and RAMS management. 
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Therefore, it is essential to develop a model for a new approach of RAMS management which 
satisfies the needs and expectations of the railway organisations.  
2.2.2   Research Questions 
Three research questions are discussed based on the challenges and problems as stated in 
Section 2.2.1. These questions purport to seek the theoretical backgrounds that are essential to 
the  research subjects. 
Difficulties in designing RAMS characteristics, such as reliability, availability, 
maintainability and safety, into the system product property, have been lessoned from  other 
industries because there is very little literature reporting the reasons for such difficulties. 
Knowledge of the system sciences and engineering is a fundamental in the research project. 
On the basis of this reasoning, the first research question has been formulated as follow: 
• How can a system be realised in the systems engineering project and how can RAMS 
characteristics be designed as a design property of the system products? 
 
As a complex system which has applied many advanced technologies, railway systems 
include many hazards that may cause various failures and accidents. Accordingly, the 
appropriate risk assessment of railway hazards is a key factor when designing a safe, 
dependable and cost effective railway system. Another issue of interest in the research project 
is how to minimise or eliminate the possible threats within the acceptable range of the project, 
which affect the operational objectives. The following reasoning, the second research question 
has been formulated as follow: 
• How can all potential hazard factors that threaten the operational objectives of a 
system be defined, identified, assessed and controlled?  
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Systems RAMS is an inherent product design property of a system. The performance of 
RAMS characteristics is achieved through the system engineering design process. Thus, it is 
very important to determine the RAMS design and acceptance criteria in the railway 
engineering project. The final issue of interest in this research is to transform RAMS 
requirements and operational contexts into technical RAMS design and acceptance criteria for 
implementation of the system detailed design and/or project contract. On this basis, the 
following research question has been formulated: 
• How can the technical RAMS design and acceptance criteria be quantitatively 
specified for implementation of the system product design and project contract? 
 
2.2.3   Research Purpose and Objectives 
2.2.3.1   Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to develop a systematic approach for integrating RAMS 
management into a railway systems engineering project to successfully achieve the 
operational objectives, such as availability, safety and cost effectiveness. The methodology 
developed in this study will help railway organisations in establishing their policy, objectives, 
functions and activities for the RAMS management in the railway systems engineering 
projects. 
2.2.3.2   Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are to ensure the successful implementation of the above 
research purpose. They are:  
• To establish the concepts of systems engineering and RAMS management and 
investigate the processes, methods and techniques to effectively support RAMS 
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management as used in practice and literature; 
• To develop a systematic approach of RAMS management for railway systems 
engineering; 
• To provide the methods that define and assess all potential hazards that threaten the 
operational objectives of railway systems; 
• To provide the methods that quantitstively specify RAMS requirements and 
operational contexts into technical RAMS design and acceptance criteria; 
• To conduct a case study to demonstrate the proposed risk assessment method, and; 
• To provide recommendations for further implementation of RAMS management in 
the railway engineering project. 
 
2.3  Research Methodology 
2.3.1   Literature Review 
This research establishes a broad research foundation through the investigation, understanding 
and analysis of various literatures. The literature review should be implemented throughout 
the whole research period to obtain the consolidatory basis of the research topic and to 
continuously improve and update the quality of the research results achieved. Therefore, the 
literature survey is performed in the two perspectives: (1) preliminary literature review and (2) 
detailed literature review. 
The preliminary review has already been conducted from the early phase of this research and 
it aims for: (1) the establishment of the research topic, (2) the identification of the challenges 
and problems associated with the research topic, (3) the determination of the purpose and 
objectives of the research, (4) the establishment of the theoretical background, methods and 
techniques associated with the research subjects, (5) the development of the conceptual 
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research models, (6) the acquisition of the research information and data needed and (7) the 
identification of the gaps between the best practices recommended from various industrial 
areas and the current capacity of the industrial fields.  
The detailed literature review is carried out throughout the whole research period in order to 
sustain the followings: (1) the continuous improvement and upgrading of the developed 
conceptual research models, (2) the establishment of a deeper and wider theoretical 
background for the developed research models, (3) the prevention of the omission of 
important information related to the research subjects and (4) the continuous collection of 
advanced knowledge and information.  
The literature review have been performed through major international engineering standards, 
text books, journals and conference articles. The generic models, methods and techniques 
associated with the research subjects are explored by well-known text books and international 
engineering standards. The text books provide the detailed descriptions and guidance for the 
general science and engineering related to each system life cycle phase. The international 
engineering standards provide the international engineering trends, the defined terminologies 
and the general guidance for the application of specific engineering activities associated with 
each system life cycle phase. On the other hand, the articles and journals provide some 
specific methods and techniques which can be used at the important decision-making points 
of the specific engineering (Valkokari et al., 2012). 
2.3.2   Use of Interview Survey 
This research applies an individual interview method to identify the current issues and 
challenges related to the research subjects and to evaluate the research models developed 
through the research. Interviewing is one of the common research methods; it can find 
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research challenges and issues, collect the information and data related to the research topics, 
and lead to the solution of the research challenges and issues. Furthermore, the interview is a 
flexible method which can extract important ideas and useful opinions from interviewees 
(Bryman et al., 2007). 
Most commonly, an interview is conducted on an individual basis, but group interviews, 
mailed questionnaire or telephone survey may also be useful methods. They will be helpful to 
obtain the practical challenges, problems and detailed opinions related to the research study, 
and improve the intended research strategies by conducting interviews to collect information 
from different organisations (Kendall et al., 1992; Bryman et al., 2007). 
The research considers individual interview from railway experts, for example: researchers, 
consultants, operators and maintainers of several different railway organisations.  
2.3.3   Case Study  
This research conducts a case study to identify the current issues of railway systems and 
demonstrate the developed research models. The case study is a very useful method to 
understand the complex issues and challenges related to the research topic effectively. It can 
also expand the range of experiential know-how, background and knowledge that have been 
reported and recognised from the past data. The case study emphasizes the comprehensive 
contextual analysis of limited events, conditions and their relationships. Therefore, various 
case studies have been used across a variety of engineering disciplines (Ahamad, 2011). 
This research implements a case study to demonstrate railway risk assessment method and 
investigate operational RAMS performance and major failure causes. 
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2.4   Research Design  
This research project is step by step implemented according to the planned strategy and 
procedures as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  
              Determination of Research Methodology
  •  Problem Statement, Research Purpose and Objectives
  •  Research Definition, Framework and Methods 
                    Implementation of Literature Review
  •  Concepts of system/systems, Definition of Systems Engineering
  •  Concepts of RAMS management 
  •  Survey of RAMS management Techniques
             Development of RAMS Management Models
  •  Process Based RAMS Management Systems Model
  •  Performance Based RAMS Specification Model
  •  FMEA-FTA Based RAMS Risk Assessment Model
         Literature Review
  •  Detailed Literature Review 
  •  Current Model Analysis
Interviews
        •  Expert Opinions
Conference
• Railway Conference
Still more Improved?
Determination of Final RAMS Management Models
Case Study
(RAMS Risk Assessment Using FMEA-FTA Technique)
Conclusion and Recommendation
No
Yes
                             Definition of the Research
  • Need of RAMS, Systems Engineering and RAMS management
  • Determination of Research Subjects
 
Figure 2.1 Research Process 
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 Concepts of Systems Engineering:
 Principles of Systems Engineering Management
   Concepts of RAMS Management: 
   Principles of RAMS Risk Assessment 
 Techniques for RAMS Management
 Recent RAMS Management Models 
and Other Engineering Discipline Management Models
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Literature Review
Identification of Research Objectives
Analysis of  RAMS Management 
Models reviewed
Development of Conceptual RAMS 
Management Models
Empirical Work
Modification of  RAMS Management Models
Interviews with  Railway Engineers in the Railway Industry
Case Study for applying RAMS Risk Assessment
Paper 1
Paper 2
Publications
Paper 3
Development Work
 
Figure 2.2 Research Plan  
Figure 2.1 describes the research process that will be performed through the whole research 
period. The process consists of five phases: (1) the definition of the research, such as research 
subjects, research purpose and objectives and research methodology, (2) the establishment of 
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research issues through literature review, interview, survey etc., (3) the development of 
conceptual research models, (4) the evaluation of research results through literature review, 
interview and conferences and (5) the continuous improvement of research results.  
Figure 2.2 describes the plan that will implement the research project during the entire 
research period. This research is conducted in the four areas: literature review, model 
development, empirical work and publications. The literature review focuses on the 
establishment of theoretical fundamentals associated with the research subjects. The 
development work concentrates on the development and continued improvement of the 
research models to meet the research objectives. Finally, the empirical work focuses on the 
finding of the solutions and identifying the gaps related to the issues of the research subjects. 
2.5   Summary 
This chapter has presented the research methodology adopted to perform the research project 
effectively and efficiently.   
Firstly, this research was defined through a survey of the current challenges and problems 
related to the introduction of RAMS management into railway systems engineering. In the 
survey, the major challenges and problems confirmed the needs of RAMS management for 
railway systems engineering in the management perspective. The problems and challenges are 
based on the development of the research questions, which are reflected in the establishment 
of the research purpose and objectives.  
RAMS management and railway systems engineering are relatively new engineering 
disciplines in the railway industry. Hence the industrial and organisational approach for 
finding out the issues, challenges and solutions related to the research subjects are greatly 
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limited. Therefore, the planned research methods to resolve such a problem were presented 
and their application method was described in detail.  
Finally, this chapter has presented the research process and plan to conduct the research 
project step by step. This research is performed over a long period of time. Therefore, the 
research process and plan will be upgraded and improved for the effective achievement of the 
research objectives. As mentioned above, RAMS management in the railway industry is a 
relatively new engineering discipline and the industrial approach of the RAMS management 
may be greatly limited. Therefore, it is anticipated that the research methodology will be 
modified and updated continuously.  
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Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Railway RAMS is an inherent system product property that affects the overall quality of a 
defined rail traffic service. The RAMS performance needed for the achievement of the 
operational objectives of a system can be achieved through the successful integration of 
RAMS characteristics into the product design of the system. Accordingly, railway systems 
engineering, to design the optimal RAMS characteristics at the system concept design phase, 
is essential for the successful implementation of RAMS management. Therefore, this chapter 
firstly discusses the definitions of system, systems and systems engineering, and the concepts 
of systems engineering management to establish a fundamental engineering basis of RAMS 
management (Vintr et al., 2007; BS EN 60300-3-15, 2007). 
Railway system is a mission and safety critical system. Therefore, to achieve the operational 
objectives of a railway system, all possible potential hazards that affect the railway system 
must be defined, identified, assessed and controlled through RAMS management from the 
system concept design stage throughout the system life cycle phases. The concept of risk is 
defined for an effective risk assessment and the resultant risk assessment is the basis of 
RAMS management. Thus, this chapter reviews the concepts of risk based RAMS 
management and also investigates the various methods and techniques to implement the 
RAMS management (Pasqual et al., 2003; BS EN 50126-1, 1999).  
This chapter consists of five sections to provide an extensive literature review. Section 3.2 
presents the concepts and principles associated with systems engineering, followed by Section 
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3.3, which reviews the concept and principle of systems RAMS management and risk 
assessment. Section 3.4 investigates the various techniques for implementation of RAMS 
management. Subsequently Section 3.5 finally provides a summary of this chapter. 
3.2   Concept of Systems Engineering Management 
Systems engineering forms a foundation for the design and development of a system. RAMS 
management is a branch engineering discipline of the systems engineering. Therefore, the 
RAMS management is implemented as an integrated part of systems engineering (BS EN 
60300-3-15, 2003). This section firstly reviews the concept of systems engineering in the 
management aspect to establish a theoretical background of RAMS management.  
3.2.1   History of Systems Engineering 
The term ‘system’ derives from the Greek ‘sustēma’, which means ‘with set up’ or ‘with an 
organised whole’ (Blanchard, 2012). The Oxford dictionary (2012) defines the system as “a 
set of things that work together as part of a mechanism; a complex whole, a set of principles 
or procedures when something is done; an organized scheme or method.” The concept of the 
system has been applied to many engineering disciplines, related to the large, complex 
mission and/or safety critical systems. 
The field of natural science firstly applied ‘the concept of system’ in the 19th century in terms 
of the proposal of Nicolas Leonard Sadi Carnot (1796-1832), a French physician. On the other 
hand, the science and engineering field started the wider application of the system concept by 
‘General system theory,’ published by Bertalanffy in 1945. The general system theory has 
been applied subsequently as a principle that designs and develops a system (Elphick, 2010; 
Blanchard, 2012).  
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The Bell Company in the United States first deployed ‘the principles of systems engineering’ 
to develop ‘systems operability’ in the 1940s. The principle of systems engineering has been 
applied to many industries in an effort to improve the competitiveness and to solve the 
complexity and uncertainty of a system due to the introduction of advanced technology and 
management. Above all, the successful implementation of ‘the Apollo Spaceship Project’ in 
the 1960s provided a big opportunity for the worldwide application of the systems 
engineering principle. Many railway organisations have been attempted the application of the 
systems engineering since the 1980s, but it is still in the infant stage (Kossiakoff et al., 2011).  
3.2.2   Definition of Systems Engineering 
The concept ‘system and systems’ are the major principles of systems engineering and RAMS 
in the technical and management aspect (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). 
3.2.2.1   Definition of System 
There are many definitions of the term ‘system’ in the international standards and literature, 
but these definitions have some differences in the expressive degrees. The following three 
definitions are provided to clarify the understanding of the considerable differences between 
them as below: 
System (BS ISO 9000, 2005) is “a combined set in which organised system elements 
interact to achieve the stated objective.” 
System (Hasikins et al., 2007) is “an integrated set of system elements, for example, 
subsystems, components or assemblies, which achieve a defined objective. These 
elements include products (hardware, software and firmware), processes, people, 
information, techniques, facilities, services and other support elements.” 
System (Kapurch, 2010) is “a constructed set of many different elements to create the 
desired results together, which cannot be achieved by the individual elements. The 
- 29 - 
 
system elements can include people, hardware, software, facilities, polices and 
documents, namely, all things that are required to obtain the desired results in the 
system level. The results of the system level include system qualities, properties, 
characteristics, functions, behaviour and performance. The value as a whole or system 
level, contributed by the independent elements, is primarily created by the relationship 
and interaction among the elements; that is, it is very important how they are 
interconnected.” 
3.2.2.2   Definition of Systems 
The term ‘systems’ is an enlarged concept of the above ‘system’ as a major approach of the 
management aspect; it is often called the ‘system of system’ or ‘system of systems’. Recently, 
the concept of the systems has been applied as the principle of the systems engineering in the 
management aspect; it has been applied to the management of the large, complex systems that 
are made up of many independent subsystems and/or components, for instance, an aircraft 
system and a railway system (BS ISO/IEC 15288, 2002; Clark, 2008; Blanchard, 2012). 
In general, customers have required the application of the systems concept as an ‘acceptance 
criteria’ of the system being designed and developed, while system suppliers have applied it to 
develop ‘technical design criteria’ of the system. The systems concept is defined through the 
investigation of the operational behaviour and interface for the successful mission criteria of a 
system, for example, mission profiles, performance, availability, safety, cost etc. However, the 
two concepts of system and systems are not any difference in the technical aspect, but the 
systems concept is very important in the management aspect of systems engineering (Clark, 
2008). Three different definitions of the term ‘systems’ are provided to clearly understand: 
Systems (Despton, 2007) is “an organized complex unity that is assembled from 
dispersed, highly co-operating autonomous systems – each of which is capable of 
operating independently.”  
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Systems (Blanchard, 2012) is “a collection of system elements that produce results 
unachievable by an individual system. The individual system in the systems structure is 
likely to be operational in its own right, as well as be contributing in the 
accomplishment of some higher-level mission requirement. The life cycles of the 
individual systems may vary somewhat as there will be additions and deletions at 
different times, as long as the mission requirements for any given system are met. Thus, 
there may be some new developments in progress at the same time as other elements are 
being retired for disposal.” 
Systems (BS ISO/IEC 15288, 2002) is “a man-made, created and utilized to provide 
services in the defined environments for the benefit of users and other stakeholders. 
These systems may be configured with one or more of the following: hardware, software, 
humans, processes (e.g., review process), procedures (e.g., operator instructions), 
facilities and naturally occurring entities (e.g., water, organisms, minerals). In practice, 
they are thought of as products or services. The perception and definition of a 
particular system, its architecture and its system elements, depend on an observer’s 
interests and responsibilities; one person’s system of interest can be viewed as a system 
element in another person’s system element of interest. Conversely, it can be viewed as 
being part of the environment of operation for another person can be viewed as being.” 
Elphick (2010) classifies the hierarchy of a railway system into three levels in the systems 
perspective as below and BS EN 50126-1 (1999) describes the aspects of system, subsystems 
and components under consideration of the system level approach as shown in Figure 3.1. 
However, the definition of the system, subsystem and component can be changeable under 
different considerations as shown in Figure 3.1: 
 Level 1: A subsystem, which is defined substantially within one engineering 
discipline, for example, a driving gear box, an air conditioning, a bogie etc.; 
 Level 2:  A system, which includes two or more engineering disciplines, for example, 
a rolling stock, an electrical power supply, a signalling etc. and; 
 Level 3: Systems, which affects or is impacted by many disciplines and economics, 
social or environmental factors, for example, a railway system as total system. 
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Figure 3.1 Systems Level Approach (BS EN 50126-1, 1999) 
3.2.2.3   Definition of Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering is an important principle to develop the ‘technical design criteria’ of a 
system in the system concept design phase. There are many different definitions related to the 
systems engineering in the international engineering standards and literature. The below three 
different definitions are given to help the complete understanding of the systems engineering: 
Systems Engineering (MIL-STD-499B, 1994) is “the application of scientific and 
engineering efforts to: 
• Transform an operational need into a description of system performance 
parameters and a system configuration through the use of an iterative process of 
definition, synthesis, design, test and evaluation; 
• Integrate related technical parameters and ensure compatibility of all physical, 
functional and program interfaces in a manner that optimises the total system 
definition and design and; 
 
• Integrate reliability, maintainability, safety, survivability, human engineering and 
- 32 - 
 
other factors into the total engineering effort to meet cost, schedule, 
supportability and technical performance objectives.” 
 
Systems Engineering (Hasikins et al., 2007) is “a discipline that concentrates on the 
design and application of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves 
looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facts and all the 
variables and relating the social to the technical aspect.” 
Systems Engineering (BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007) is “an interdisciplinary approach and 
means to enable the realisation of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer 
needs and required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting 
requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while 
considering the complete problem. Systems engineering considers both the business and 
the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a quality of the product 
that meets the user needs.” 
From the definitions of systems engineering, Kossiakoff et al. (2011) describes the difference 
between the systems engineering and the traditional engineering discipline (e.g., mechanical, 
electrical, civil engineering etc.) as below: 
Systems engineering: 
• is concentrated on the system as a whole;  
• is focused on the customer requirements and operational contexts;  
• provides the conceptual design of a system, and;  
• takes the role as a bridge between traditional engineering disciplines.  
 
Moreover, systems engineering is applied as an integral part of a project, which plans and 
guides the overall activities of systems engineering (Daup, 2001). Therefore, systems 
engineering is sometimes called systems engineering project or systems engineering 
management. 
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3.2.3   Concept of System Life Cycle 
System life cycle is a very important concept in the systems engineering. A system life cycle 
includes the various activities that are required from the defined sequential stages from the 
concept to retirement as Table 3.1. Every system, regardless of its type or size, follows a 
defined life cycle stage. The life cycle consists of the sequential stages, as described in Table 
3.1, which cover the whole life of a system and typically provide a framework that plans, 
assesses, controls, monitors and reviews all activities for engineering a system. Therefore, 
systems engineering focuses on integrating the system life cycle functions. Table 3.1 shows 
system life cycle stages and functions that are typically used in the systems engineering 
management (BS ISO/IEC 15288, 2002; Blanchard, 2012; Hasikins et al., 2007).  
Table 3.1 System Life-cycle Stage (From BS ISO/IEC 15288, 2007) 
Life-cycle 
stages 
Purpose Decision gates 
Concept  
 To confirm customer’s needs and expectations. 
 To examine concepts. 
 To propose viable system solutions. 
Decision Options: 
 Conduct next stage 
 Continue this stage 
 Go to a preceding 
stage 
 Hold project 
activity 
 Terminate project 
Design & 
Development 
 To define system requirements. 
 To develop system solution description. 
 To build system products. 
 To verify and validate system products. 
Production 
 To produce system products. 
 To inspect and test (to verify system products). 
Operation  To operate system to meet customer’s needs. 
Support 
 To provide the sustained capability of the 
system. 
Retirement  To store, archive or dispose of the system 
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3.2.4   Concept of Systems Engineering Management 
Systems engineering can be conducted successfully, not only through the achievement of the 
technical knowledge, but also through that of the management. The establishment of an 
appropriate organisational environment together with the effective and efficient management 
structures are essential criteria for the successful implementation of systems engineering, and 
it assures the development of the optimal technical design and acceptance criteria which 
satisfy the customer’s needs and expectations of a system (Blanchard, 2012).  
In general, the role of systems engineering management is for the complete integration of the 
following three engineering activities: (1) the control of the baselines in each design and 
development phase, (2) the implementation of the system engineering process and (3) the 
integration of the major system life cycle functions. Figure 3.2 provides the interrelationship 
between the systems engineering management activities, which are a basis of systems 
engineering management and RAMS management (Daup, 2001). 
 
Design & Development 
Phase
Systems Engineering 
Process
Baseline Systems 
Engineering 
Management
Life cycle 
Integration
Life cycle 
Plan
Integrated 
Team
 
Figure 3.2 Systems Engineering Management Activities (From Daup, 2001)  
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3.2.4.1 Control of Design and Development Phase  
The control of the baseline in the design and development phase is an important role of 
systems engineering management. In general, a system is designed and developed 
progressively through several design phases; the design results are controlled in the allocated 
baseline phase as shown in Figure 3.3.  
Design Definition
Design Definition
Design Definition
 
Figure 3.3 Baseline Controls of Design and Development Phase (From Daup, 2001) 
The system concept phase creates the concepts of a system to design and develop; it is often 
called the feasibility study phase. The system definition phase provides a description for the 
requirements in terms of the system functions and performances and it consists of a functional 
baseline as shown in Figure 3.3. Finally, the preliminary and detailed design phases produce a 
set of the subsystem and component architectures, including the performance characteristics 
and design description of the system products. The preliminary design phase comprises the 
allocation baseline and the detailed design phase forms the product baseline. Each baseline is 
a management control point of systems engineering (MIL-STD-499B, 1994).  
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3.2.4.2   Implementation of Systems Engineering Process  
Systems engineering conducts the management through a technical engineering process to 
give an effective solution to the problems that are required for the successful development of 
a system. The technical engineering process can apply to all stages of the design and 
development; its major functions are described below (Daup, 2001). 
Systems engineering process takes the following three roles of: 
• Transforming system requirements into the system design solutions and process 
descriptions; 
• Producing information and resources required for decision making, and; 
• Providing input for the next design and development phase. 
 
Requirement Analysis
Functional Analysis & 
Allocation
Design Synthesis
System Analysis
 & Control
Verfication
Process Input
Process Input
Requirement Loop
Design Loop
 
 
Figure 3.4 Systems Engineering Process (From MIL-STD-499B, 1994) 
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There are many kinds of systems engineering process models in the different international 
standards (for example, MIL-STD-499B, EIA 632, IEEE 1220, ISO/IEC 15288 etc.) and 
literature. Figure 3.4 describes a process model, published as a military standard of MIL-
STD-499B (1994). The systems engineering process has basic three functions: (1) 
requirement analysis, (2) functional analysis and allocation and (3) design synthesis. Each 
process phase is conducted through the activities of definition, identification, analysis, 
evaluation, control and verification as shown in Figure 3.4.  
The process is iteratively implemented by two process loops, such as requirement loop and 
design loop. Each process phase includes the verification or validation activities to verify the 
successful achievement of input as illustrated in Figure 3.4. The detailed description of the 
systems engineering process and its activities will be provided in Chapter 4.  
3.2.4.3   Integration of Life Cycle Functions 
Another role of the systems engineering management is to integrate all functions required 
throughout the entire life cycle period of a system into the systems engineering process to 
resolve effectively all possible problems that may be caused in the system life cycle period. 
Daup (2001) provides the eight primary functions of the system life cycle to be integrated into 
the systems engineering process. The eight primary functions of the system life cycle are: (1) 
design and development, (2) manufacturing, (3) deployment, (4) operation, (5) support, (6) 
disposal, (7) training and (8) verification. 
3.2.5   Evolution of Systems Engineering Standards 
There are many systems engineering standards, which have developed in the military and 
commercial sectors. Due to the development of many systems engineering standards, system 
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engineers may sometimes have a difficulty when selects a useful standard as the basis for the 
design and development of a system.  
Systems engineering standard was first developed and published by the US Military. After the 
first standard, “MIL-STD- 499 (1969) – Engineering Management,” was published by the US 
Military, several standards were developed in the commercial areas as described in Figure 3.5. 
The first standard was twice revised in 1974 (MIL-STD-499A) and 1994 (MIL-STD-499B). 
However, the MIL-STD-499B was revised in 1994, but it was not formally published. 
However, the principle and concept of the MIL-STD-499B were succeeded by the following 
three commercial standards: IEEE-1220 (1995), EIA 632 (1998), and EIA/IS-632 (1999) as 
depicted in Figure 3.5. Recently, the EIA/IS-632 and IEEE 1220 have been harmonized as a 
single concept, based on the ISO/IEC 15288 (2008) (Shead et al., 1994, 2001; Martin, 1998; 
EIA, 1994).  
EIA 632
Systems Engineering
EIA-ANSI 632
Processes for 
Engineering a System
IEEE 1220
Application A management of 
Systems Engineering Process
ISO 15288
Systems Engineering 
Life Cycle Process
MIL STD 499B
Systems Engineering
MIL STD 499A
Engineering Management
MIL STD 499
Engineering Management
 
Figure 3.5 Evolution of Systems Engineering Standards 
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3.3. Concept of Systems RAMS Management 
3.3.1   History of Systems RAMS Management 
Systems RAMS is an enlarged engineering discipline that was originated from the concepts of 
safety and reliability. The concept of reliability and safety were firstly introduced by the 
aerospace industry in the 1930s. Due to the application of the statistical techniques in the 
system failure analysis, the safety and reliability became a significant engineering discipline 
of the aerospace system in the 1950s (An, 2005; Ebeling, 2010).  
The safety and reliability engineering were introduced to assess product failure and human 
errors. ‘Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)’ is the first technique for reliability and 
safety assessment, developed in the 1940s. The Boeing Company further updated the FMEA 
in the 1960s as ‘Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)’ added ‘Criticality 
analysis (CA)’. The CA reinforces the quantitative safety assessment through the analysis of 
single point failures, which directly affect systems safety (Nicholls, 2005). 
In the 1970s, many advanced assessment techniques related to safety and reliability risk were 
developed in the aeronautical field, such as ‘Event Tree Analysis (ETA)’, ‘Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA)’ and ‘Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)’. These techniques have been 
variously applied to many different industries, for instance, oil and gas, chemicals, railway etc. 
(An, 2005; Ericson, 2005). 
Systems RAMS management has been adopted with the introduction of availability and 
maintainability concepts for safety and reliability, and the development of systems 
engineering since the early 1980s; it is achieved through the definition, assessment and 
control of all hazards that adversely affect the whole system, especially it was applied to the 
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mission and safety critical systems. The systems RAMS management has developed as a 
distinct discipline of systems engineering since the early 1990s; it requires the established 
engineering concepts, methods, techniques, measurable parameters and mathematical tools 
(Villemeur, 1992; BS EN 50126-1, 1999).  
In particular, railway organisations have applied RAMS management to achieve the systems 
safety, availability and cost-effectiveness in the management aspect of system’s long term 
operation. The application of RAMS managment for railway systems engineering has been 
started from the US railway industry since the early 1980s, while the European railway has 
been applied it since the early 1990s, with the alteration of the contract scheme due to the 
introduction of systems engineering to railway project (BS EN 50126-1, 1999; Krri, 2007).  
Railway RAMS management was firstly standardised by the European Committee for 
Electrical Standardisation (CENELEC) in 1999. The standard was subsequently adopted as an 
international standard, IEC 62278, of railway RAMS management in 2002, and its family 
standards: BS EN 50128 (2009) and BS EN 50129 (2003), were also published by the 
CENELEC. These standards have played a great important role in many global railway 
projects (BS EN 50126-1, 1999; Krri, 2007). 
3.3.2   Definition of Systems RAMS Management 
BS EN 50126-1 (1999) and Ucla et al. (2000) define systems RAMS management in the 
following three aspects as shown in Figure 3.6: (1) the definition of four RAMS 
characteristics to achieve RAMS requirements and operational contexts, (2) the assessment 
and control of all potential threats which adversely affect the achievements of RAMS 
requirements and (3) the provision of the means to achieve the systems RAMS requirements.   
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Figure 3.6 Concept of Systems RAMS Management (From Ucla et al., 2000) 
Systems RAMS management defines four characteristics: reliability, availability, 
maintainability and safety as an inherent system product design property to ensure the 
successful accomplishment of the operational objectives of system. BS EN 50126-1 (1999) 
and Milutinović and Lucanin (2005) provide the general interrelation between systems RAMS 
characteristics under the operational objectives as shown in Figure 3.7.  
Availabilty Safety
Reliability & 
Maintainability
Operation & 
Maintenance
Systems RAMS
 
Figure 3.7 Systems RAMS Element Framework (From Milutinović and Lucanin, 2005) 
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Reliability characteristic represents the ability that a system can perform its intended function 
over a given time without any defined failure. Maintainability is a system characteristic that 
designs the ease of maintenance within the structure of a system. Availability characteristic 
means the ability to operate a system at the starting point of the required mission whenever 
required by operator. Finally, safety is a system design characteristic to provide freedom from 
unacceptable risks with regard to operation, maintenance, person, environment and equipment. 
The reliability and maintainability characteristics are determined by the system or operational 
availability and/or safety requirements as product design performance characteristics, while 
the availability and safety are achieved by the reliability and maintainability characteristics as 
shown in Figure 3.7 (Milutinović and Lucanin, 2005).  
Systems RAMS management defines, assesses and controls all potential threats to a system: 
such as faults, errors and failures. The potential threats may occur from three sources, such as, 
system, operation and maintenance conditions. These factors are applied as an important input 
of RAMS management process, together with their effects, especially the input for their risk 
assessment (BS EN 50126-1, 1999; Lundteigen et al., 2009).  
Systems RAMS management finally provides the means for the management, such as fault 
prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting, as shown in Figure 3.6, in 
order to achieve the intended operational objectives. The means directly relates to the control 
of the threatening factors affecting the RAMS performance. Railway RAMS management in 
EN BS 50126-1 (1999) are based on the concept of precautions to minimize the possibility of 
impairment. The precaution is a combination of prevention and protection, but the prevention 
should be preferred to the protection in the RAMS management of a railway system (BS EN 
50126-1, 1999). 
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Systems RAMS management is a process that implements the followings: (1) the informed 
decision of strategic direction of RAMS management policy, (2) the effective control of 
RAMS management functions and (3) the coordination of all RAMS management activities. 
The RAMS management is also performed, based on cost effectiveness, system effectiveness, 
risk and environmental impacts and project. The RAMS management of railway system will 
be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 (Vintr et al., 2007; BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007). 
For the effective systems engineering, railway RAMS management supports the following 
five activities (BS EN 50126-1, 1999; Lundteigen et al., 2009):  
• Defining  RAMS requirements; 
• Assessing and controlling all threats to railway RAMS; 
• Planning and implementing RAMS tasks; 
• Achieving the compliance of RAMS requirements and; 
• Conducting on-going monitoring and review. 
 
3.3.3   Systems RAMS Risk Assessment 
As mentioned above, risk assessment is a core part of RAMS management as well as systems 
engineering (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). Therefore, this section reviews the concept of systems 
risk and its risk assessment.  
3.3.3.1   Definition of Risk 
Risk is defined by the consequence of a hazard (or a failure mode). Risk assessment is a basis 
for implementing RAMS management and a core part of the RAMS management process (BS 
EN 50126-1, 1999):  
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Below are two definitions for the risk: 
• “Risk is the combination of two elements of the expected frequency of occurrence of 
consequence (loss) of a hazard and the degree (severity) of the consequence.” (BS EN 
50126-1, 1999). 
• “Risk is the likelihood that a hazard will actually cause its adverse effects, together 
with a measure of the effects.” (Chen, 2012). 
 
In general, the following basic four elements are required to define risk qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Figure 3.8 describes the relationship of these four elements (BS EN 31010, 
2008): 
• A potential root hazard causes (or failure causes); 
• A hazard (or a failure mode); 
• consequences (or failure effects) and;  
• A probability of occurrence (or failure consequences). 
 
 
Consequence 1
Consequence 2
Hazard 
(system level)Cause (system level)
Cause 
(Subsystem level)
Causes
Boundary of the system under 
consideration
Consequences
Hazard (level of system under 
consideration)
 
Figure 3.8 Concepts for Risk Definition (From BS EN 50129, 2003) 
- 45 - 
 
3.3.3.2   Definition of Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a process that defines, identifies, analyses and evaluates a risk qualitatively, 
quantitatively and/or both. The risk assessment generally attempts to answer the following 
four fundamental questions (Chen, 2012; BS EN 31010, 2008): 
• What can happen and why (by identifying risk)? 
• What are the failure effects (by defining severity of the consequence)? 
• How likely is it to happen (by defining frequency of occurrence of a failure)? 
• What is the level of risk? Is the risk tolerable or acceptable and is any further control 
required (by applying risk assessment techniques)? 
In order to answer the above questions, a system must be examined to define, identify, 
analyse and evaluate all potential hazards and their situations by a process as described in 
Figure 3.9 (An, 2005).  
 
Problem Definition
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Figure 3.9 Risk Assessment Process (From An, 2005) 
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Risk assessment provides a comprehensive understanding for risks, and their causes, 
consequences and likelihoods (or probabilities) to support the decision making of systems 
RAMS management. The risk assessment also provides the following five factors to ensure 
the successful implementation of RAMS management (BS EN 31010, 2008):  
• Selection between various options with different risks; 
• Determination of risk priorities for decision making of risk management options; 
• Selection of appropriate risk management strategies; 
• Determination of the risk activity to undertake and; 
• Determination of the risk levels to be controlled. 
 
3.3.4    Risk Assessment Methods 
Risk assessment fulfils the purpose of the intended risk assessment and the determination of 
the risk level of details required through the use of the information, data and resources that are 
collected. The risk assessment method can be classified into two groups: general and specific 
group. The general group can fall into three broad categories: qualitative, quantitative and 
semi-quantitative assessment by the analytical circumstances, data and resources. The specific 
group can be categorised by the analytical directions of the system design process, which are 
top-down and bottom-up assessment. The top-down assessment can be applied in the 
functional design phase and the bottom-up assessment can be applied for the physical product 
design stage (An, 2005; BS ISO 13824, 2008; BS EN 31010, 2008).  
3.3.4.1   General Risk Assessment Methods 
In the design phase of systems engineering, qualitative assessment methods are often used as 
a preliminary risk assessment to obtain the general level of the identified risk, and to identify 
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and estimate all of possible potential risks. However, the qualitative assessment may be a 
necessary phase to undertake a semi-quantitative or complete quantitative risk assessment of 
the risks identified in each design process phase of systems engineering. For example, FMEA 
is a representative technique for the qualitative risk assessment (An, 2005; BS EN 60300-3-1, 
2004). 
A qualitative assessment is suitable for identifying all of possible failure effects and 
suggesting safety monitoring and safety functions in the functional (subsystem) design phase. 
Such a qualitative approach, instead of using quantitative data, may use some linguistic ranges 
to evaluate the frequency and the severity of the failure consequences. In general, four ranges, 
for example ‘catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible’, may be generally used to classify 
the failure severity, and five ranges, for example, ‘frequent, probable, occasional, remote and 
improbable’, can be applied for the failure frequency (An et al., 2006; MIL-STD-882D, 2000).  
A semi-quantitative risk assessment is very similar to the above qualitative assessment 
method, but a more expanded ranking scale can be applied, compared to the qualitative 
assessment. It includes most of the advantages of the quantitative methods. However, such an 
approach may be not as accurate as quantitative methods. If complete quantitative value is not 
available, the index parameters using risk assessment metrics, such as FMECA to transform 
the qualitative concepts into quantitative measures, can be applied. FMECA is a 
representative semi-quantitative risk assessment method (An et al., 2002; Chen, 2012).  
A quantitative risk assessment method aims to provide system and RAMS designers with the 
quantified measures to determine the alternatives of a system design solutions. The quantified 
values have great advantages in applying, understanding and comparing risks. However, the 
quantitative assessment method requires the data and techniques for the statistical analysis. 
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The application of the quantitative method requires the deeper understanding for the system to 
design and the more detailed information that can further improve the system design. Fault 
tree analysis (FTA) and Event tree analysis (ETA) are the representative techniques of the 
quantitative risk assessment (An et al., 2011).  
3.3.4.2   Specific Risk Assessment Methods 
The top-down and bottom-up risk assessment methods are applied to identify and analyse the 
consequence scenarios of failure effect. The selection of the method is dependent on the data 
and information available, the indenture level of risk assessment, the complexity of the 
interrelation of the components and subsystems comprising the system to assess, and the level 
of the system’s technical innovation (BS EN 60300-3-4, 2008; BS EN 31010, 2008).  
Figure 3.10 is a top-down risk assessment process that identifies the root failure causes from 
the past failure data, whilst the further continued risk assessment for the intended lower level 
is required to define the hierarchy of failure causes. The top-down risk assessment is 
continued until all root failure causes are completely identified. Both the qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessment can be applied to this top-down assessment, but it requires the 
deeper knowledge and many experiences for risk assessment. FTA is a typical top-down risk 
assessment method (An, 2005; BS EN 60300-3-4, 2008; Chen 2012). 
A bottom-up approach for the risk assessment is described in Figure 3.11. It is an inductive 
risk assessment method, which requires the detailed breakdown of a system to identify all 
possible failure modes. The failure modes are identified from the bottom level to the top level, 
and then the severity evaluation for the failure consequence and its frequency evaluation of 
occurrence are undertaken. The bottom-up risk assessment has the following features, 
compared with the top-down assessment (An, 2005): 
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• It can analyse precise failure modes and their causes; 
• It is easier to use a computer package, and; 
• It is appropriate for the risk assessment of the large, complex scale systems. 
Identify the data and information
Apply to the relevant system
Choose the top events
Identify the cause leading to 
the top events
Risk Evaluation
Monitoring and Review
 
Figure 3.10 A Top-down Risk Assessment Process (From An, 2005) 
 
Problem Definition
Risk Identification from component to 
system level
Risk Estimation from component to 
system level
Risk Evaluation
Monitoring and Review
 
Figure 3.11   A Bottom-up Risk Assessment Process (From An, 2005)  
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3.3.4.3   Data Collection for Risk Assessment 
Data for risk assessment can be obtained from appropriate information sources. The most 
common information sources and types can be used to estimate risk probability. The 
information can be collected from the following sources (BS EN 31010, 2008): 
• Past failure/accident records (field data); 
• Practice and relevant data (incident data); 
• Experiments and prototypes;  
• Engineering or other models, and; 
• Specialist and expert judgement (expert opinion). 
 
3.3.4.4 Selection of Risk Assessment Technique 
BS EN 31010 (2008) and BS EN 60300-3-4 (2008) provide the methods that select risk 
assessment technique in the following two aspects: risk assessment process phase and factors 
affecting risk level. Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3 are summarised for the results estimated for the 
eight typical risk assessment techniques and they are referred from BS EN 31010 (2008) and 
BS EN 60300-3-4 (2008). Table 3.2 provides the applicability of the typical risk assessment 
techniques in the risk assessment process. Table 3.3 explains that of the typical techniques by 
the three factors affecting the risk level of a system. 
 
 
 
 
- 51 - 
 
Table 3.2 Estimation of Typical Risk Assessment Techniques in Risk Assessment Process 
Types 
Risk Assessment Process 
Risk 
Identification 
Risk Analysis Risk 
Evaluation Consequence Likelihood Level of Risk 
FMEA
3
 SA SA NA NA NA 
FMECA
4
 SA SA SA SA SA 
FTA
5
 NA A A A A 
HAZOP
6
 SA SA NA NA SA 
RCM
7
 SA SA SA SA SA 
PHA
8
 SA NA NA NA NA 
ETA
9
 NA SA SA A NA 
RBD
10
 SA A A A A 
 
 NA: Not Available; SA: Selection Available; A: Available 
Table 3.3   Estimation of Typical Risk Assessment Techniques by Risk Influence Factors 
Techniques 
Relevance of influence factors 
Quantitative 
Output 
Resources & 
Capacity 
Nature & Degree of 
Uncertainty 
Complexity 
FMEA Medium Medium Medium + 
FMECA Medium Medium Medium + 
FTA High High High ++ 
HAZOP Medium High High + 
RCM Medium Medium Medium ++ 
PHA Low High Medium ± 
ETA Medium Medium Medium ++ 
RBD High High High ++ 
 
 ++: Excellent; +: Good; ±: Possible 
                                                          
3. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
4. Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
5. Fault Tree Analysis 
6. Hazard and Operability Study 
7. Reliability Centred Analysis 
8. Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
9. Event Tree Analysis 
10. Reliability Block Diagram 
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3.3.4.5   Difficulty in Risk Assessment 
Many risk assessment techniques have been developed and they have applied in many 
different industries. However, there are several difficulties regarding the application of risk 
assessment method and technique in the systems engineering design phase. An (2005) 
provides several difficulties of risk assessment as follows: 
• The collection of resources, data and information available are highly limited and they 
are statistically inaccurate;  
• Many threats affecting system performance have difficulty in implementing the 
mathematical modelling to assess system’s functional behaviour; 
• The quantitative risk assessment is essential in the system design analysis, but it is 
expensive and it also requires accurate data. Hence, determining the scope and depth 
of risk assessment is very difficult; 
• The quantitative risk assessment of failure consequence can involve great uncertainty 
due to inaccurate data, and; 
• The qualitative assessment requires many analytical experiences with numerous 
assumptions, estimations, opinions and judgments, but the assessment results may 
often be subjective, depending on the analysts.  
 
3.3.5   RAMS Management Standards 
Railway RAMS standards have been developed based on BS IEC 61508 series (2002 and 
2005) as shown in Figure 3.12. The BS IEC 61508 series are the representative standards for 
safety management related to the electrical/electronic systems.  
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Three railway RAMS management standards were developed by the CENELEC and they are 
based on the BS IEC 61508 series as shown in Figure 3.12. BS EN 50126-1 was first 
published in 1999 as the basic principle and application of railway RAMS management. BS 
EN 50128 is a standard for the software RAMS management of communication, signalling 
and processing systems involved a railway system and it was developed in 2008. BS EN 
50129 is a standard related to the hardware RAMS management of railway signalling system 
and it was published in 2003. These RAMS management standards have been revised every 
five year (Lundteigen et al., 2009; Nordland, 2003; Braband et al., 2003; Pasquale, 2003). 
 
Electrical/Electronic
RAMS
Railway RAMS
Railway 
software
Railway 
Communication
Railway 
Signaling
BS IEC 61508-1
BS IEC 61508-2
BS IEC 61508-3
BS IEC 61508-4
BS IEC 61508-5
BS IEC 61508-6
BS IEC 61508-7
BS EN 50126-1
BS EN 50128
BS EN 50129
BS EN 50129
 
 
 
Figure 3.12   Railway RAMS management Standards  
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3.4 Techniques for RAMS Management  
This section reviews several important RAMS management techniques, which have been 
developed to support RAMS management process effectively. 
3.4.1   Functional Analysis  
Functional analysis (FA) is an essential technique to understand and design the desired system 
performance and critical functions. It is necessary to perform the FA in the RAMS 
management and systems engineering. Therefore, FA is the basis and starting point of the risk 
assessment and RAMS management to analyse the functional behaviours. The objective of the 
functional analysis is to provide the main information that affects the system function and 
performance and to establish a fundamental basis for RAMS management. The FA is also 
used for specification, modelling, simulation, validation and verification. Accordingly, FA is 
often used as an important design tool to define a system’s functional structure. The 
functional analysis generally uses the following two ways:    
• Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT); 
• Functional Analysis System Technique (FAST). 
 
SADT has been used in many industrial fields. It is a diagrammatic notion designed to 
understand and describe system’s functional behaviours and interfaces. It offers the building 
blocks to represent data flow and activities, and a variety of arrows related to the building 
blocks as shown in Figure 3.13, which is an example of SADT (Rafrafi et al., 2006).  
FAST was developed by Charles Bytheway in 1964; it is also used in many industrial areas. 
The FAST can be utilised in the situations that can be functionally represented to depict the 
functions in a logic sequence, to prioritise them and to test their dependency. It is not able to 
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solve the functional problems, but it can identify the system’s essential functional 
characteristics. Figure 3.14 is an example of FAST model developed by Kaufmnan (1982). 
 
 
Figure 3.13   SADT Model (From Rafrafi et al., 2006) 
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Lower order 
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Minor logic path
Major logic path
 
Figure 3.14   FAST Model (From Kaufmnan, 1982) 
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3.4.2   Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a technique to assess the risks identified in the system 
level. The purpose of PHA is to identify all potential hazards possible, and their causal factors, 
effects and level of risks, and to control the identified hazards. The PHA is also intended to 
provide a process that assesses all possible hazards in the system definition phase and 
establishes the system requirements through the results of the PHA. Several modified PHA 
are sometimes used under different names, such as rapid risk ranking (RRR) and hazard 
identification (HAZID) (Ericson, 2005; BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007).  
PHA technique was originated by the US military in the 1960s for the safety risk assessment 
of missile system. Thereafter, it has been widely applied to many industrial fields. The PHA 
technique is generally used in the requirement analysis stage of the systems engineering 
process, namely after system boundary, interface and operational contexts are defined. The 
PHA was formally established and announced by the developers of MIL-STD-882 and it was 
orginally called a gross hazard analysis because it was conducted in the preliminary design 
phase (MIL-STD-882D, 2000). 
PHA provides an initial overview of the risks that may appear in the overall functional 
behaviour of a system. It also provides a broad risk assessment, which is usually not detailed 
or specific. However, PHA in the low risk systems is implemented for identification of total 
risks. On the other hand, in the high risk systems such as airplane and railway, the risk 
identified is prioritised to provide the full range of risk issues. The PHA can be applied to the 
concept design phase of a system as well as all subsystems and componets (Ericson, 2005; BS 
ISO/IEC 26702, 2007).  
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3.4.3   Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a safety and reliability assessment technique to 
assess all potential failure modes and their failure effects of the components comprising a 
system, which may affect the entire system performance. It also identifies how to avoid the 
failure modes and how to reduce the impacts of the failure modes. The FMEA is a technique 
that defines, identifies, prioritises and controls all potential failure modes that may include in 
the system design and manufacture phases or their process (Kim at el., 2009; Nicholls, 2005). 
Initially, FMEA was called FMECA. The ‘C’ in FMECA is an abbreviation for the criticality 
rank of the failure modes that are included in the system. However, FMEA is often regarded 
as a synonym for FMECA, but its function is completely different. In general, FMEA is used 
to rank the severity of the effects of a failure mode; whilst FMECA includes ranking the 
frequency of occurrence of the failure effects as well as their failure severity. The 
combination of the failure severity and frequency is called the criticality or risk of a system 
(MIL-STD-1629A, 1980). 
FMECA was one of the systematic techniques for the failure analysis in the system design 
process and it is applied essentially as a core part of the system design process in the large, 
complex system project. FMECA was developed by the US military in the 1950s and the first 
guideline procedure ‘Mil-P-1629’ was published in the 1950s. FMECA is the most commonly 
and widely used reliability and safety assessment technique in the system concept design 
stage to ensure that all potential failure modes have been considered (Ebleing, 2010; Ericson, 
2005). 
 FMECA can be used to determine the alternatives of the system design solutions with high 
reliability and safety risk at the conceptual design phase. It also guarantees that all possible 
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failure modes and their effects related to the mission success of the system have been referred 
and listed. FMECA can develop the testing plan and the test acceptance criteria of the system 
requirements, and it can provide a basis for the plan, functions and activities of the system 
maintenance. Finally, FMECA can give the fundamentals for the RAMS assessment (MIL-
STD-1629A, 1980; BS EN 60812, 2006).  
The following six basic questions are required to perform FMECA effectively (Moubray, 
2001): 
• How can a system fail? 
• What is the mechanism for the failure modes which occur? 
• What is the consequence of a failure mode? 
• What are the effects for the safety of a failure mode? 
• How can the failure mode be detected? 
• How can the design for a failure mode be supported? 
 
FMECA can be performed by the two analytical approach methods: bottom-up and top-down 
approach. The bottom-up approach is used for making decisions on the concept of a system. It 
is applied from each component level to the overall system level. The bottom-up approach is 
sometimes called hardware approach. On the other hand, the top-down approach is mainly 
used in the functional analysis before making decisions regarding the whole system structure. 
The analysis is focused on the functions, and the functional failures with signficant effects are 
prioritised for selecting design solutions. Although the functional approach is not a complete 
analysis, it may be used for an existing system to identify the problem areas for making 
decisions on safety functions (BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007). 
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In summary, FMECA is used for analysing: (1) Design FMECA, which is conducted to 
improve potential failure during the design process, considering all types of potential failures 
which may occur during the whole system life cycle, (2) Process FMECA, which is used for 
solving the problems which may occur in manufacture, maintenance or operation processes 
and finally (3) System FMECA, which looks for potential problems and weak points in larger 
processes. 
There are many standards for FMECA analysis, such as MIL-STD-1629A (1980), BS IEC 
60812 (2006) and SEA-J 1739 (1970), but their analysis methods are slightly different as 
shown in Figure 3.15. Table 3.4 summarise the major difference between the three standards 
in the application of failure mode to FMECA analysis. This research will apply the method of 
MIL-STD-1629A (1980) in terms of risk definition of Section 3.3.3 (Kim et al., 2009). 
SAE-J1739
FMEA
Risk Priority Number
MIL-1629A, IEC-60812
FMEA
CA
Criticality Matrix
Consequence Severity 
Ranking
Consequence Severity 
Ranking
Consequence Severity 
Ranking
Consequence Frequency
Consequence Frequency
Detection
 
Figure 3.15 Analytical Differences of FMECA Standards   
- 60 - 
 
Table 3.4 Analytical Differences of FMECA Standards  
 MIL-STD-1629A BS EN 60812 SAE–J1739 
Analysis Step 2 Levels (FMEA & CA) 1 Level (FMEA) 
Criticality Analysis Severity, Frequency Severity, Frequency, Detection 
Criticality Criticality Ranking RPN (Risk Priority Number) 
Criticality 
Determination 
Failure Mode Failure Cause 
Significance of  
Severity & Occurrence 
Frequency 
Severity 
Severity and Frequency are 
equal 
Failure effect analysis 
3 Levels (Local, 
Next & End level) 
2 Levels (Local & 
End level) 
1 Level (Failure Effect) 
 
3.4.4   Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic, deductive and symbolic logic analytical technique to 
identify, model, analyse and evaluate the conditions and factors which may cause a fault event 
(or top event), and which may affect the system performance related to safety, reliability, 
maintainability and cost. FTA can be considered as one of the most reliable techniques to 
logically assess the reliability and safety assessment of a fault event (Stamatelatos and 
Caraballo, 2002; Ericson, 2005; Andrews, 2012). 
FTA was developed by H. Watson and Allison B. Mearns in 1962, who together worked at 
the Laboratory of the US Bell Company, and the Boeing Company further applied the FTA 
technique to quantify the safety factors that affect the weapon systems. In addition, many 
industries such as the commercial aircraft industry (1960s), transportation (1990s), the 
chemical industry (1980s) and the nuclear power industry (1970s) have widely used the FTA 
technique for safety and reliability assessment (Ericson, 1999). 
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FTA focuses on a subset of all possible failure modes, in particular those that may cause 
catastrophic failure effects. The gate, events and cut sets are the major analytical elements of 
the FTA. The logical diagram, 'AND' and 'OR' gates, depicts the analytical results of the FTA. 
The failure effects show input into gates, and the cut sets represent a set of failure effects that 
can cause a system failure. FTA can be usually used as a combination of FMECA, Markov 
and Event Tree analysis (ETA) in order to overcome the limitations that FTA may have in the 
failure analysis (Stapelberg, 2008; BS EN 60812, 2006). 
FTA can be applied to all process stages of the system engineering, as an analytical technique 
for effective improvement of potential design problems included due to incomplete 
information and data related to the design details in the concept design phases. The early 
analytical activities can be extended by the increased availability of information and data. 
FTA also identifies and assesses the potential problems that may be induced from product 
design, environment or operation, manufacturing and operational and maintenance conditions 
(Muttram, 2002; BS EN 61025, 2007). 
T
X2 X3AX1
X4 X6X5
T: Rolling stock derailment
A: Track fault
X6 : Track twist  
X1 : Rolling stock faults 
X2 : Running into obstruction 
X3 : Over-speed 
X4 : Broken rail 
X5 : Bucked rail 
 
Figure 3.16   A Fault Tree Example for Rolling Stock Derailment (From Muttram, 2002). 
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Figure 3.16 depicts an example of FTA analysis on the derailment event of rolling stock. The 
top event of the fault tree is defined as “the derailment event of rolling stock” which is 
connected by one intermediate event (A) and three basic events (X1, X2, and X3) by an OR 
gate. The intermediate event shows the main causes of the top event. The three basic events 
(X4, X5, and X6) show the causes of track faults (Muttram, 2002).  
3.4.5   Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is one of the techniques that estimate the sequence of failure 
events in the consequence scenario analysis of a potential failure event. ETA uses a graphical 
logic tree model,  i.e., an event tree that represents a serious hazard, to determine whether  the 
failure event is effectively controlled by the safety systems or not. ETA may bring about 
many possible outcomes from an initiating event. It can provide a probability for each 
outcome as shown in Figure 3.17 (Ericson, 2005; BS EN 62502, 2009). 
ETA consists of a binary form of a decision tree in which multiple decision paths are 
determined as shown in Figure 3.17. ETA was published by the WASH-1400 in1974, which 
is  a nuclear plant safety study. The WASH-1400 presented that the PRA
11
 of a nuclear power 
plant could be described by the ETA; however, it would be very complex and large if it is 
constructed by the fault trees of FTA. The ETA was established as a useful technique that can 
condense the analysis into a more manageable picture, while still utilising the FTA (Ericson, 
2005). 
ETA is generally applicable for almost all types of risk assessment, but it is effectively used 
to model the accidents where multiple safeguards are in place as protective features. ETA is 
highly effective when it determines various initiating events for accidents of interest, as 
                                                          
11. Probability Risk Assessment  
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shown in Figure 3.17. An event tree is started from the establishment of an initiating event, 
such as a component failure which is caused by the increase in temperature, pressure, or the 
release of a hazardous substance. The consequences of the events follow a series of possible 
paths. Each path can be allotted by a probability of occurrence through the application of 
FTA, and the probability of all possible outcomes can be calculated as shown in Figure 3.17 
(Berrado et al., 2010; BS EN 60300-1, 2004)  
Figure 3.17 shows an ETA model that analyses the failure consequence scenarios of an event. 
The failure scenarios can be represented by the FMEA and the failure probability also can be 
assessed from the FTA analysis. This model will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Initiating Event
Pivotal Events
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Outcomes
Success (P1s)
Success (P2s)
Success (P3s)
Success  (P3s)
Fail  (P2F)
Fail  (P3F)
Fail  (P3F)
Fail  (P1F)
Initiating Event (P1E)
Outcome A
PA=(P1E)(P1S)(P2S)(P3S)
Outcome B
PB=(P1E)(P1S)(P2S)(P3F)
Outcome C
PC=(P1E)(P1S)(P2F)(P3S)
Outcome D
PD=(P1E)(P1S)(P2F)(P3F)
            Outcome E
   PE=(P1E)(P1F)
 
Figure 3.17 ETA Model (From Stapelberg, 2008) 
3.4.6   Reliability Centred Maintenance  
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) is a logically structured maintenance analysis 
technique to identify and determine the failure management policies for the achievement of 
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the operational objectives such as safety, availability and cost. The failure management 
policies generally include maintenance strategies, operational changes, design modifications 
or others to control the consequences of a failure mode. However, it focuses on the effective 
and economic maintenance policy to keep the safety and availability of a system (BS EN 
60300-3-11, 2009; Moubray, 2001).  
Until the early 1960s, all maintenance schemes, such as preventive maintenance, periodic 
replacement or overhaul, were planned and performed in terms of the constant interval, which 
were determined by the operational experience of the maintenance organisations. To resolve 
the problem, RCM programme was first developed by the commercial aviation industry, 
based on ATA MSG–3, which is an airline maintenance-planning document. RCM is now 
accepted in the wider industrial fields, such as aviation, the oil industry, railways, shipping 
etc., as a proven methodology for maintenance (Carretero at el., 2003; BS EN 50126-3, 2006). 
RCM provides a structured logical decision process to determine appropriate preventive 
maintenance policies, design improvements, or alternatives appropriate to safety, operational 
consequences, and the degradation mechanism of potential functional failures, the analysis of 
which is supported by FMECA, FTA etc. The application of RCM at the design stage is 
generally the most effective, but RCM at the operation and maintenance stages can be applied 
for the improvement of the existing maintenance policy (BS EN 60300-3-11, 2009; Blanchard 
et al., 1995). 
Figure 3.18 shows a RCM procedure that can be performed with FMECA in the system 
engineering design process. RCM is generally implemented to control the results of risk 
assessment by a preventive maintenance strategy.  
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Figure 3.18 RCM Model (From Blanchard, 2012) 
3.4.7  Hazard and Operability Study  
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) analysis is a systematic assessment technique that 
identifies and analyses potential hazards and operability problems of a system; it uses an 
organized, structured and methodical process (Ericson, 2005; Berrado et al., 2010). 
The Chemical Industry Institute of the United Kingdom formalized the HAZOP in the 1970s. 
It is widely used in many safety critical industries as well as the chemical industry. Herbert. G. 
Lawley firstly published the paper on the HAZOP technique in 1974 to give a guideline on 
how to use HAZOP in practice of hazard assessment (Ericson, 2005; BS IEC 61882, 2001). 
The HAZOP deploys several guidewords to help the analysts find what is deviated from the 
system design objective. The design deviations are identified by a questioning process using 
the guide words: ‘No or Not’, ‘More’, ‘Less’, ‘As well as’, ‘Part of’, ‘Reverse’, ‘Other than’ 
etc. as shown in Table 3.5. The guidewords take the role of stimulating imaginative thinking 
to maximize the effectiveness of the study. HAZOP is most suitable after the detailed design 
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phase in order to investigate operating problems. Table 3.5 shows an example of the 
application of HAZOP for analysing the operational problems of train doors at platforms (BS 
IEC 61882, 2001; BS EN 60300-3-1, 2004; Choi, 2008).  
Table 3.5 An example of the application of HAZOP (From Choi, 2008) 
Guideword Deviation Cause Effect 
No Doors fail to open Defective mechanism No passenger egress 
More 
Doors open too early 
(train moving or not 
adjacent to platform) 
Operator error Possible harm to passsengers 
Less Only one door open Defective mechanism 
Restricted passenger egress, 
may lead to crush injuries 
As well as 
Doors open on both 
sides of train 
Failure in control 
circuitry 
Possible harm to passengers if 
they exit the wrong door 
Part of Same as less - - 
Reverse N/A N/A  
Other than Doors open wrong side 
Failure in control 
circuitry 
Possible harm to passengers if 
they exit the wrong door 
 
3.4.8  Reliability Block Diagram  
Reliability block diagram (RBD) is a graphical analysis technique to represent the reliability 
of the system structure that is logically connected. The blocks of RBD represent the system 
success paths, which is made in various different levels for the use of qualitative analysis (e.g., 
FMEA, FTA etc.) and quantitative analysis (e.g., simple Boolean algebra techniques for 
analysing minimal cut sets and path sets) (BS EN 61078, 2006; BS EN 600300-3-1, 2004).  
RBD is directly built from the system functional diagram and systematically represents the 
functional paths. It can express many different types of system configurations, for example, 
series, parallel, redundant, standby etc. as shown in Figure 3.19. The RBD is used to analyse 
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variations and trade-offs of system performance parameters and set up models for reliability 
and availability evaluation. However, the RBD is not used for a specific fault analysis such as 
the cause and effect analysis and applied probabilistic models of system performance. Figure 
3.19 shows examples of RBD models for reliability design and assessment (BS EN 61078, 
2006; Berrado et al., 2010). 
R1 RnR2 • 
R1
Rn
R2
R2
R1
Rn
m/n
Series Model
Parallel Model
m out of n Model
SW
A
B
Standby Redundancy Model
• 
• 
 
Figure 3.19 RBD Models (From BS EN 61078, 2006) 
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3.4.9  Fuzzy Logic Analysis 
A fuzzy set (FS) is a theory that can effectively solve problems that are inaccurately defined 
and insufficiently handled information by means of a method which reinforces the cognitive 
of expert systems and controls uncertainty. The FS provides an excellent tool for decision 
making in a conflicting management environment. It can be effectively integrated into the risk 
assessment process to obtain more reliable results from highly uncertain and ambiguous 
information (An, 2005; An et al., 2011). 
The FS was developed by Lukasiewicz in the 1920s and Zadeh extended the FS into a formal 
system of mathematical fuzzy logic in 1969. It is a branch of logic which uses the degrees of 
membership in sets. Fuzzy logic defines the set of vague, linguistic terms: e.g., low risk, 
reasonable risk or high risk. These terms are not fixed with a single value, but FS theory 
provides the means by mathmatical logic (An et al., 2006). 
The two dynamic techniques, i.e. Fuzzy decision function (FDF) and fuzzy inference (FI), are 
provided for decision making and modelling as shown in Figure 3.20. The FDF is a tool 
which combines decision objectives and constraints in order to confirm the decision maker’s 
preferences. Linguistic rules provide interpretations and transparency for the FI. This 
desirable facility provides a mapping between inputs and ouputs described in the fuzzy rule-
based system. A risk assessment model through the above two fuzzy techniques is shown in 
Figure 3.20 (An et al., 2006; An et al., 2011). 
The proceeding steps of the new fuzzy risk assessment model are explained below (An, 2005): 
Step 1: Investigate and check risk related data and information; 
Step 2: Determine risk criteria;  
Step 3: Measure risk criteria; 
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Step 4: Input the risk criteria into the FDF of two main actions: fuzzification and 
            Aggregation; 
Step 5: Input the aggregated criteria into the proposed FI system, and; 
Step 6: Convert the fuzzy result into a matching crisp value (Defuzzification).  
Survey & review
Data & information
Determination of risk criteria
Measurement of risk criteria
Fuzzification
Fuzzy aggregation
Fuzzy decision 
functions
Risk magnitude
Defuzzification
Fuzzy inference
Knowledge 
bases
 
Figure 3.20 Fuzzy Logic Analysis Model (From An, 2005) 
3.4.10   RAMS Requirement Allocation 
The allocation of RAMS requirement is an essential part for design of the lower systems (i.e., 
subsystems) in the systems engineering process. The objective of the requirement allocation is 
to find the most effective physical design architecture that can achieve the RAMS 
requirements of the system level and the allocation is conducted by the analysis of the 
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functional behaviours. When a RAMS design is required, an allocation of each performance 
characteristic for reliability, availability, maintainability and safety is necessary and the 
allocation techniques for four RAMS characteristics are similar (BS EN 60300-3-1, 2004). 
The allocation of RAMS requirements is dependent on the complexity of these subsystems, 
based on experience with comparable subsystems. If the requirements are not achieved by the 
initial design phase, the design process should be repeatedly performed. The allocation is also 
often made on the basis of considerations, such as complexity, criticality, operational profile 
and the environmental condition (Ebeling, 2010; MIL-HDBK-388B, 1998). 
When the allocation of RAMS requirements is normally conducted in the early design stage, 
if information available is insufficient, the allocation should be updated continuously through 
functional analysis. The allocation of RAMS requirements at lower system levels is necessary 
for the system product definition phase and the aims are set out below (BS EN 60300-1, 
2004):  
• To confirm the feasibility of RAMS requirements for the entire system, 
• To determine verifiable RAMS design requirements at lower levels and, 
• To determine clear and feasible RAMS requirements for subsystems and components. 
In general, the allocation of RAMS requirements is performed by the following steps: 
• Analyse the system;  
• Identify areas where design is known and information related to RAMS 
characteristics available or ready assessed; 
• Assign the appropriate weights and; 
• Determine their contribution to the top-level RAMS requirement.  
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MIL-HDBK-388B (1998) provides four techniques for allocation of RAMS requirements as 
set out below: 
• Equal allocation technique; 
• ARINIC12 allocation technique; 
• Feasibility of objective technique, and; 
• AGREE13 technique. 
It should be noted that the equal allocation technique is an apportionment technique that 
equally allocates the reliability requirement of the system to all subsystems. It is usually used 
when there is no information available for the subsystems to design. The ARINIC technique 
is applied when the failure rate of the subsystems is the only one available. The allocation is 
conducted by the weight factor that a subsystem contributes to the failure of the system. The 
feasibility technique is used according to appropriate experience and knowledge of the 
designers related to the subsystems and these techniques consider the system complexity, 
environment and operation as well as the failure rate. Finally, the AGREE technique allocates 
system reliability requirements by the complexity of the subsystem and the contribution of the 
subsystems causes the failure of the entire system. The complexity can apply the number of 
components that comprise a subsystem and the contribution can be calculated by the failure 
rate of the entire system over the failure rate of a subsystem (MIL-HDBK-388B, 1998). 
3.4.11   Reliability Growth Assessment 
Reliability growth assessment (RGA) is applied for the improvement of reliability 
performance through the systematic and permanent removal of failure mechanism. The RGA 
                                                          
12. Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated. 
13. Advisory Group on Reliability of Electronic Equipment 
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aims to assess reliability performance over time through design changes of the system. The 
RGA is accomplished through implementation of the test-fix-test-fix cycle for the system 
prototype. There are many reliability growth models in the literature, but Duane and Power 
Law models are generally used (Rooney et al., 2001; MIL-HDBK-189C, 2011). 
The Duane model is the most frequently used model to analyse reliability growth graphically. 
The model was originally developed by J.T. Duane in 1964 and it is quick, simple and easy to 
understand. The Duane model uses a deterministic approach to reliability growth such that the 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of the system versus operating time is represented as an 
approximate straight line when it is plotted on ‘log-log paper’ (Smith et al., 1980; MIL-
HDBK-781A, 1996). 
The Power Law model (or AMSAA
14
 model) was developed by L.H. Crow in the 1970s. The 
growth pattern of the power law model is the same as the Duane model, but the Power Law 
model is statistics-based. The statistical structure of the Power Law model is equivalent to a 
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) model with Weibull failure rate function. This 
has several advantages because the parameters of an NHPP can be estimated on a statistically 
rigorous basis; confidence intervals can be obtained; and Goodness of Fit Test (GFT) can be 
applied (Smith et al., 1980; Ebeling, 2010; BS EN 61164, 2004).  
3.4.12   RAMS Test Assessment  
3.4.12.1   Reliability Test Assessment 
BS EN 60300-3-5 (2001) classifies reliability tests as estimation, compliance and comparison 
tests. The reliability estimation test aims to evaluate the reliability measures for the estimation 
of warranty costs and reliability prediction. The comparison test is for comparison between 
                                                          
14. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
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the reliability performances of functionally similar two systems in order to determine whether 
system A has higher reliability than system B, rather than to estimate the reliability 
performance measures between them.   
The compliance test (or demonstration test) is used to identify the compliance with specified 
parameters. The outcome of the test is determined by either "accepted" (compliant) or 
"rejected" (non-compliant). The test is based on the principle of statistical hypothesis testing. 
The reliability demonstration test is important in determining the acceptance of the system 
reliability design. In general, two reliability demonstration methods can be applied to railway 
system tests: truncated sequential test and fixed duration test (BS IEC 61124, 2006; MIL-
HDBK-781A, 1996).  
3.4.12.2 Maintainability Test Assessment 
As part of system test performing during the system engineering design, a maintainability test 
is conducted to verify that maintainability requirements are being met by the system design. 
BS EN 60300-3-10 (2001) and MIL-HDBK-470A (1997) classify maintainability test as two 
categories: maintainability qualification test and maintainability demonstration test.  
The maintainability qualification test can be conducted to confirm that a prototype meets the 
customer’s requirements in initial studies and during the development of a prototype. This test 
is not necessarily required, but it is a very effective method to ascertain that maintainability 
requirements have been met. The maintainability demonstration test is a test which verifies 
the developed prototype’s fulfilment of maintainability requirements. The test assessment is 
based on the theory of statistical hypothesis testing and it is applied after completing the final 
design (BS IEC 706-3, 2006). 
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3.5   Summary 
This chapter presents the overall concepts, methods and techniques of systems engineering to 
establish the theoretical engineering background relating to systems RAMS management. The 
systems, risk and system life cycle based approach for implementation of railway RAMS 
management is the focal point of this chapter. Therefore, this chapter has discussed the 
definitions, processes, methods and techniques related to the successful implementation of 
railway RAMS management.    
This chapter has firstly reviewed several definitions of system/systems and systems 
engineering to establish the engineering concepts for the successful realisation of a system. 
The management activities of systems engineering have been reviewed in three ways: RAMS 
characteristics, threats and means, to help the thorough understanding of systems RAMS in 
the management perspective. However, systems engineering is a relatively new engineering 
concept that has many difficulties to overcome for the application it to railway systems 
engineering. Accordingly, it is revealed that more study is required to integrate RAMS 
management into railway systems engineering.  
This chapter defines systems RAMS management in four perspectives based on (1) the risk 
based RAMS management, (2) the definition of RAMS performance characteristics, (3) the 
assessment and control of the hazard factors affecting RAMS performance and (4) the 
provision of the means for the prevention of the threating factors. This chapter has also 
investigated various RAMS risk assessment methods for the actuate risk assessment and the 
overcoming of the problems due to insufficient information and data with the definition of 
risk. Typical assessment techniques to support RAMS management are variously investigated 
and discussed. 
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Much literature related to this research topic has been reviewed, but the literature survey will 
be continued during the entire research period of time in order to improve the developed 
research models and enhance the necessary theoretical background continuously.  
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Chapter 4 
DEVELOPMENT OF PROCESS BASED RAILWAY RAMS  
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction  
Railway RAMS can be conducted successfully, not only through the achievement of the 
technical issues, but also through the establishment of the management issues. Thus, it is a 
prerequisite for the successful implementation of RAMS management establishing the 
effective management structure and organisational environment. Railway RAMS management 
is an engineering discipline that shall be implemented as an integrated part of railway systems 
engineering. Thus, it shall be consistent with the policy, objectives, principles, criteria, 
techniques, methods and tools of railway systems engineering management. Accordingly, 
railway RAMS management shall conduct a systematic approach for railway systems 
engineering to establish the management structure and organisational environment and to 
make a quick response to the changes of railway systems engineering. However, railway 
organisations have not established a coherent management structure and environment in the 
railway project as an integrated part of railway systems engineering. This chapter focuses a 
systematic approach on the implementation of RAMS management for railway systems 
engineering.  
This chapter comprises five sections to present a systematic approach of railway RAMS 
management. Section 4.2 presents the methods to develop a railway RAMS management 
systems. Section 4.3 deals with railway systems engineering process and its process activities. 
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Section 4.4 presents risk based RAMS management process. This chapter finally concludes 
with a brief summary in Section 4.5. 
4.2   Development of Railway RAMS Management Systems  
4.2.1   Railway RAMS Management  
Railway is a complex engineering system that works together with various typical engineering 
disciplines as stated in Chapter 1. Therefore, railway industry has considered or addressed the 
introduction of systems engineering in the railway projects as an interdisciplinary means of 
the various engineering disciplines to develop the steadfast conceptual design criteria and take 
a role of a bridge between railway systems engineering and the traditional engineering 
disciplines
15
. On the other hand, the objective of railway is to perform a defined railway 
traffic service safely within a scheduled time and limited budget. For the achievement of the 
railway service objective, railway industry has also addressed the integration of RAMS 
management into railway systems engineering as a comprehensive engineering management 
discipline for the achievement of safety and time dependence performance. However, many 
railway organisations have not implemented the RAMS management successfully because of 
the lack of systematic approach for systems engineering. Therefore, it becomes a great 
significant challenge to integrate RAMS management into railway systems engineering (BS 
EN 50126-1, 1999). 
Railway systems engineering has been focused on the successful realisation of a system as a 
whole for all function and performance requirements. The system performance is defined 
through the assessment of railway risks to reduce or eliminate all potential threats to the rail 
traffic service as minimum as possible. Accordingly, the assessment of railway risks is a 
                                                          
15. Mechanical, Electrical, Electronics, Civil and Software Engineering 
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major focus of railway systems engineering and the assessment results are controlled by 
RAMS management as shown in Figure 4.1. Many inherent risks which have been identified 
and experienced from the railway operational contexts, such as operation, system, 
maintenance and the maintenance support conditions, and the challenges which have been 
posed from many railway engineering projects shall be continuously managed from the 
system concept design stage to the detailed design phase. This is because the railway risks 
have a great potential to cause injury and/or loss of life to the staff or passengers, 
environmental degradation, damage to the railway property or freight and adverse impact for 
railway service. Therefore, railway RAMS management shall require a systematic approach 
for railway RAMS risks and the risk assessment is a core part of the RAMS management 
process (An et al., 2007; Umar, 2010). 
Systems Engineering Process
Engineering 
Plan
Engineering Progress 
Assessment
            Control
▪ Trade-off: schedule,
   cost, performance & 
   risk 
▪ Risk handling: 
  selection of options
RAMS 
Management
Railway Systems Engineering Management
 
Figure 4.1 Concept of Risk Based Railway RAMS Management  
4.2.2 Railway Systems Engineering Management  
As described in Figure 4.1, RAMS management shall be implemented as an integrated part of 
railway systems engineering. The railway systems engineering conducts an interdisciplinary 
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approach as a technical and management means to facilitate the design and development and 
to success railway project. Thus, railway systems engineering is essential to integrate RAMS 
characteristics needed in the operational contexts into system product design property. The 
railway systems engineering shall be required, not only in the technical aspects, but also in the 
management aspects. Railway systems engineering management shall establish a set of the 
management structure and organisational environment as a system and it also includes the 
systems engineering management process to solve the problems and challenges effectively. 
The railway systems engineering management generally conducts the following three 
activities (Blanchard, 2012):  
• Implementing railway systems engineering process; 
• Controlling the baselines of railway system design and development phases and, 
• Integrating railway system life cycle functions. 
The baseline control of the design and development phases, including the trade-off of risk, 
cost and operational effectiveness and the section of risk handling options, takes a significant 
role in the railway systems engineering management. The design of a railway system is 
progressively implemented through several design phases, such as system concept phase, 
system definition phase, and subsystem and component design phase. The system concept 
phase is to establish the concepts of the system to design; it is often called the feasibility study 
phase. The system definition phase provides a description for all system requirements related 
to the system functions and performances. The subsystem design phase is to establish a 
description of the system’s functional architecture as a preliminary design stage. The 
component design phase produces a set of the physical design architecture and their 
performance characteristics as a detailed design phase. Each design phase comprises the 
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baselines in the operational, functional and physical product aspect. The baselines are 
important control points of the railway systems engineering management (Daup, 2001). 
The railway systems engineering management is implemented through the use of systems 
engineering process to produce the effective technical design criteria for the needs and 
expectations that are required for a railway system. The system engineering process can be 
applied to all stages of the systems engineering design; its major functions can be described 
below (Blanchard, 2012). 
The systems engineering process takes the following three roles: 
• Transforming customer’s system requirements into a set of design solutions and their 
acceptance performance criteria, and  process descriptions; 
• Producing all information required for the decision making of system engineering 
management, and; 
• Providing input for the implementation of the next phase in each system design phase. 
Another activity of the railway systems engineering management is to integrate all functions 
which may be required or occur throughout the life system cycle into the systems engineering 
process in order to effectively resolve all possible problems that may occur during the system 
life cycle and to ensure the feasibility of the railway system in the operation and maintenance 
phase. RAMS management shall be consistent with the three management activities.  
In conclusion, the three roles of railway engineering management: the baseline control of 
design and development phase, the implementation of systems engineering process and the 
integration of system life cycle functions, are the major focus of railway RAMS management 
functions; they become a fundamental basis of the railway RAMS management activities. 
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4.2.3   Development of Railway RAMS Management Systems 
4.2.3.1 Systems Approach to Railway RAMS Management  
As stated above, RAMS management shall be implemented as an integrated part of railway 
systems engineering management; hence, it is subjected to the systems approach for the 
systems engineering management as shown in Figure 4.2. The systems approach means the 
study of an organisation's management structure and environment as a system in the whole 
aspect so that the objective of organisation can be achieved as effectively as possible. In the 
same way, it is also necessary to consider the objectives of individual management activities 
very carefully. The systems approach requires that the individual management activities shall 
be brought together in the form of the organisation’s objective as a whole. Figure 4.2 
describes a systems approach model of RAMS management for railway engineering 
management. Therefore, RAMS management requires the systems approach to be integrated 
into systems engineering management as shown in Figure 4.2 (BS ISO 9000, 2005). 
Systems 
Approach
Systems Engineering
Management
Top Management
Systems Engineering 
Management Systems
RAMS  Management 
Systems
RAMS  Management
Objectives
Policy
Plan Implementation Assessment Control
 Railway Engineering 
Project
 
Figure 4.2 Systems Approach to Railway RAMS Management  
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4.2.3.2 Development of Railway RAMS Management Systems 
It is essential to establish RAMS management at the early concept phase of system design as 
well as develop the RAMS management systems. However, the development principles and 
methods of the RAMS management systems are not yet established and have not been 
provided from the railway industry. Figure 4.3 shows a proposed framework that develops a 
railway RAMS management systems, which is based on the definition of the systems 
approach reviewed in Chapter 3.  
Determination of 
RAMS Management 
Systems Framework
Step: 3
Determination of
RAMS
Management
Process
Step: 4
RAMS
Management 
Principles
Step 1:
RAMS 
Management 
Elements
Step 2:
Railway Systems Engineering Management
 
Figure 4.3 Development of Railway RAMS Management Systems 
RAMS management systems shall be developed, based on the thorough understanding of the 
overall systems engineering project. The procedure for development of a RAMS  management 
systems consists of the following four steps as shown in Figure 4.3: (1) the establishment of 
the fundamental principles of RAMS management, (2) the determination of the major 
elements of RAMS management, (3) the determination of RAMS management systems 
framework and (4) the development of the technical RAMS management process. 
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Step 1:  Definition of RAMS Management Principles 
Defining the principles of RAMS management is a prerequisite to successfully lead RAMS 
organisation to improve system’s RAMS performance. In general, RAMS management 
principles shall provide a basic proposition that serves the functional behaviours of the 
RAMS organisation as a system (Oxford, 2012). Therefore, the following seven items 
suggest as the principles of railway RAMS management, referred from BS ISO 9000 (2005) 
and BS EN 60300-1 (2003): 
• To focus on the customer’s requirements, to achieve the customer’s requirements 
successfully and even strive to exceed the requirements; 
• To establish leadership, which aims to establish the RAMS management policy and 
continuously improve the environment and performance of the RAMS organisation; 
• To involve the customers to RAMS management, which aims to achieve the customer 
requirement and satisfy them effectively; 
• To apply systems approach to RAMS management, to increase the synergy of 
management by the interaction of the interrelated processes and system elements; 
• To apply process approach to all system elements of RAMS management systems, to 
solve the managerial and technical issues more efficiently, 
• To continuously improve the performance of RAMS organisation and system products, 
for the steady and incremental performance improvement of overall organisation and 
system products and;  
• To use statistical techniques to RAMS assessment, to support the precise decision 
making of RAMS management.  
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Step 2:    Determination of RAMS Management Elements 
The second step is to determine the appropriate management elements in order to establish the 
RAMS management policy and strategy, to coordinate the management functions, and to 
direct and control the management activities effectively. Accordingly, the RAMS 
management elements should consider including the following seven activities, referred from 
BS ISO 9001 (2008) and BS EN 60300-1 (2003):  
• To determine RAMS management activities needed; 
• To establish RAMS management policy and objectives; 
• To determine appropriate system life cycle phases; 
• To establish the time phased activities of RAMS management in the systems 
engineering process stages; 
• To determine the acceptance criteria and methods for RAMS requirements; 
• To provide necessary resources and information, and; 
• To monitor and review the results of RAMS management activities. 
Step 3:  Integration of RAMS Management Elements as a System  
RAMS management elements shall comprise a framework as a system to determine the 
sequence and interaction of the management elements. Figure 4.4 shows the concept of 
integrating RAMS management elements based on the principle of PDCA
16
 cycle (BS ISO 
9000, 2005). In the PDCA cycle, the ‘Plan’ includes the objectives and processes necessary to 
meet the customer requirements and the organisation’s policies. The ‘Do’ includes directing 
the implementation of the processes and objectives. The ‘Check’ includes monitoring and 
measuring the results of all of process activities, and assessing the process results against the 
                                                          
16. Plan-Do-Check-Act 
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policy, objectives and requirements, as well as reporting all of the achieved results. Finally, 
the ‘Act’ includes conducting corrective or preventive actions to continually improve process 
performance (BS ISO 9001, 2008).  
Figure 4.4 describes the concept for developing a framework of RAMS management systems, 
which integrates the management and technical elements into the framework of a PDCA cycle. 
A proposed framework based on Figure 4.4 will be described in the next section.   
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DO:
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 • Monitoring
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ACT:
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RAMS Management Systems
 
Figure 4.4 Concept of Railway RAMS Management Systems 
Step 4:    Development of RAMS Management Process 
RAMS management shall be focused on the technical management process to achieve the 
objectives of the RAMS management effectively. The technical management process includes 
the technical management elements to define, analyse, evaluate and control RAMS 
characteristics as described in Figure 4.4; it shall be implemented in the systems engineering 
process. Therefore, the establishment of the systems engineering process is essential to 
provide the basis to the process activities of RAMS management. Accordingly, the process 
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and its activities of the systems engineering will be presented with several models in Section 
4.3 and the RAMS management process will be presented in Section 4.4 of this chapter.  
4.2.3.3 A Proposed Framework of Railway RAMS Management Systems  
Until now, the method has been discussed in which a railway RAMS management systems is 
developed to direct the RAMS management policy, control the management functions and 
coordinate the management activities. Figure 4.5 describes a proposed process based RAMS 
management systems model that is comprised of six management elements. The management 
activities of six system elements and their interactions are established on the basis of the 
principles of PDCA cycle, process and systems.  
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Figure 4.5 Proposed Process based Railway RAMS Management Systems Model  
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(1)   Determination of RAMS Management Responsibility 
RAMS organisation should determine the overall management responsibility for the strategic 
policy and objectives of RAMS management as shown in Figure 4.2. The management 
responsibility contains the requirements for top management activities. The top management 
means a leader of an organisation to achieve the organisational objective. The management 
responsibility can generally include the following six elements for RAMS management: (1) 
commitment and function, (2) strategy, (3) policy, (4) planning, (5) responsibility, authority 
and communication and (6) management review (BS EN 60300-2, 2004). 
(2)   Establishment of Resource Management 
As mentioned above, RAMS management takes a role of optimally allocating the limited 
resources to achieve the operational objectives successfully. Therefore, adequate resource 
management is a key factor for the successful achievement of RAMS management, and for 
the continuous implementation and maintenance of RAMS management systems. Therefore, 
the resource management is specially included as an individual RAMS management element 
that is separated from RAMS management responsibility. The major role of the resource 
management includes the following three elements: (1) organisation’s personnel and expertise, 
(2) financial resources and (3) information and data resources including RAMS knowledge 
base. The resource of information and data is the key factor to meet the RAMS performance 
requirements (BS EN 60300-1, 2004). 
(3)  Establishment of customer RAMS Requirements  
RAMS organisation should support the establishment of customer RAMS requirements in 
order to facilitate the RAMS specification process. In general, a customer has the weak point 
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in the accurate understanding of systems, risk and system life cycle management concepts for 
the recent systems engineering and in the numeral expression of the RAMS characteristics of 
all functional requirements. Therefore, the supplier and customer should establish the RAMS 
requirements together through the analysis of resources, system’s needs and expectations, 
which are provided by the customer. 
(4)   Implementation of RAMS Management  
RAMS organisation should implement the planned management activities and achieve RAMS 
requirements, which are implemented through technical RAMS management process as 
shown in Figure 4.5. To implement the RAMS management, an appropriate schedule, policy 
and strategy are included in the RAMS management process. However, the RAMS 
management process has to be implemented into the systems engineering process. RAMS 
management process will be in detail dealt with in Section 4.4 (BS ISO/DIS 31000, 2008).  
(5)   Measurement, Assessment and Improvement of RAMS Management Systems 
RAMS organisation should plan and implement a process that can monitor, measure, assess 
and improve the effectiveness of RAMS management systems. The RAMS organisation 
should continually improve the effectiveness of the RAMS management systems through the 
above process activities. The results of measurement and assessment are significant 
foundations to continuously improve the RAMS management systems (BS EN 60300-2, 
2004). 
4.2.3.4 Integration of RAMS Management Systems into Railway Systems Engineering 
Figure 4.6 describes a proposed model for integrating RAMS management into railway 
systems engineering. As shown in Figure 4.6, RAMS management is implemented as an 
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integrated part of railway systems engineering management. The RAMS management 
activities are dependent on the results of the systems engineering process. Therefore, the 
establishment of the systems engineering process activity is essential to implement RAMS 
management process. Section 4.3 will present the detailed activities of systems engineering 
process to establish the functions and activities of RAMS management.   
RAMS  Management
 RAMS Management Process
Systems Engineering Management Process
Railway  Systems Engineering Management
RAMS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Systems Design Phase
 
Figure 4.6 Integration Model of RAMS Management into Railway Systems Engineering 
4.3   Establishment of Railway Systems Engineering Process 
RAMS management is performed through railway systems engineering process. Therefore, it 
is necessary to establish the railway systems engineering process and its process activities. BS 
EN 50126-1 (1999) provides the system life cycle based railway systems engineering process 
with the general management activities, but it is comprised of highly simplified sequential 
phases from concept to decommissioning, as shown in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1.  
- 90 - 
 
 
 1.                 Concept
 2. System Definition & Operational
     Application
 3. Risk Analysis & Evaluation
 4. Specification of System 
     Requirements 
 5. Architecture & Apportionment 
     of System Requirements 
 6.     Design & Implementation 
 7.               Manufacture 
 8.               Integration 
 9.             System Validation 
 10.     System Acceptance 
 11. Operation, Maintenance & 
       Performance Monitoring 
 12.        Decommissioning 
O
p
er
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 
R
is
k
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 &
 D
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
C
o
m
p
li
an
ce
 w
it
h
 R
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
C
o
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
 o
f 
su
b
se
q
u
en
t 
R
A
M
S
 r
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 i
n
 P
ro
d
u
ct
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
O
p
er
at
io
n
 &
 
D
ec
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
in
g
 
Figure 4.7 Typical Railway Systems Engineering Process 
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Table 4.1 System Life Cycle Management Tasks 
Life-cycle Phase General Management Tasks 
1. Concept 
- Establish railway project. 
- Undertake feasibility studies. 
- Establish systems management. 
2. System definition & 
operational applications 
- Establish mission profile. 
- Identify operational applications. 
3. Risk analysis & evaluation - Undertake risk analysis and evaluation. 
4. Specification of system  
requirements 
- Undertake system requirements analysis. 
- Specify system, operational contexts and environment. 
- Establish system verification plan. 
5. Architecture & 
 apportionment of system 
 requirement 
- Apportion systems requirements. 
- Specify subsystem & component requirements. 
- Define subsystem & component acceptance criteria. 
6. Design & implementation 
- Perform design & development. 
- Perform design analysis & test. 
- Perform design verification. 
7. Manufacture 
- Perform production plan. 
- Establish training. 
8. Integration 
- Assembly system. 
- Install system. 
9. System validation 
- Commission. 
- Perform probationary period of operation. 
10. System acceptance 
- Undertake acceptance procedure. 
- Compile evidence for acceptance. 
11. Operation, maintenance 
& performance 
- Perform operation & maintenance. 
- Collect operational performance statistics. 
- Acquire, analyse & evaluate data. 
12. Decommissioning - Plan decommissioning and disposal. 
 
However, the sequential phase may not be effective in implementing the management 
activities of railway systems engineering. In practice, the phases are overlapped and repeated 
as a process that integrates the possible system life cycle functions to find out the solutions for 
the best, optimal and balanced design, and to ensure the feasibility in the operational phase. 
Thus, the processes of Figure 3.4 and 4.7 can be modified as a process based model as 
depicted in Figure 4.8.  
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Figure 4.8 Modified Process Based Railway Systems Engineering Model 
The proposed systems engineering model is divided into the technical systems engineering 
process that implements and assesses the technical system management, and the systems 
engineering management process to trade off and control the results of the technical process 
activities as shown in Figure 4.8. The management process is a process that trades off, 
controls and selects the assessment results of the technical process activities for the planned 
management. The technical process is a process that is conducted to find out the technical 
design solutions and acceptance performance criteria through the assessment of requirements, 
functional behaviours and design alternatives. The technical process consists of three baseline 
phases to conduct the systems engineering management process activities. 
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The requirement definition phase establishes the requirement baseline. The functional 
definition and allocation phase establishes the functional architecture baseline. The design 
definition and synthesis phase determines the design architecture baseline. These baseline 
phases are the significant decision-making points of the systems engineering management. 
As seen in Figure 4.8, the technical systems engineering process has two process loops to 
represent the iterated process activities: requirement and design loop. The requirement loop 
aims to define the functional and performance requirements. The design loop aims to establish 
the design architecture and performance characteristics. Each loop activity also establishes the 
functional architecture. The results produced from the engineering process phase are verified 
through inspection, analysis, test or demonstration.  
4.3.1   Requirement Definition Phase 
This phase is a process which assesses customer’s requirements to define the level or 
quantitative value of system requirements needed in the system design. Figure 4.9 describes 
the major four process activities of this phase: operational scenarios definition, measures of 
effectiveness definition, functional requirements definition and performance requirements 
definition. Figure 4.10 provides the expanded framework that includes the major activities 
and their assessment elements.  
This phase begins with identifying the customer’s requirements and the internal and external 
constraints related to the engineering implementation. The measures of effectiveness and the 
operational scenarios are defined through the assessment of system boundaries and interfaces, 
operational environments and the life cycle process. The functional and performance 
requirements are defined with assessment of modes of operation, technical performance, 
human factors and functional behaviour analysis for the operational scenarios as Figure 4.10.  
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Figure 4.9 Requirement Definition Process 
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Figure 4.10 Requirement Definition Process Activities 
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4.3.2 Functional Definition and Allocation Phase 
This phase is a process that defines the functional architecture through allocation method. The 
functional behaviours and their interfaces analysis and the performance requirement 
allocation are the basis activities of this process phase. The sub-function definition and the 
performance allocation are established by the analysis of sub-function states and modes, as 
shown in Figure 4.11. Figure 4.12 describes the more detailed activities of this process.  
This phase commences with the analysis of the functional behaviours and their interfaces for 
the operational scenarios and the allocation of system performance requirements, which form 
the basis of the definition of sub-function states and modes and which are determined through 
the analysis of functional timeline, data and control flow, and functional failure modes and 
effects. The failure modes and their effects are analysed to determine safety functions and 
their monitoring functions as shown in Figure 4.12.  
Functional behaviour/
Interface definition
Performance requirement 
allocation
Subfunction definition
Subfunction state and mode 
definition
Requirement definition 
process
Design definition & 
synthesis process
Requirements Loop
Design Loop
Verification
System analysis & 
evaluation process
 
Figure 4.11 Functional Definition & Allocation Process 
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Figure 4.12 Function Definition and Allocation Process Activities 
4.3.3   Design Definition and Synthesis Phase 
This phase is a process that defines physical designs (components), their performance 
characteristics and the physical interfaces which comprise a subsystem. The establishment of 
the design solution alternatives and the assessment of the model or prototype are the major 
roles of this phase as shown in Figure 4.13. Figure 4.14 provides the expanded framework 
that includes detailed process activities based on Figure 4.13. 
The establishment of subsystems and their design solution alternatives are conducted through 
the assessment of safety hazards, life cycle quality factors and technical requirements, as 
depicted in Figure 4.14. The definition of design and their performance characteristics are 
established by the development of models or/and prototypes, and then the assessment of 
failure modes and effects, testability and design capacity of the developed models and 
prototypes as shown in Figure 4.14. 
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Figure 4.13 Design Definition & Synthesis Process 
Define Design and  
performance characterises
Define physical 
interfaces
Group and allocate 
functions
Identify design solution 
alternatives
Assess life cycle 
quality factors
Assess technology 
requirements
Assess safety and 
environmental hazards
Identify off-the-shelf 
availability
Identify make or buy 
alternatives
Identify standardization 
opportunities
Assess  failure mode, 
effect, & criticality
Assess testability
Develop Models & 
Fabricate Prototypes
Assess design 
capacity to evolve
Verification
Design Architecture 
Establishment
 
Figure 4.14 Design Definition & Synthesis Process Activities 
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4.3.3.1   Design Verification  
Verification is commonly conducted in all engineering process phases. However, the design 
verification is the most important part in the systems engineering process phase because the 
verification principle includes the methods using in the other process phases. Figure 4.15 
depicts the verification method that is applied in the design phase, which confirms that the 
design definition and synthesis process has achieved the design architecture that satisfies the 
system requirements. The objectives of this process include the confirmation of the 
established acceptance criteria to conduct the verification of the design architecture, 
functional and performance measures and design constraints from the lowest level to the 
entire system level. The design verification is performed by one method among inspection, 
analysis, demonstration or testing as shown in Figure 4.15. 
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4.15 Design Verification Procedures 
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4.3.4   Systems Control Phase 
This phase conducts the trade-off and technical managements for the assessment results of all 
systems engineering process phases. As shown in Figure 4.16, there are three process 
activities: (1) controlling the assessment results of the systems engineering process, (2) 
conducting the trade-off for the assessed process results to select risk handling options and (3) 
implementing the technical management for the selected risk handling options. The detailed 
tasks of this process are described in Figure 4.17. 
System Assessment
Engineering Progress 
Assessment
Process Output
Trade-off/Alternatives
selection
Technical Management 
  • Requirements definition
  • Functional definition/allocation
  • Design definition/synthesis 
 
Figure 4.16 Systems Control Process 
Figure 4.17 describes the detailed activities of this process. The process begins with the 
identification of the assessment results of each process phase and risk factors. These identified 
results conduct trade-off for selecting risk-handling options through the analysis of the life 
cycle cost, system and cost effectiveness, environmental impacts and quantification of risk 
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factors. The risk handling options are controlled by the various management methods, such as 
data, configuration, interface, RAMS and performance based progress as shown in Figure 
4.17 (BS IEC/ISO 26702, 2007). 
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Figure 4.17 Systems Control Process Activities 
4.4   Development of Risk Based RAMS Management Process 
As described in Figures 4.8 and 4.17, railway systems engineering management focuses on 
the control of railway risk handling options which are determined through the trade-off of life 
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cycle costs, system and cost effectiveness, quantitative risk factors and environmental impact. 
RAMS management will also focus on the control of RAMS characteristics for the risk 
handling options. Therefore, the risk assessment process will be a core part of the RAMS 
management process to provide a complete understanding of railway risks which are included 
in the system and operational contexts. The life cycle costs, the system and cost effectiveness 
which support the selection of risk handling options can be considered as an integrated part of 
RAMS management, but full attention will be devoted to the railway RAMS management for 
the assessment and control of risk handling options. Figure 4.18 describes a proposed risk 
based RAMS management process; it consists of four process phases: requirement definition 
phase, risk assessment phase, RAMS control phase and monitoring and review phase (An, 
2005; BS EN 31010, 2008).  
The risk based RAMS management process will cover all perspectives related to the 
assessment and control of railway risks in order to provide the rational decision-making that 
will minimise, reduce, eliminate, even avoid or share the evaluated railway risks. The 
requirement definition phase determines the RAMS risk design requirements and their 
acceptance criteria. The risk assessment phase is implemented to identify, analyse and 
evaluate the railway risks. Firstly, risk identification is a phase that determines all potential 
risk factors and develops the models needed. Risk analysis is a phase that quantifies the 
failure severity and frequency of the failure scenario models. Moreover, risk evaluation is a 
phase that determines the risk level of a failure consequence using a risk evaluation matrix. 
The multitude of the risk level should require the RAMS management for the improvement of 
the design or the development of the maintenance policy and the process activities should be 
monitored and reviewed continuously as shown in Figure 4.18. 
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Figure 4.18   Proposed Risk based RAMS Management Process 
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4.4.1   Requirement Definition Phase 
This phase is implemented in the requirement definition phase of the systems engineering 
process. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 are fundamental in the application of this process phase. The 
process involves identifying the need and implication of RAMS management in the railway 
systems engineering through a feasibility study, and defines the RAMS requirements and their 
acceptance criteria. The RAMS requirements should be defined and specified by different 
system hierarchy levels: operational design level, functional design level and physical design 
level. The following typical requirements may be needed in this phase (An et al, 2006; BS 
IEC/ISO 26702, 2007):  
• Design constraints: e.g. sets of rules and standard regulations; 
• Operational scenarios and operational effectiveness; 
• System boundaries, operational environments and life cycle process;  
• Functional requirements; deterministic and/or probabilistic RAMS requirements and; 
• RAMS acceptance criteria.  
4.4.2   Risk Identification Phase 
The risk identification phase is conducted in the functional definition and the allocation phase 
of the systems engineering process. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 are fundamental processes needed 
for successful achievement of risk identification. The identification involves identifying the 
following activities: (1) the sub-functions and their performance, (2) all possible failure 
modes, causes and effects that may be included in the sub-function states and modes and data 
flow, last of all (3) determining safety functions and their monitoring functions. 
The purpose of this phase is to produce a comprehensive list of railway risks, based on all 
possible failure modes that may affect the railway service, and to determine the scenarios for 
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all failure effects and causes. Railway risks can be identified and evaluated by the following 
methods (BS EN 31010, 2008):   
• Evidence based approach, for example, checklists and past data; 
• Systematic teamwork approach, and; 
• Inductive step by step approach. 
In this process, typical risk identification techniques, such as brainstorming, checklists, what-
if, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) or hazard and operability study (HAZOP), can be 
deployed, depending on the analytical objectives. However, the FMEA technique has been 
applied most commonly because it is very effective in identifying all possible failure modes 
and it can practically support other analysis techniques practically to represent the logical 
structures or the expert opinions, such as ETA, FTA and Fuzzy Logic Analysis approach (An, 
2005). 
4.4.3   Risk Analysis Phase 
Risk analysis phase is conducted in the design definition and synthesis phase of the systems 
engineering process. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 are a basis for implementing this phase. The risk 
analysis involves estimating the frequency of the failure consequence for design solution 
alternatives by using the identified failure data. The risk analysis process begins with the 
identification of failure severities of the failure consequences in order to quantify them. If the 
collected failure data cannot be quantified, qualitative approaches should be considered. 
However, if the level of the identified uncertainty is very high, the specific risk analysis 
methods or combined methods may be considered in order to quantify the level of failure 
consequence, for example, FMEA, FTA, ETA etc. (An, 2005). 
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As the systems engineering design stage progresses step by step, more failure data and 
information sources related to railway risks may be collected with the more detailed failure 
data and information sources, the failure cause analysis required for the failure frequency can 
be implemented in more detail. The FTA technique is an excellent technique for the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the failure causes in which it can analyse the roots of 
the failure causes, their relationship and their interaction. The basic failure causes that may 
lead to top events are identified by the cut sets analysis using the Boolean algebra rules. The 
minimal cut sets identified by the cut set analysis must have been balanced for the system 
design architecture, and the quantitative analysis can be conducted by failure probability or 
failure rate (Ericson, 2005; BS EN 61025, 2007).  
4.4.4 Risk Evaluation Phase 
This phase is conducted to determine the overall risk levels with a combination of the failure 
severity of the failure consequence and its frequency to occur. The risk evaluation provides a 
good understanding of railway risks to support the decision-making for RAMS management. 
The railway risk evaluation is a process of comparing the analysed railway risk levels with the 
defined risk criteria to determine the importance of the level and type of the railway risk. Risk 
evaluation is conducted by a defined risk matrix, which is a matrix that is used to define the 
various levels of risk as the product of the probability and severity categories (BS ISO/IEC 
31010, 2008). 
4.4.5 RAMS Risk Control Phase 
This phase is conducted in the systems control phase of systems engineering management. 
Figures 4.16 and 4.17 are the basis for carrying out these process activities. The RAMS risk 
control phase aims to select risk-handling options appropriately by the RAMS acceptance 
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criteria, as shown in Figure 4.16. The cost or system effectiveness analysis is based on the 
RAMS risk control within the tolerable risk level. The RAMS control can be implemented by 
the five actions as shown in Figure 4.18 (BS IEC 62198, 2001): 
• Avoid the risk altogether;  
• Decrease the failure probability of occurrence; 
• Reduce the failure consequences; 
• Transfer or share the risk and; 
• Maintain the risk and make maintenance plans and strategies. 
4.4.6 Monitoring and Review Phase 
As shown in Figure 4.18, all process stages are monitored and reviewed to ensure that 
management actions are effectively taken. It makes sure that the proper procedures are 
selected and adequate information is collected throughout the RAMS management process. 
The verification activities of Figure 4.17 are the basis of this process and these methods. It 
should be noted that the system is evolving and becomes more complex, which may mean that 
the system is exposed to new risks as the system engineering process progresses over time. 
Accordingly, the monitoring and review process can track the changes that the system may 
have undertaken (Berrado et al, 2010; BS EN 31010, 2008). 
4.5   Summary 
This chapter has presented the methods for integrating RAMS management into railway 
systems engineering, such as the development of railway RAMS management systems, the 
establishment of the railway systems engineering process and its activities, the development 
of RAMS management process etc.  
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Firstly, this chapter provided a proposed framework for developing railway RAMS 
management systems including the establishment of management principles, the 
determination of management elements, the integration of management elements as a system, 
and the development of the technical management process. This chapter provided a process 
based railway RAMS management systems that can be applied to a railway systems 
engineering design phase to direct RAMS management policies and objectives, to coordinate 
RAMS management functions, and to control RAMS management activities.  
Furthermore, railway systems engineering process and its process activities were established 
through the combination of several logical block diagrams to provide the fundamentals of the 
RAMS management functions and activities. The railway systems engineering process 
consists of the systems management that implements the trade-off of risk, system, cost and 
progress and the control of risk handling options as well as the technical engineering process 
that defines, analyses and evaluates the requirements, functions and design.  
Finally, the risk based railway RAMS management process were proposed to focus the 
control of all possible railway risks within the acceptable range by the RAMS management. 
The risk-based RAMS management process provides RAMS requirement definition, risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, RAMS risk management and monitoring, based 
on the established systems engineering process phase. 
Systems engineering and RAMS management are respectively new engineering management 
concepts to railway organisations. Therefore, there are many difficulties in establishing the 
systems engineering and RAMS management at once, but the models and processes proposed 
in this chapter will help railway organisations to gradually establishing and implementing 
RAMS management at the early system concept design phase.   
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Chapter 5 
DEVELOPMENT OF FMEA-FTA BASED RAILWAY 
RAMS RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE 
5.1   Introduction 
The engineering of the mission and safety critical systems, such as railway and aeroplane, has 
to focus the control of all potential hazards which may pose a threat to system performance as 
a whole as stated in Chapter 4. Thus, the risk assessment of the hazards is the main focus of 
RAMS management. The railway hazards are assessed by the qualitative, quantitative or 
semi-quantitative methods to determine the risk level of the hazards, which is determined by 
the combination of the failure severity and frequency of the failure consequence. The failure 
severity, as a qualitative assessment parameter, is determined by the bottom-up approach 
method. The failure frequency, as a quantitative assessment parameter, is evaluated by the 
top-down approach method. Therefore, the risk assessment of railway systems requires the 
various types of risk assessment techniques that satisfy the above stated methods (An, 2005).  
Many risk assessment techniques have been developed, and the techniques have widely 
applied to the mission and safety critical systems. Railway industry has also studied and tried 
the application of the various techniques appropriate to the risk assessment of railway hazards 
for the long time. Most studies for the risk assessment technique have emphasised the 
individual application of the risk assessment techniques. However, their individual application 
may not meet the precise analytical objectives of the risk assessment through the entire 
system engineering process. Accordingly, the combination of various different risk 
assessment techniques has been required, but the practical application methods have not been 
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provided. Therefore, this chapter presents the method which combines risk assessment 
techniques, depending on the analytical objectives, information and data available and the 
systems engineering design phase (Zhou et al., 2001; An, 2005). 
This chapter consists of four sections to present the risk assessment method of railway 
hazards. Section 5.2 discusses the application of FMEA-FTA techniques to the railway risk 
assessment and their combination models. Section 5.3 presents the FMEA-FTA based railway 
risk assessment process that is applicable to cover all phases of systems engineering process. 
This chapter is concluded with a brief summary in Section 5.4. 
5.2   Development of FMEA-FTA based  Railway Risk Assessment Model 
5.2.1 Railway Risk Assessment Technique 
All railway risks that threaten the performance of RAMS characteristics designed to achieve 
the operational objectives are the central focus of RAMS management, which is supported by 
the processes and techniques appropriate to the nature of railway risks. Many inherent risks 
identified from railway systems and the challenges which have been posed from railway 
development projects must be continuously improved from the early stage of system concept 
design. As stated in this thesis, railway risks have a great potential to cause injury and/or loss 
of life of staffs or passengers, to cause environmental degradation, to damage to railway 
property or freight and to impose other adverse impacts upon the various operational 
conditions. Therefore, railway risk assessment requires a systematic approach with 
appropriate technique and process to successfully control all potential railway risks in the 
systems engineering design phases. 
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Many typical techniques are currently being attempted and studied to assess railway risks 
explicitly and effectively, for example, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Fuzzy Logic Analysis (FLA) 
etc., as reviewed in Chapter 3. However, the application of the risk assessment techniques to 
the systems engineering process have been not provided. The typical risk assessment 
techniques were generally developed by the specific analytical objective needed in the 
systems engineering process phase or data available; they have inherently specific 
characteristics as reviewed in Chapter 3. Therefore, risk assessment techniques shall be 
appropriately used by their analytical objectives, data and information available and system 
design phase. 
The increasing complexity of railway systems, their risky nature and the limited availability 
of information and data resources require various analytical methods and techniques as 
occasion demands of the systems design phase. It is essential to appropriately combine the 
risk assessment techniques needed. Therefore, the combination of FMEA and FTA techniques 
is proposed and its application as the basic technique for a railway risk assessment is 
described as below.  
5.2.2 FMEA and FTA Risk Assessment Techniques  
 
In Chapter 3, the features of FMEA and FTA techniques were discussed in details: i.e., 
analytical objectives, applications, advantages, disadvantages etc., which will be reviewed 
again to demonstrate the need of the combination of FMEA and FTA.  
FMEA is a useful technique for risk assessment and it has been effectively used for the 
detailed failure analysis of the system which can cause the failure consequences that affect 
- 111 - 
 
railway systems. The analysis procedure of FMEA can also be applied as an essential 
engineering design process to define all potential failure modes and effects of a system. 
However, FMEA has several challenges to be overcome in the risk assessment of large-scale, 
complex systems that have multi-functions and safety functions like railway systems. This 
technique has the difficulty in the quantification and logical expression of the detailed 
relationship of the system elements to judge the defects or weak points in the system 
engineering design phase (BS EN 60812, 2006; BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007). 
When FMEA is applied to the analysis of the system that has several hierarchy levels with 
many redundancy structures, it becomes very complicated and even causes misunderstanding 
or errors. FMEA cannot effectively represent the relationship between individual and group of 
failure modes or causes, so it is difficulty in supporting the system design process adequately. 
Furthermore, the deficiency of FMEA is clearly shown in the interactive expression of 
components in the system engineering design. However, such deficiencies of FMEA can be 
overcome and further complemented by the integration of two or more different techniques 
that can logically express the relationship of system components, for example, FTA, ETA etc. 
FTA has been recommended most commonly as the integration technique of FMEA to 
effectively design the high safety risk nature of railway systems (BS EN 60300-1, 2004). 
FTA can effectively trace the low-level failure causes of a high-level failure consequence by 
building a logical and graphical fault tree and providing a quantitative and qualitative minimal 
cut set representations of the fault tree. FTA is a useful technique to model the scenarios of the 
failure causes, especially single failure points which directly lead to major safety accidents. 
Therefore, FTA can be used in the identification and design of safety functions and their 
monitoring functions.  
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FMEA is a systematic, inductive risk assessment technique which is used for the qualitative 
assessment of failure consequences, whilst FTA is a deductive technique which is most often 
used for the quantitative assessment through the logical analysis of failure causes. As stated in 
Chapter 4, systems engineering design process requires various risk assessment methods: an 
inductive and/or deductive approach, including qualitative, quantitative and/or semi-
quantitative assessments to achieve the engineering design objectives effectively. Therefore, 
the combination of FMEA and FTA can form a useful risk assessment method to achieve all 
of such analytical requirements, depending on the system design phase (Gofuku et al., 2006). 
5.2.3 FMEA and FTA Based Risk Assessment Models  
As stated in Chapter 3, railway risk is defined by the combination of the severity degree of a 
failure consequence and its frequency or probability. The railway risk assessment requires the 
clear answers for the following four questions (see diagram) to determine the levels of the 
failure severity and frequency. Therefore, a process that determines the levels of railway risk 
can be represented as shown in Figure 5.1. Each step will require the selection of the 
appropriate risk assessment techniques that can satisfy the given questions.  
1. What can go wrong?
(Definition of Scenarios)
Failure Mode 
Selection
2. What are the Consequences?
(Scenario Consequence Quantification)
Consequence Modelling
Scenario 
Development
3. How  frequently does it happen?
(Scenario Frequency Quantification)
Scenario Logic 
Modelling
Scenario Frequency 
Evaluation
Risk Level
Evaluation
4. What is the risk level?
 
Figure 5.1 Concept of Railway Risk Assessment  
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Figure 5.2 shows the proposed risk assessment technique based on FMEA-FTA appropriate to 
the model of Figure 5.1. The FMEA technique is used for the qualitative failure analysis of all 
system elements, such as all possible failure modes, their consequences and causes, and the 
scenario development of the failure consequences and causes and it applies the bottom up 
approaches to the failure analysis in order to answer the questions 1 and 2. 
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Severity of 
Consequence, X
FMEA
S (X)
Risk Level (X : P)
Fault tree 
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Figure 5.2 Concept of FMEA-FTA based Railway Risk Assessment 
 
On the other hand, FTA is used for the quantitative analysis of the failure consequences 
through the logical analysis of the failure causes, which are analysed by the logical structures 
of the fault tree, Boolean algebra rules, the developed scenarios of failure causes and the top-
down approach in the failure analysis to answer the question 3. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the combination method of FMEA and FTA techniques at any analytical 
point of a risk. The first performs the FMEA analysis for all system elements and the results 
of the FMEA analysis are effectively supported by the fault tree construction, which performs 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the failure tree by using Boolean algebra rules and 
probability laws. However, the purpose of the combination is differently applied in the system 
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engineering design phase as shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Figure 5.3 FMEA and FTA Combination Model 
The FMEA and FTA combination model of Figure 5.2 can be applied by two methods: top-
down approach and bottom-up approach, depending on the systems engineering design phase 
as shown in Figure 5.4. As stated in Chapter 4, the subsystem definition phase is performed to 
define the functional architecture of the subsystems. Accordingly, the failure analysis is 
conducted as a top-down approach to trace the root failure causes in the objective for 
identification and establishment of the safety and their monitoring functions. The component 
definition phase is to define the physical design architectures. Thus, the failure analysis is 
conducted as a bottom-up approach to trace the failure consequence scenarios quantitatively. 
Figure 5.4 describes FMEA-FTA based risk assessment approach for a failure hazard. 
However, the FMEA-FTA combination models can apply two approaches at the same time as 
shown in Figure 5.4. Therefore, in each design phase, the analysis of the failure consequences 
and causes can be applied at once. 
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Figure 5.4 FMEA and FTA based Railway Risk Assessment Approach Model 
5.2.3.1   Top-down Risk Assessment Model 
Figure 5.5 shows the principle of an integrated FTA-FMEA approach model and it is applied 
for the top-down (or backward) risk assessment in the systems engineering process. In this 
model, FTA has an active role as the main assessment technique to trace the root of a failure 
cause, while FMEA is for all possible failure modes, causes and effects and the results of 
FMEA analysis support the FTA to continuously expand the fault tree model until the roots of 
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failure causes are reached, and they also support the development of the modelling and 
severity classification of failure consequences. Figure 5.5 describes the combined model of 
FTA-FMEA techniques.  
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Figure 5.5  FTA-FMEA based Top-down Risk Assessment Model 
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The FTA-FMEA model starts by selecting a top event. The top event can be determined by 
various analytical methods: preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), hazard and operability 
analysis (HAZOP), hazard log lists, safety requirements etc. at different design phases, but the 
selected top events should be analysed by FMEA because it can determine all analytical items 
that are needed to assess risks and it supports the construction of a fault tree and the modelling 
of the failure consequence scenarios. 
The important bottom events that are identified from the qualitative fault tree analysis in the 
system design phase are applied as the failure modes to conduct the FMEA analysis of the 
next system level, as shown in Figure 5.5. The compensating provision is very important to 
establish the functional architecture. This model is very useful in supporting the design and 
analysis of adequate functional structure (subsystems), as it has a great advantage for the 
identification of safety functions and safety monitoring functions, as described in Chapter 4. 
5.2.3.2   Bottom-up Risk Assessment Model 
Figure 5.6 shows the principle of an integrated FMEA-FTA approach model, which is applied 
for the bottom-up (or forward) approach in the failure analysis of the design architecture of 
the railway system. In this model, FMEA is deployed as the main analysis technique and FTA 
supports the FMEA analysis for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the failure causes in 
more detail by providing the logical structure of system design and the quantified evaluation 
of failure causes.  
FTA analysis is in turn conducted by the severity ranking of the failure effects at any system 
design phase to identify the failure causes quantitatively. The failure modes are used as 
intermediate events in the fault tree, as shown in Figure 5.6. In this model, FTA is 
implemented more comprehensively to provide the compensating provisions for failure causes 
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to support the system design and maintenance policy. This approach model can be applied 
from component to system level in the design definition phase as stated in Chapter 4.  
Failure Mode Failure Causes
Severity Ranking
Failure 
Consequence
Top Eventop vent
Frequency 
Ranking
Risk Level
Intermediate
 Event
Basic 
event
Basic 
event
Basic 
event
FMEA 
FTA
Quantitative analysis
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Failure Severity
Compensating 
Provision
Risk Matrix
Risk Estimation
Risk Identification
 
Figure 5.6   FMEA-FTA based Bottom-up Risk Assessment Model  
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5.3 Development of FMEA-FTA based Railway Risk Assessment Process 
As stated in Chapter 4, RAMS management shall have a process to identify and assess all 
potential hazards and the relevant risks in the system engineering process and to provide the 
rational and basic information needed in determining the appropriate application of risk 
mitigation and elimination, and/or the control of risk measures. An effective risk assessment 
process will include all aspects related to railway RAMS risks in order to provide the rational 
decision-making that minimises, reduces, or even eliminates the railway risks involved 
through RAMS management. Therefore, risk assessment process will include the sufficient 
methods and techniques to demonstrate that failure modes with all potentials and pertinent 
measures applied to conform the level of risks to As Low As Reasonably Practicably 
(ALARP) (Umar, 2010; An et al., 2007). 
The proposed railway risk assessment process based on FMEA and FTA commences with 
identifying the need of RAMS management and determining the RAMS requirements through 
the comparison and analysis of the relevant information and data collected from the past 
incidents and accidents of similar systems. The RAMS requirements are established with 
reference to statutory regulations, product deterministic life, failure modes as well as possible 
resultant failure consequences. However, the risk assessment of high complexity of railway 
system and its insufficient risk information and data source may require the combined use of 
risk assessment techniques to satisfy the use of experts or engineering judgement and the 
quantification of the risk evaluation concurrently in the system engineering design process. 
The important failure consequences are then further analysed through the progressive top-
down steps from a system level to the components and then the bottom-up steps from 
components to the sub-systems and finally to a whole system level (Umar, 2010; An et al., 
2004). 
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Figure 5.7   Proposed FMEA-FTA Based Risk Assessment Process 
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5.3.1   Requirement Definition Phase 
This process involves identifying the needs and implications of the RAMS management in the 
railway system engineering project through the feasibility studies, and then it defines the 
RAMS design solutions and their acceptance performance criteria through the definition of 
system boundaries, operational contexts, environments and life cycle processes. The RAMS 
design solution and acceptance criteria should be defined and specified by different system 
hierarchy levels: a system level, the subsystem level and component level comprising the 
system as shown in Figure 5.7.  
The items need to be identified and defined in this phase (BS IEC/ISO 26702, 2007): 
•  Design constraints: e.g. sets of rules and standard regulations; 
•  Operational scenarios and measures of RAMS effectiveness; 
•  System boundaries, operational environments, and life cycle process;  
•  Functional requirements, deterministic and/or probabilistic RAMS requirements and; 
•  RAMS acceptance performance criteria. 
5.3.2 Risk Parameter and Evaluation Matrix Definition Phase 
 
After the RAMS requirements: i.e., design and acceptance criteria; system and operational 
contexts, are defined, the data and information needed for risk assessment are collected and 
analysed to establish the index and range of risk parameters, and to provide input for the risk 
assessment process. 
5.3.2.1   Data Collection and Analysis  
The second phase of the risk assessment process starts with the analysis of the collected data 
and information available to establish the index and range of a risk parameter and a risk 
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evaluation matrix, and to provide an input to the risk assessment process. The data and 
information are collected from historical data, test data, expert knowledge and sources of 
other information, as shown in Figure 5.7.  
The objectives of the collected data and information analysis are to identify the explicit 
understanding of all possible railway risks from the past accidents and incidents of similar 
systems, and to obtain a set of information from the collected data. If the data is not 
statistically accurate or the amount of data is insufficient, expert judgement and/or 
engineering decisions can be applied. The information and data identified and analysed can be 
used to determine the ranking of index parameter, and make up a qualitative indexing matrix 
(Umar, 2010).  . 
Many common statistical techniques can be applied to collect information and knowledge, for 
example, statistical data and information analysis, human experience and engineering 
knowledge analysis, conceptual mapping etc. Two or more of these techniques can be 
combined to overcome their inherent shortcomings and to reinforce their inherent 
environmental characteristics (An et al., 2007).  
5.3.2.2   Establishment of Risk Parameters 
The information and data that are identified from the collected data can be used to determine 
the index ranking and make up a qualitative indexing matrix. By the definition of railway risk, 
the proposed FMEA-FTA based risk assessment model requires two risk index parameters: a 
failure severity parameter and a failure frequency parameter of occurrence. This is to 
determine the risk levels of the failure consequences of components and their impact on the 
sub-systems and the railway level system and it also requires an evaluation matrix to 
determine the risk level (An et al., 2007; BS EN 50126-1, 1999).   
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(1) Failure Severity Parameters 
The failure severity parameter (FSP) of a failure consequence describes the possible 
magnitude of the failure consequence for the system as a whole. The FSP can be expressed by 
the defined words to define the different terms as described in Table 5.1: for example, 
insignificant, marginal, critical and catastrophic. The failure consequence of the railway 
system can be separated into three consequence conditions: people, environment or railway 
service. Table 5.1 shows the FSPs which are considerable in the railway risk assessment to 
rank the possible magnitude of all failure consequences (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). 
Table 5.1 Failure Severity Parameters  
Severity 
category 
Level Consequence to Person or Environment Consequence to Service 
Catastrophic 4 
Fatalities and/or multiple severe 
injuries and/or major damage to the 
environment 
Whole system failure 
Critical 3 
Single fatality and/or severe injury 
and/or significant damage to the 
environment 
Loss of a major system. 
Marginal 2 
Minor injury and/or significant threat 
to the environment 
Severe system (s) 
damage 
Insignificant 1 Possible minor injury Minor system damage 
 
 
 
(2) Failure Frequency Parameters 
 
Table 5.2 describes the classification of the failure frequency parameter (FFP) of occurrence 
of all possible failure consequences to quantify the risk level. In general, frequent, probable, 
occasional, remote, impossible and incredible are suggested in the interational standards and 
- 124 - 
 
literature, and their failure frequency between 100/year and 10
-6
 /year is defined as shown in 
Table 5.2 (Kim et al., 2008). 
Table 5.2 Failure Frequency Parameters 
Category Level Description Frequency 
Frequent 6 
It is likely to occur frequently and will be 
continually experienced. 
≥100 
Probable 5 
It will occur several times and can be expected to 
occur often. 
100< to ≤ 1 
Occasional 4 
It is likely to occur several times and can be 
expected to occur several times. 
1< to ≤ 10-2 
Remote 3 
It is likely to occur at some time in the system 
life cycle and can reasonably be expected to 
occur. 
10-2< to ≤ 10-4 
Impossible 2 
It is unlikely to occur but is possible and can be 
assumed that it may exceptionally occur. 
10-4< to ≤ 10-6 
Incredible 1 
It extremely unlikely to occur and can be 
assumed that it may not occur. 
<10-6 
 
(3)  Risk Level  
Risk level (RL) is commonly expressed quantitatively or qualitatively as shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Risk Level Parameters 
Risk 
Classification 
Risk 
Level 
Risk Reduction/Control 
Unacceptable 4 Risk shall be eliminated. 
Undesirable 3 
Risk shall only be accepted when risk reduction is 
impracticable and with agreement.  
Tolerable 2 Risk is acceptable with adequate control and agreement. 
Negligible 1 Acceptable without any agreement. 
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BS EN 50126-1 (1999) provides qualitative descriptors, such as negligible, tolerable, 
undesirable and unacceptable and BS EN 50129 (2003) provides RL for signalling system 
design. Table 5.3 shows the qualitative descriptor categories of risk level derived from 
ALARP
17
.  
5.3.2.3   Establishment of Risk Evaluation Matrix 
Table 5.4 shows a risk estimation matrix which determines the level of the railway risk. The 
risk evaluation matrix includes the levels of  FFP in the horizental axis and the FSP in the 
vertical axis, as shown in Table 5.4. The point at which each index parameter mutually meets 
is the RL of a failure consequence. For example, if the FFP is ‘frequent’ and the FSP is 
‘insignificant’, then the risk level is determined as ‘undesirable (high risk)’. If the FFP is 
‘incredible’ and the FSP of failure consequence is ‘catastrophic’, and then the risk level is 
determined as ‘negligible’, as shown in Table 5.4 (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). 
Table 5.4 Risk Evaluation Matrix 
Frequency Level Risk Level 
Frequent 6 Undesirable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable 
Probable 5 Tolerable Undesirable Intolerable Intolerable 
Occasional 4 Tolerable Undesirable Undesirable Intolerable 
Remote 3 Negligible Tolerable Undesirable Undesirable 
Improbable 2 Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable 
Incredible 1 Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
 
1 2 3 4 
Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic 
Severity Levels of Failure Consequence 
                                                          
17. As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
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5.3.3   Risk Identification Phase 
As stated in Chapter 4, risk identification is generally performed after the functional 
architecture has been established. Therefore, the functional block diagram, such as SADT
18
 or 
FAST
19
 which was described in chapter 3, is essential for the identification of possible risks 
with other collected data and information. As mentioned in Chapter 4, risk identification is a 
process that systematically identifies all potential failure modes, failure causes and effects at 
different system hierarchy levels, for instance, from component level to sub-system level; it 
determines the failure consequences and causes affecting the performance of the whole 
system level, and then establishes their two models. Therefore, the risk identification is 
performed in three process stages: operational, functional and design definition process stage, 
as stated in Chapter 4. The operational definition phase is conducted to confirm the major 
risks and the functional definition stage is conducted by a top down approach to identify and 
compare risks, and the design definition and synthesis stage is conducted by a bottom up 
approach for an update of the risks identified in the above phase. The risk identification is 
consisted of the identification of failure modes, the analysis of their failure effects and causes, 
and the development of their failure effect and cause scenario models. 
At this process phase, typical risk assessment techniques, such as brainstorming, checklist, 
what if and HAZOP, can be used together with FMEA to identify railway risks explicitly. The 
risk identification initially started from the system level and is continuously extended to 
component level. It is repeated again from component level and completed at the system level 
as shown in Figure 5.7. This phase develops the scenario modelling of the failure 
                                                          
18. Structured Analysis and Design Technique 
19. Functional Analysis System Technique  
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consequences and failure causes to confirm the logical architectures of the system design (An 
et al., 2007; Niels Peter Hoj, 2002; BS EN 31010, 2008).  
5.3.3.1   Development of Failure Consequence Scenario 
The scenario development of failure consequences is to estimate the impacts on the situations 
or circumstances of the failure events, which have a range of the level of the different failure 
severity. The failure consequences are modelled to determine the failure severity of the entire 
outcomes of a failure effect, a set of failure effects or by judging from experimental studies or 
past data. The scenario development of failure consequences starts from the occurrence of an 
initial event to the final failure consequence, as shown in Figure 5.8. Both ETA and FTA, 
based on the results of FMEA analysis, can be applied to model the logical and graphical 
scenario development of the failure consequences, but as stated in Section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3, 
if FTA is used to model the failure consequences of the systems which have multiple 
safeguards, the scenario would be very complex and large. Therefore, the systems which have 
the multiple safeguards like railway system are modelled by ETA. Figure 5.8 depicts the 
methods that develop the scenario of failure consequences by ETA (Ericson, 2005). 
Event 1
(Initial Event)
Event 2 ConsequencesEvent 3
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Failure
Failure
Consequence 1
Consequence 2
Consequence 3
Consequence 4
Initiating 
Event
 
Figure 5.8 Development of Failure Consequence Scenario by ETA  
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5.3.3.2   Development of Failure Cause Scenario 
Risk identification should be a structured method to identify all possible causes that lead to an 
undesirable system failure. It should organise the possible contributory factors into broad 
categories. However, not all possible failure causes may contribute to the actual failure 
because these can only be determined by collected data and empirical testing data. 
Accordingly, a fishbone diagram can more effectively judge all possible causes; so it is a very 
useful technique to represent and understand the relationship between failure causes leading 
to a failure consequence. Hence a fishbone diagram can effectively support FMEA analysis to 
identify the precise failure causes, and it can assist FTA analysis to model the failure cause 
scenarios as shown in Figure 5.9. The fishbone diagram can be easily converted as a fault tree. 
Figure 5.10 depicts a fishbone diagram that uses the factors affecting railway RAMS 
performance in the railway system, maintenance and operation conditions, provided from BS 
50126-1 (1999). 
Cause Category 1
Failure Consequence
Cause Category 3ause ategory 3 Cause Category 2
Cause 
Subcause 
 
Figure 5.9 Establishment of Failure Cause by Fishbone Diagram 
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Figure 5.10 Factors affecting Railway RAMS  
The scenarios of failure causes can be modelled by using a logical structure. The logical 
modelling is implemented by using a fault tree. The logical modelling is an iterative process 
that starts from a top event and it is continuously preceded through the tree structures until it 
reaches the root failure causes. This fault tree modelling is performed using the two steps as 
shown below: 
   Step 1: Top Event Determination 
A fault tree is the symbolic representation of the system conditions that may cause a failure 
event so that the fault tree can identify the root failure causes of a failure event. The 
construction of a fault tree starts with identifying a top event and all events that lead to the top 
event. The top event is determined by three failure causes as shown in Figure 5.11. 
Primary failure is an event of component failure within the design boundary, i.e. an event due 
to an inherent component characteristic. Secondary failure indicates a failure of a component 
outside the design boundary, i.e. a failure due to environmental or operational stress of a 
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component. Command failure is an inadvertent operation for the component due to normal 
operation being commanded at the wrong time (Ericson, 2005; MIL-HDBK-764, 1990).   
Primary Failure
Undesired failure
Primary 
Failure
Command Fault Secondary
 Failure
Command failure Undesired failure
Secondary failure
 
Figure 5.11 Fault Tree Construction Method 
   Step 2:  Fault Tree Symbol Determination 
The next step for the construction of a fault tree is to identify fault tree symbols. There are 
two kinds of symbols for building a fault tree: logic symbols and event symbols, as shown in 
Table 5.5. Logic symbols are for the interconnection of the failure events leading to the 
specific top event; the basic logic symbols are ‘OR’ and ‘AND’ gates. Event symbols 
represent the defined failure events by system hierarchy. Table 5.5 includes a brief description 
of the fault tree symbols that are often used.  
- 131 - 
 
Table 5.5   Definition of Fault Tree Symbols 
Category Symbols Name Description 
Event 
Symbol 
 
Top Event or 
Intermediate 
Event 
Top event and intermediate event which 
describes the system fault, subsystem fault or 
higher level fault than the basic level fault. 
 
Basic Event 
Basic event for the application of reliability 
information. 
 
House Event 
Event which has happened, or will happen 
with certainty. 
 
Undeveloped 
Event 
A part of the system that is yet to be 
developed or defined. 
 
Connecting 
Event 
Gate indicating that this part of the system is 
developed in another part or page of the 
diagram. 
Logic 
Symbol 
 
AND Gate 
Gate applies when all of the input events 
happen. 
 
OR Gate 
Gate occurs when any of its input events 
happens. 
 
Inhibit Gate 
Gate applies only if both the input events 
occur and one of them is conditional. 
 
5.3.4 Risk Analysis Phase 
Risk analysis is a process that quantitatively estimates the scenario of the failure causes and 
consequences developed in the previous phase to determine the risk level of failure 
consequence.  Figure 5.12 shows the quantitative evaluation model of failure consequence, 
which is performed by the FTA analysis for the failure cause scenarios of the failure events. 
The evaluated levels of the severity and frequency of each failure consequence are applied to 
the risk evaluation matrix of Table 5.4 to determine the risk level (Ericson, 2005). 
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Figure 5.12 Failure Cause-Consequence Quantification Model 
5.3.4.1 Qualitative Analysis of Failure Cause Scenarios  
A fault tree provides the failure combinations of the components that can cause the top event. 
The fault tree provides one mechanism that leads the top event. Therefore, the cut set analysis 
of a fault tree reveals the critical and/or weak links of the components in a system design by 
identifying safety related to components cut sets with high probability, and where intended 
safety or redundancy features have been bypassed. The cut set analysis is conducted for the 
determination of minimal cut sets, which are determined by the rules of Boolean algebra 
(Stamatelatos and Caraballo, 2002). 
The Boolean algebra rules are very important in rules in order to determine minimal cut sets, 
which are a pictorial expression of the Boolean algebra relationship. Table 5.6 provides 
Boolean algebra rules being used in general.   
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Table 5.6 Boolean algebra Rules 
 Mathematical Symbolism Engineering Symbolism Designation 
1-1                 Commutative Law 
1-2                  
2-1   (   )  (   )      (   )  (   )    Associative Law 
2-2   (   )  (   )      (   )  (   )     
3-1   (   )  (   )  (   )   (   )          Distributive Law 
3-2   (   )  (   )  (   )   (   )  (   )  (   )  
4-1             Idempotent Law 
4-2              
5-1   (   )      (   )    Absorption Law 
5-2   (   )      (   )     
6-1               Complementation 
6-2                      
6-3 (  )    (  )     
7-1 (   )        (   )        De Morgan’s Law 
7-2 (   )        (   )         
 
 
A fault tree builds a top event by one or more minimal cut sets (MCSs). One basic event, 
MCS, means a single point failure that will lead to the top event. The two basic events, MCSs, 
represent the double point failures that together will result in the top event to occur. For an n-
basic event, MCSs, the top event will be caused when all n-basic events in the cut sets are 
failed (Stamatelatos and Caraballo, 2002). 
Therefore, the basic events, MCSs, for the top event can be expressed as: 
                                                                                                            (   ) 
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Where, 
T = top event; 
  = MCSs. 
Each MCS is comprised of a combination of specific events. Therefore, the general n-basic 
event MCSs can be expressed as follow: 
                                                                                                              (   ) 
Where, 
X1, X2… Xn = basic events on the fault tree.  
Therefore, Equation 5.1 can be replaced by basic events as Equation 5.3: 
                                                                                                       (   ) 
Equation 5.4 is an example which expresses a top event: 
                                                                                                                      (   ) 
Where, 
X1, X2 and X3 are basic event failures.  
The top event (T) has a one-basic event MCS (  ) and a two-basic event MCSs (     ).  
To determine the MCSs of a fault tree, the fault tree is converted into the equivalent Boolean 
algebra equations. A variety of algorithms exists to translate the Boolean algebra equations 
into cut sets. The top-down and bottom-up substitution method are the general application 
methods. The methods are straightforward and they involve substituting and expanding the 
Boolean algebra expressions. Figure 5.13 is an example fault tree to show the equivalent 
Boolean algebra equations (Stamatelatos and Caraballo, 2002). 
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Figure 5.13 An Example of a Fault Tree for the equivalent Boolean algebra 
The fault tree shown in Figure 5.13 can be expressed as follows: 
                                                                                                                            (   ) 
                                                                                                                         (   ) 
                                                                                                                         (   ) 
                                                                                                                         (   ) 
                                                                                                                                     (   ) 
 
  Top-down Substitution Method 
The first presents the top-down method. Equation 5.5 is replaced by Equations 5.6 and 5.8, 
and then it is arranged by the absorption law as shown in Equation 5.10: 
  (     )  (     ) 
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    (     )  (     )  (     )  (     )                                                (    ) 
Then, B1 of Equation 5.10 is replaced by Equation 5.7 as below: 
        (     )           (     )     
                                                                 (    ) 
By the idempotent law for the equation given below: 
                        
Thus, Equation 5.11 is simplified as shown below: 
                                                                                                         (    ) 
 B2 of Equation 5.12 is replaced by Equation 5.9 and then the law of absorption is applied 
twice, as shown below: 
     (     )     (     )                                                                      (    ) 
(     )           
Thus, Equation 5.13 is: 
     (     )  (     )                                                                                  (    ) 
Then, by the absorption law:  
(     )  (     )        
Finally, Equation 5.5 can be expressed by minimal cut sets as Equation 5.15: 
                                                                                                                     (    ) 
The MCSs of the top event thus consists of one single event MCS (X3) and one double event 
MCSs (X1 • X2). Equation 5.15 can be represented by Figure 5.14. 
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Figure 5.14 Equivalent Fault Tree Simplified from Figure 5.13 
 Bottom-up Substitution Method 
Bottom-up substitution method for Figure 5.13 follows the procedure as described below. For 
Equations 5.5 to 5.9, firstly, A1 and A2 are replaced by Equations 5.7 and 5.9 that are made up 
by only basic events as shown below: 
                                                                                                                  (    ) 
                                                                                                                    (    ) 
Then, Equation 5.5 is replaced by Equation 5.6 and 5.8 and the top event can be expressed as 
shown below:  
  (        )  (        )                                                                        (    ) 
Finally, using the absorption law, Equation 5.18 is simplified as Equation 5.19: 
                                               
                                       
   (           )  (        )  (              ) 
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   (        )  (        )  (         ) 
                                                                                                                       (    ) 
It is confirmed that Equation 5.15 is equal to Equation 5.19. Therefore, any of these two 
methods can be used to get the same minimal cut sets. 
5.3.4.2 Quantitative Analysis of Failure Cause Scenarios 
A failure cause scenario model can be quantified by the probability law or failure rate. These 
quantifying methods are described below: 
(1) Quantification by Probability Law 
After the minimal cut sets of a fault tree are determined, the probability of the top event can 
be evaluated. The basic concepts of the probability laws are applied to the logic gates of FTA. 
Two basic laws of probability are represented for 'OR' and 'AND' gate: 
 OR gate 
The probability expression of OR gate for the top event is given by Equation 5.20: 
 ( )   (𝑎)   (𝑏) −  (𝑎  𝑏)                                                                              (    ) 
If a and b are statistically independent events and “ (𝑎  𝑏)”is very small, then the above 
Equation 5.20 can be approximated as Equation 5.21: 
 ( ) ≅  (𝑎)   (𝑏)                                                                                                  (    ) 
In the case of n number of inputs OR gate, the Equation 5.21 may be generalised by Equation 
5.22: 
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 (𝑎  𝑏  𝑐   ) ≅  (𝑎)   (𝑏)   (𝑐)                                                    (    ) 
 AND gate 
The probability expression of AND gate for the top event is given by Equation 5.23: 
 (𝑎𝑏)   (𝑎)   (𝑏)                                                                                                   (    )  
For AND gate of n input, the above Equation 5.23 can be generalised as Equation 5.24: 
 (𝑎  𝑏  𝑐   ) ≅  (𝑎)   (𝑏)   (𝑐)                                                                  (    ) 
 
(2)  Quantification by failure Rate  
 OR gate 
Logically the OR gate corresponds to a series system, the reliability of which is evaluated by 
the following Equation 5.25: 
 𝑠(𝑡)  ∏    (𝑡)
 
 = 
                                                                                                       (    )  
Where,  
     = the reliability of the i
th
 component; 
 𝑠 = the series system reliability and; 
  = the number of components. 
The failure rate, F (t), is a probability complementary to reliability, as shown below: 
 (𝑡)   −  (𝑡)                                                                                                           (    ) 
Therefore, the failure rate of a series system can be represented by Equation 5.27: 
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 𝑠(𝑡)   − ∏( −     (𝑡))
 
 = 
                                                                                     (    ) 
Where,  
     = the failure rate of the i
th
 component; 
 𝑠 = the series system failure rate, and; 
  = the number of components. 
 AND gate 
The AND gate corresponds to a logically connected parallel system. Reliability of the parallel 
system is given by the following equation: 
 𝑝(𝑡)   − ∏( −   (𝑡))
 
 = 
                                                                                     (    ) 
Where,  
 𝑝 = the parallel system reliability; 
  = the number of components, and; 
   = the i
th
 component reliability. 
On the other hand, the failure rate of the parallel system is given by the following equation: 
 𝑝(𝑡)  ∏(  (𝑡))                                                                                                      (    )
 
 = 
 
Where,  
     = the failure rate of the i
th
 component; 
 𝑝 = the parallel system failure rate, and; 
  = the number of components. 
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Figure 5.12 shows the methods that analyse the probability of failure frequency of each failure 
event through consequence scenarios developed in previous phases (Ericson, 2005). 
5.3.5 Risk Evaluation Phase 
The risk evaluation phase is performed to determine the risk level by the combination of the 
failure severity and its frequency levels through the risk evaluation matrix. The results 
obtained from this phase will provide important information for the selection of appropriate 
risk handling and control options. The evaluated results are used to assist the systems 
engineers or RAMS engineers to design system products and develop maintenance, logistic 
support and operation schemes. If the risk requires high-risk measures, it has to be controlled 
to reduce the failure frequency or any possible failure consequences. If the risks were 
accepted, no further action would be required, but the analysis results provided would need to 
be recorded for certification (Umar, 2010; BS ISO/IEC 31010, 2008). 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented railway risk assessment method, based on the combination of 
FMEA-FTA to support the control of railway RAMS risks that affect the mission and safety 
of railway service. The hazards, information and data available and systems design phase are 
important decision-making factors for the selection of railway risk assessment techniques.  
This chapter firstly presented railway risk assessment models, based on the definition of 
railway risk and the application of FMEA-FTA combination. This chapter presented four 
questions for the definition of railway risk, the construction of risk scenarios and the selection 
of the risk assessment techniques, and it also provided the method of applying FMEA-FTA 
combination to the railway risk scenario. This chapter presented two FMEA-FTA based risk 
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assessment models, top-down and bottom-up, that are applicable to the functional and design 
architecture design phases.  
This chapter secondly provided FMEA-FTA based railway risk assessment process that is 
applicable to all systems design phase to cover all aspects of railway risk assessment, based 
on the systems engineering process. The process is started with the definition of RAMS 
design and acceptance criteria. In the risk identification phase, the process proposed the use of 
ETA and fishbone diagram to identify all possible risks effectively. The ETA can be used for 
the graphical representation of the failure consequence scenarios and the fishbone diagram 
can be used for the exact determination of the failure causes and the effective support of a 
fault tree construction.  
The identified railway risks are analysed qualitatively and quantitatively to quantify the 
frequency and severity of the failure consequences. The qualitative analysis is conducted to 
determine minimal cut sets, which exactly identifies the causes of a failure consequence, 
especially, to determine the safety functions and their monitoring functions and the 
quantitative analysis is performed to quantify the determined minimal cut set by the failure 
probability or failure rate 
In conclusion, railway risk assessment is a core part of RAMS management and systems 
engineering, providing a thorough understanding and sufficient information for the effective 
control of railway risks. The proposed risk assessment methods can easily be used in the 
systems design phase and have a great potential to design the system safety functions. 
However, the risk assessment process requires the thorough understanding for the railway 
system functions and failures, its operation conditions, adequate risk data sources and many 
experiences and knowledge.   
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Chapter 6 
DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE BASED RAMS SPECIFICATION 
FOR RAILWAY SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
6.1   Introduction 
Chapters 4 & 5 have discussed the method to establish railway RAMS management and 
integrate the RAMS management into railway systems engineering. For this objective, a 
RAMS management systems with risk based RAMS management process was proposed, and 
a railway systems engineering process and its detailed process activities were established to 
provide the fundamentals of the policy, functions and activities of the RAMS management. A 
FMEA-FTA based railway risk assessment method was also presented to focus RAMS 
management on the assessment and control of railway risks that affect the quality of railway 
service. These resultant outcomes lay the foundations for development of RAMS specification 
that provides RAMS design solutions and its acceptance criteria. 
Specifying RAMS requirements and operational contexts is a starting point for implementing 
RAMS management through systems engineering process; it provides a basis for performing 
RAMS management activities. RAMS specification shall require the systematic and 
quantitative RAMS requirements and operational strategies to the customers. On the other 
hand, it also requires the development of technical RAMS design and its acceptance criteria to 
the supplier. Therefore, developing RAMS specification is an essential activity to both the 
customer and the supplier to achieve the objective of RAMS management and increase the 
feasibility of the system design in the operation phase. However, in many railway projects, 
customers have not provided systematic and quantitative RAMS requirements and operational 
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conditions to the suppliers. The suppliers have also not systematically developed RAMS 
specification with the customers. In fact, railway projects have just provided RAMS 
specification without the implementation of RAMS specification process. Thus, railway 
projects have undergone many difficulties in ensuring that RAMS requirements can be 
achieved in the system concept design phase and some projects were even failed. Therefore, 
this chapter presents the method that develops systematic and quantitative RAMS 
requirements by the customers, and develops technical RAMS design criteria by the suppliers.  
This chapter comprises five sections to present the development of railway RAMS 
specification. Section 6.2 presents a framework to develop RAMS performance specification. 
A proposed railway RAMS specification process is presented in Section 6.3. This chapter is 
concluded in Section 6.4 with a brief summary. 
 
6.2 Development of Railway RAMS Performance Specification 
6.2.1 Railway RAMS Performance Specification 
A railway systems specification shall accurately describe all function and performance 
requirements required for the establishment of technical design solutions and their acceptance 
criteria, operational conditions and test provision. It aims at ensuring that all system 
requirements should be achieved successfully during the system design and operation phases. 
It also includes the essential internal and external constraints. A railway system performance 
specification provides the overall design solutions, its acceptance performance criteria and the 
operational contexts of the system to design; it is also allocated to the subsystems comprising 
the system to establish the optimal functional architecture. RAMS performance specification 
shall be conducted in the same way as an integrated part of the systems performance 
specification to facilitate the system design efforts (BS EN 62347, 2007). 
- 145 - 
 
RAMS performance specification is generally implemented for the achievement of the 
following objectives: (1) to avoid duplication, conflict and inconsistency of the performance 
related to RAMS management activities that may occur during railway systems engineering is 
progressed, (2) to analyse and evaluate RAMS requirements and operational behaviours 
adequately, (3) to negotiate for contract and reference of RAMS performance that may be 
caused due to the changes in the system engineering policy, methods, and techniques, (4) to 
support configuration management and (5) to consistently communicate with the customer, 
especially related to responsibility (Duap, 2001).  
6.2.2 Development of Railway RAMS Performance Specification  
RAMS performance specifications have been provided from many railway projects, but the 
principle, method, techniques and process for the development of RAMS performance 
specification have not been provided from railway industry and other mission and safety 
critical industrial fields as well. Therefore, this section proposes a framework that can specify 
RAMS requirements and operational contexts into RAMS design and its acceptance 
performance criteria as shown in Figure 6.1. The framework provides a foundation for the 
development of RAMS performance specification of a railway system. 
Figure 6.1 describes a proposed framework for the development of RAMS performance 
specification and it is based on the systems approach, as stated in Chapter 3. The proposed 
framework consists of five steps under the thorough understanding of the entire railway 
service objectives: (1) the establishment of railway service objectives, (2) the definition of 
railway RAMS, (3) the establishment of principle for RAMS performance specification, (4) 
the establishment of RAMS measures and (5) the development of RAMS performance 
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specification process. The RAMS performance specification process should be consistently 
applied and implemented in all system design phases.  
Establishment of 
 RAMS Measures 
Step: 4
Development of
RAMS Performance 
Specification Process
Step: 5
Definition of
 Railway RAMS
Step 2:
Principle  of
RAMS 
Performance 
Specification
Step 3:
Establishment of Railway Service Objectives: Step 1
Application to Each Systems  Engineering Design Phase
 
Figure 6.1 Framework for Development of Railway RAMS Performance Specification 
Step 1:   Establishment of Railway Service Objectives 
RAMS performance specification is started with the identification of the overall railway 
service objectives in the entire railway business aspect and the establishment of the service 
performance that takes on the railway system to design. The railway service performance 
shall effectively satisfy the achievement of the overall railway service objectives and it is a 
basis of railway RAMS performance specification as an input. Therefore, the quantitative 
definition of the railway service objectives is very important to develop the RAMS design 
solutions and their acceptance performance criteria.  
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Step 2:   Definition of Railway RAMS  
Definition of railway RAMS as a framework, as shown in Figure 6.2, is to provide the RAMS 
concepts and operational strategies of the system to design and develop. It generally includes 
railway service objectives, operational RAMS objectives, operational contexts and product 
RAMS measures as shown in Figure 6.2. However, the RAMS definition can be tailored from 
the framework of Figure 6.2, depending on railway service objectives and operational 
strategies. For example, the goal of the railway service is to achieve the level of a defined 
railway traffic service within the defined time and limited cost safely. The defined time, 
limited cost, safety and the defined service level are important factors to define railway 
RAMS and its performance level. If the defined time means the arrival time at the terminal 
station, it can only define reliability. However, if the defined time means both readiness at the 
departure station and the arrival time at the terminal station, it can define availability, 
including both reliability and maintainability. The planned cost greatly affects the 
performance level of RAMS measures as shown in Figure 6.2 (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). 
Availability Safety
Maintainability
Reliability
Maintenance
Operation
Cost
Maintenance Support
Railway Service 
Objectives
 
Figure 6.2 Definition of Railway RAMS Elements 
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Step 3: Establishment of RAMS Performance Specification Principle 
The railway RAMS definition of Figure 6.2 provides the basis for RAMS performance 
specification. Figure 6.3 presents a proposed principle that specifies RAMS design solutions 
and their acceptance performance criteria, which is modified from Figure 6.2. The RAMS 
performance specification is implemented by three steps and their interaction as shown in 
Figure 6.3 (Green, 2001; Daup, 2001). 
Measures of  Operational 
RAMS Effectiveness 
Measures of RAMS 
Performance 
RAMS Performance 
Measures
Increasing Technical 
Resolution & Periodic Insight
Increasing Scope of 
Technical Solution
 Measures of Railway Service 
Performance 
Technical Insight 
 
Figure 6.3 Principle of Railway RAMS Performance Specification 
(1) Establishment of Measures of Railway Service Performance 
The objective of RAMS performance specification is to effectively contribute to the 
successful achievement of the overall railway service objectives in the rail traffic business 
aspect. Therefore, RAMS performance specification is started with identifying the overall 
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railway service objectives and establishing the railway service performance which undertakes 
the system to design and its measures. The railway service performance and measures become 
an input of RAMS performance specification as shown in Figure 6.3. 
(2) Definition of Operational RAMS Effectiveness  
Operational RAMS effectiveness is the measure that is designed to correspond to the 
achievement of railway operational objectives, which are closely related to the achievement of 
the railway service objectives. It focuses on how well the railway service objectives are 
achieved, and how well the system being designed is integrated successfully into the 
operational conditions. In general, there are many measures of operational RAMS 
effectiveness, but the availability, safety and cost can be defined as the measures of 
operational RAMS effectiveness as described in Figure 6.2. 
(3) Definition of Measures of RAMS Performance  
Measures of RAMS performance are the quantitative measures that define the functional or 
design architectures of a railway system. These performance and measures are generally 
defined from the specified operational conditions and they shall be considered for the 
successful achievement of the operational RAMS effectiveness, but they are not directly 
measured. The assessment of the operational conditions is the basis for the determination of 
the quantitative RAMS performance (Kapurch, 2010). 
(4) Determination of RAMS Performance Measures 
RAMS performance measures are directly derived from the measures of operational RAMS 
effectiveness and RAMS design performance; they become the RAMS design solutions and 
acceptance performance criteria. The RAMS performance measures are used for a periodic 
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review and control of the acceptance performance criteria for the system design efforts and 
they are used in the system design process to assess the achievement of the system 
requirements, monitor the achievement of them and identify risks.  
In RAMS management, RAMS performance measures are generally used for the followings 
(Kapurch, 2010): 
• To predict RAMS performance measures to be achieved;  
• To identify the difference between the actual RAMS performance measures and 
planned ones; 
• To support the assessment of measures of RAMS performance, and; 
• To assess RAMS performance measures for the changes of the system design. 
Step 4: Determination of RAMS Measures 
The four steps determine the RAMS measures needed to variously assess the measures of the 
effectiveness of the operational RAMS and the RAMS design performance. Figure 6.4 
describes a framework of basic RAMS measures produced in the RAMS specification process 
phase. However, the customer or supplier may require various RAMS measures to evaluate 
the performance of RAMS design effectively as if needed as provided in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 
6.3.   
Step 5: Development of Railway RAMS Performance Specification Process 
The final step is to develop the RAMS specification process to resolve the RAMS 
performance issues, based on the systems performance specification process. The detailed 
process activities of the RAMS performance specification process will be presented in Section 
6.3. 
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Service Availability Service Safety Service Cost
Service Reliability
Operational Availability Operational Safety Operational Cost 
Operational Reliability Operational Maintainability 
Operational Maintenance 
Support 
Functional Availability Functional  Safety Functional Cost
Functional Reliability
Functional Maintenance 
Support
Design Availability Design Safety Design Cost 
Design Reliability
Design Maintenance 
Support
Railway Service Objectives
Functional Maintainability
Design Maintainability
 
Figure 6.4 Framework of Proposed Railway RAMS Measures 
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Table 6.1 Examples of Availability and Safety Measures 
Availability Safety 
Measure Symbol Measure Symbol 
Availability 
        Inherent 
       Achieved 
       Operational 
A 
Ai 
Aa 
Ao 
Mean Time Between 
Hazardous Failure 
MTBF (H) 
Fleet Availability FA 
Mean Time Between 
‘Safety System Failure’ 
MTBSF 
Schedule Adherence SA Hazard Rate H(t) 
  Safety Related Failure 
Probability 
Fs(t) 
  Probability of Safe 
Functionality 
Ss(t) 
  Time to Return to Safety TTRS 
 
Table 6.2   Examples of Reliability and Maintainability Measures 
Reliability Maintainability 
Measure Symbol Measure Symbol 
Failure Rate λ Mean Down Time  MDT 
Mean Up Time MUT 
Mean Time/Distance 
Between Maintenance 
MTBM/MDBM 
Mean Time to Failure 
Mean Distance To Failure 
MTTF 
MDTF 
MTBM/MDBM, Corrective 
or Preventive 
MTBMc/P 
MDBMc/P 
Mean Time Between Failure 
Mean Time Between Failure 
MTBF 
MDBF 
Mean Time To 
Maintenance 
MTTM 
Failure Probability F(t) 
MTTM, Corrective or 
Preventive 
MTTMc/p 
Reliability  
(Success Probability) 
R(t) Mean Time To Repair MTTR 
 
Table 6.3 Examples of Maintenance Support Measures 
Measure Symbol Measure Symbol 
Operation and Maintenance Cost O&MC Maintenance Man Hour  MMH 
Maintenance Cost MC 
Logistic & Administrative 
Delay LAD 
Fault Correction Time  Repair Time  
Maintenance support 
Performance 
 Employees for Replacement EFR 
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6.3   Development of Railway RAMS Performance Specification Process 
This section presents a process which is applicable to all the different design phases to define 
the performance value of the RAMS design and its acceptance criteria. Figure 6.5 describes a 
proposed railway RAMS performance specification process and its key process activities. The 
process is based on Figures 6.1 to 6.4 and it consists of an input and three performance 
definition phases: i.e., (1) service RAMS definition phase, (2) operational RAMS definition 
phase, (3) functional RAMS definition phase and (4) design RAMS definition phase.  
The specification process should cover all aspects that quantitatively define RAMS design 
solutions and their acceptance criteria through the various design steps in order to reach a 
rational decision making with regards to the optimal and balanced RAMS performance design 
and its acceptance criteria. The specification process includes sufficient activities for the 
successful achievement of all functional requirements to demonstrate the RAMS design 
performance criteria required in the operational conditions, and demonstrate that all potential 
hazards that are included in the functions are defined, assessed and appropriately controlled to 
bring the acceptance level of risks to ALARP
20
.  
Each phase of the process includes the specific activities and techniques to achieve its specific 
design objectives. Thus, each process phase focuses on the specific activities and techniques, 
for example, the allocation of railway service performance targets, the assessment of the 
operational behaviours, RAMS performance trade-off/control, the allocation of RAMS 
performance requirements into the lower systems and the establishment of RAMS design 
verification and acceptance criteria. The operational RAMS performance definition phase is 
the basis of the RAMS performance specification process activities as shown in Figure 6.5.  
                                                          
20. As Low As Reasonably Practicably 
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Maintenance concept
Operational Concept
AO?
Trade-off/Control
Maintenance Support concept
TDT
Verification
 Service Reability
 Cost
Operational Availability
TUT
TCM, TPM
TCMC, TPMP
Operational Safety
Hardware Risk Assessment
Design Performance Definition Phase
Trade off/Control
Operational Behaviour Analysis
Design Performance Baseline
Operational Risk Assessment
AO?
Operational Modes
Modelling & Prototype
Service Safety
Railway Service 
Objectives
Functional  Performance Definition Phase
Verification
 RAMS Requirements 
Allocation
Functional Behaviour Analysis
Subfuction states & modes
Functional Risk Analysis
Trade-off/Control
Verification
Risk Identification
Risk Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Operational Performance Definition Phase
Design Behaviour Analysis
Design Solution Alternatives
 Operational Performance 
Baseline
Functional Performance 
Baseline 
Service Performance Definition phase
 Service Availability
RAMS Performance 
Specification  
Figure 6.5 Proposed Railway RAMS Performance Specification Process 
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6.3.1 Service RAMS Performance Definition Phase 
This phase provides an input as a basis for the RAMS performance specification process. It is 
a process which identifies the overall railway service objectives, included measures and their 
performance targets, and determines the service RAMS performance targets that conduct the 
system to design and develop. The railway service RAMS performance targets are determined 
by the allocation techniques as stated in Chapter 3. In general, railway service RAMS 
measures are defined by service safety and availability as measures of service effectiveness 
and service reliability as technical RAMS performance measure as described in Figure 6.5. 
There are many allocation techniques applicable as described in Chapter 3, but the ARINIC 
allocation technique using failure rate can be used effectively in this phase.  
6.3.2 Operational RAMS Performance Definition Phase 
This phase is a process which determines the measures of operational RAMS effectiveness
21
 
through the railway service objectives and establishes the performance of operational RAMS 
effectiveness through the assessment of operational behaviours for the operational scenarios. 
The overall activities of this process phase provide a basis for other process activity as shown 
in Figure 6.5. The process phase consists of four activities: i.e., (1) the determination of 
operational RAMS effectiveness targets, (2) the assessment of operational behaviours, (3) 
RAMS performance trade-off/control and (4) RAMS performance verification as shown in 
Figure 6.5. The process phase starts with the determination of operational (or system) RAMS 
effectiveness.  
                                                          
21. Operational RAMS effectiveness = RAMS effectiveness of the system level to develop 
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6.3.2.1 Determination of Operational RAMS Effectiveness  
Figure 6.5 provides operational availability and safety as measures of operational 
effectiveness. In general, the availability performance target is defined as the probabilistic 
value; the safety performance target is defined as the deterministic value as mentioned in 
Chapter 5 (Ebeling, 2010; Tray et al., 1997). 
(1)   Determination of Operational Availability Target 
Operational availability performance target shall satisfy the service availability and 
operational cost assigned as described in Equation 6.1. Thus, the operational availability is 
determined by the operational cost and service availability performance targets. Equation 6.1 
can be generally used for determining operational availability performance (MIL-HDBK-
388B, 1984; Carlier et al., 1996): 
 𝑠  ∑(
 
 
)
 
 
  
 ( −   )
                                                                                        (   ) 
Where,  
 𝑠= Service availability performance target; 
   = Operational availability performance target to determine; 
  = Minimum cost (or systems) needed for the achievement of operational RAMS 
requirements, and; 
  = Maximum cost (or systems) to be determined for the achievement of operational 
RAMS requirements.  
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(2)  Determination of Operational Safety Target 
Operational safety performance target is determined by the external and internal constraints, 
for example, regulations, standards, laws etc. and the performance is established through risk 
assessment that may be included in the rail traffic service conditions as shown in Figure 6.5. 
The operational risk assessment is performed by PHA as stated in Chapter 3 and the 
performance target is given as deterministic values such as the level of failure severity and 
frequency as stated in Chapter 5.  
6.3.2.2 Assessment of Operational behaviour  
The performance value of operational RAMS measures is established through the assessment 
of the operational behaviours for the operational scenarios. The operational behaviours are 
assessed for the operational risks and timeline, as shown in Figure 6.5. The operational 
assessment is conducted by four steps as below: 
Step 1: Establishment of Operational Behaviours  
 
The first step of the operational behaviour assessment commences with the establishment of 
operational modes to assess. The operational modes related to RAMS performance 
specification can include operation, maintenance and maintenance support. In most railway 
projects, maintenance support has not been included in the RAMS performance specification, 
but the maintenance support performance has great influence on the RAMS design 
performance. Therefore, maintenance support performance shall be considered in the RAMS 
performance specification (Krri, 2007).  
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Step 2: Timeline Definition of Operational Behaviours 
Defining the timeline of operational behaviours is essential for the assessment of operational 
RAMS effectiveness for the operational behaviours of the system to design and develop. 
Figure 6.6 describes the defined timeline for operational behaviours, which are classified by 
total up time and down time. The total up time consists of operating time and standby time. 
The total down time includes maintenance and maintenance support time (Stapelberg, 2009). 
Total Time (TT)
Total Up Time (TUT) Total Down Time (TDT)
ST1 ST2
TMT TALDT
TCM TPM TADT TLDTOT
 
TMT Total Maintenance Time 
TALDT Total Administrative Logistic Delay Time 
OT Operation Time 
ST1 Standby Time in operation (system warm) 
ST2 Standby Time after operation (system cold) 
TCM Total Corrective Maintenance Time 
TPM Total Preventive Maintenance Time 
TADT Total Administrative Delay Time 
TLDT Total Logistic Support Delay Time 
Figure 6.6 Timeline Definition of Operational Behaviour  
 Step 3:  Definition of Mathematical RAMS Measures 
The next step is to define the mathematical models of the RAMS measures to evaluate the 
RAMS performance required in the operational behaviours.  
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(1) Availability Measure Models 
Availability is classified as inherent availability, achieved availability and operational 
availability.  
Equations 6.2 to 6.4 define availability mathematical models, as shown below: 
•  Inherent Availability (  ): 
      
   
       
                                                                                                      (   ) 
•  Achieved Availability (  ): 
       
   
           
                                                                                     (   ) 
• Operational Availability (  ): 
       
   
       
                                                                                                     (   ) 
(2) Reliability Measure Model 
Reliability is defined as “the failure frequency that has occurred over total operating time, 
namely, mean time (or distance) between failures (MTBF)”. Accordingly, the MTBF can be 
obtained by the definition between TALDT and ALDT, as shown in Equation 6.5 (Kim et al., 
2008): 
  𝐿   
𝑂 
    
×  𝐿                                                                                            (   ) 
Firstly, apply Equation 6.5 to Equation 6.4: 
   
   
       
 
  −    −   𝐿  
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  −    −
𝑂 
    ×  𝐿  
  
                                                                       (   ) 
Then, Equation 6.6 can be arranged again as reliability measure ‘MTBF’ as shown in 
Equation 6.7: 
     
𝑂 ×  𝐿  
( −   )  −    
                                                                                   (   ) 
(3) Maintainability Measure Model 
Maintainability is defined by the preventive and corrective maintenance time, but the 
corrective maintenance model is generally defined because the preventive maintenance time 
can be simply obtained by the customer’s maintenance strategy. The ratio of maintenance 
time for the total operational time, or maintenance rate, can be defined if needed. Equations 
6.8 and 6.9 describe the mathematical model of corrective maintenance time and maintenance 
rate: 
• Mean Corrective Maintenance Time (MTTR): 
     
    × 𝑂 
    
                                                                                                  (   ) 
• Maintenance Rate (MR): 
   
       
𝑂 
                                                                                                    (   ) 
Step 4: Operational Risk Assessment  
As mentioned above, operational railway risk assessment generally applies preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA) to provide an initial overview of a railway risks such as the identification of 
all possible potential hazards, their causal factors, effects, level of risk and control of the risk 
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as stated in Chapter 3. The methods to railway risk assessment were discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5 in detail.  
6.3.2.3 RAMS Performance Control 
The operational RAMS performance assessed through the RAMS performance specification 
process can conduct trade-off in the availability, safety and cost aspects if needed to prevent 
the conflict of the RAMS performance as shown in Figure 6.5. The trade-off method and 
procedure were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Therefore, this section provides two examples 
for trade-off of RAMS performance assessed as described in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. Figure 6.7 is 
an example of the trade-off method with regards to the technical aspect based on availability 
performance. Figure 6.8 describes an example of the trade-off method with regards to the cost 
and safety aspects. 
Step 1: Availability Based RAMS Performance Trade-off  
Figure 6.7 shows an example of a reliability and maintainability performance trade-off. This 
trade off can be generally implemented to control the maintainability and reliability 
performance by the availability performance target. Figure 6.7 shows the trade-off range of 
reliability performance and maintainability performance based on availability target. The 
shaded area of Figure 6.7 shows the range that can perform the trade-off for minimum 
reliability performance measure (MTBF: 400 hours) and maximum maintainability 
performance measure (MTTR: 4 hours) to satisfy the availability performance target, 99% 
(MIL-HDBK-388B, 1984).   
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Figure 6.7 An Example of RAMS Trade-off in Availability Aspect 
Step 2: Cost and Safety Based RAMS Performance Trade-off   
Figure 6.8 shows an example of trade-off of reliability and maintainability performance with 
regards to the cost and safety aspect. The safety performance target depends on the planned 
cost as shown in Figure 6.8. In the figure, horizontal axis 1 represents maintainability 
(preventive maintenance interval); horizontal axis 2 is the availability based reliability 
performance (minimum reliability) needs for the achievement of operational availability, and 
horizontal axis 3 is the safety reliability performance which is required for the achievement of 
operational safety. Curve 4 explains the changes of reliability performance compared with 
maintainability performance, and curve 5 shows the change of cost required for 
maintainability performance. Area “A” is a high cost area because many frequencies of 
maintenance are required by low reliability performance. Area “C” is also of a high cost and 
over the reliability performance area, in spite of high maintenance interval. However, area “B” 
is the area of the lowest cost and the reliability performance is satisfied for safety reliability 
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performance limitation. Therefore, RAMS design performance will be determined in the area 
B.   
Maintainability (Preventive Maintenance)
A B C
Reliability
Cost
Availability  
Based Reliability 
Target  
Safety  Based 
Reliability Target  
1
5
4
②
③ 
Reliability
Cost
 
Figure 6.8 An Example of RAMS Trade-off in Cost Aspect 
Step 3: RAMS Performance Management   
The RAMS performance characteristics which were established by the trade-off are applied to 
the lower system design. Figure 3.19 of Chapter describes RAMS design methods.  
6.3.2.4 RAMS Performance Verification  
The RAMS design performance established by RAMS control shall be verified to assure the 
achievement of operational RAMS requirements through the selected verification method. 
The detailed verification method will be described in Section 6.3.4.  
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6.3.3   Functional RAMS Performance Definition Phase 
This phase is a process that defines RAMS design performance and its acceptance criteria for 
the specific functions
22
 comprising a system. It is started with the allocation of the operational 
RAMS performance to the subsystems. The allocated RAMS performance is established 
through the functional timeline analysis and the risk analysis of functional state and modes, as 
shown in Figure 6.5. Therefore, the allocation of RAMS performance is a basis and key 
process activity of this phase (BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2008). 
The allocation of the operational RAMS performance is an essential design activity that 
establishes the optimal and balanced functional architectures. In general, it is generally 
dependent on the complexity of the sub-functions to be allocated, based on the experience of 
similar system. The performance allocation is considered for various factors if possible, such 
as complexity, criticality, operational profile and environmental conditions. However, if the 
information and data available is very limited, various approaches, such as engineering 
judgement or expert opinion, should be considered. Therefore, this section discusses the 
methods that allocate the operational RAMS performance in terms of the engineering 
judgement of systems engineering team compared with a selected similar system. The RAMS 
performance allocation is conducted for reliability and maintainability in this phase (MIL-
HDBK-388B, 1984; Nicholls, 2005). 
 6.3.3.1 Reliability Performance Allocation  
Several reliability allocation methods were reviewed in Chapter 3. The allocation methods can 
be applied by the information and data available, but at the system concept stage, the 
information and data may be very limited. Thus, this section presents a reliability performance 
                                                          
22. Specific functions = subsystems 
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allocation method using the engineering judgement by a comparative system that is the most 
similar to the system to design. The performance of the selected comparative system and the 
engineers’ knowledge and experience for system are key factors in this allocation method. 
Table 6.4 describes the evaluation factors and their possible evaluation range (Eo et al., 2010). 
Table 6.4   Reliability Performance Allocation Factors 
Evaluation Factors Evaluation Factor Description Range & Score 
System 
Complexity 
System complexity means the probable number 
of parts or components comprising the 
subsystem. 
0.8 – 1.2 
System Criticality 
(state-of-the-art) 
System criticality means the state of present 
engineering progress. 
0.8 - 1.2 
Operating Time 
Operation time means the real operating time for 
entire mission time. 
0.8 – 1.2 
Operational 
Environment 
Operational environment means the severity of 
the operating real environment. 
0.8 – 1.2 
 
As described in Table 6.4, the evaluation factor for the RAMS allocation should be 
considered in the operational and technical aspect of the system to evaluate. Therefore, the 
operational factor is selected for the operating time and environmental severity of the 
subsystem assigned and the technical factor is selected for the complexity and criticality of 
the subsystem. The range of the evaluation factors are classified within the range of ± 20 %: + 
20 % ranges for improvement and upgrade or - 20 % for down-grade, to reduce the range of 
the subjective judgements and to use the most similar system possible.  
The evaluation of the allocation factors is conducted by a combined engineering team which 
includes various engineering disciplines. For example: ‘if the same performance for the 
comparative system is required, the estimating rate will be 1.0; if the lower performance is 
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required, the estimating rate will be the between 0.80 and 0.99; if the higher performance is 
required, the estimating rate will be the range of 1.01 and 1.20’. Table 6.4 describes the 
estimation factor description and the selected estimation range.    
The evaluation is conducted as a combination of the MTBF (TFn) of the comparative system 
and the weight factor (Rni) of the evaluation factors as shown in Table 6.5. Equation 6.10 can 
be used for the confirmation of the reliability performance of the whole system. 
Table 6.5 Reliability Performance Allocation Matrix 
Comparative 
System  
Reliability Performance Evaluation 
Subsystem MTBF 
System 
Complexity 
System 
criticality 
Operating 
Time 
Operational 
Environment 
Weight 
factor 
Results 
Sub 1 TF1 R11 R12 R13 R14 ∏R  
4
i= 
      ∏   
4
𝑗
 
Sub 2 TF2 R21 R22 R23 R24 ∏ R  
4
i= 
      ∏   
4
𝑗
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
Sub n TFn Rn1 Rn2 Rn3 Rn4 ∏R  
4
i= 
      ∏   
4
𝑗
 
 
      The evaluation rate for the reliability performance of the n
th
 subsystem; 
{           } 
      MTBF of the n
th
 subsystem of the comparative system. 
The reliability performance of the system to design is evaluated by Equation 6.10 and it shall 
be also satisfied with the operational availability performance: 
- 167 - 
 
    𝑆   
[
 
 
 
 
 
∑ (
 
     ∏   𝑗
4
𝑗  
)  = 
]
 
 
 
 
                                                                            (    ) 
Where,  
      = the MTBF of the system. 
6.3.3.2 Maintainability Performance Allocation 
A maintainability performance allocation method using the engineering judgement of the 
system engineering team for the comparative system selected is also presented in this section. 
Table 6.6 describes the evaluation factors and maintainability range of the subsystems. The 
maintainability evaluation of the subsystems includes three factors as the qualitative design 
characteristics that affect the repair and replacement time, such as accessibility, modularity 
and standardisation, but the factor can be added, depending on the complexity, criticality and 
possibly the maintenance time. The estimating range is also ± 20% for upgrade and 
downgrade as shown in Table 6.6. The estimation method is the same using the reliability 
matrix estimation (BS EN 50126-3, 2006; Eo et al., 2010).  
Table 6.6   Maintainability Performance Allocation Factors 
Evaluation Factor Evaluation Methods Evaluation Rating 
Accessibility The way that makes easier maintenance 0.8 – 1.2 
Modularity 
The way that divides maintenance action into 
primary and secondary maintenance level 
0.8 - 1.2 
Standardisation 
The way that a part or component can be 
interchangeable with others 
0.8 – 1.2 
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Table 6.6 describes the estimation factors and the quantitative evaluation rating and Table 6.7 
describes the maintainability estimation matrix. The evaluation is conducted by the 
combination of the weight factors for the subsystem to allocate and the MTTR performance of 
the comparative subsystems. 
Table 6.7 Maintainability Performance Allocation Matrix 
Comparative System 
Performance 
Maintainability Evaluation 
Subsystem MTTR testability accessibility standardisation 
Weight 
factor 
Results 
Sub 1 TR1 M11 M12 M13 ∏M  
 
 = 
      ∏   
 
 
 
Sub 2 TR2 M21 M22 M23 ∏M  
 
 = 
      ∏   
 
 
 
  … … … … … … 
Sub n TRn Mn1 Mn2 Mn3 ∏M  
 
 = 
      ∏   
 
 
 
 
      The evaluation rate for the maintainability factor of the n
th
 subsystem; 
{           } 
      MTTR of the n
th
 subsystem of comparative system. 
The maintainability of the whole system shall be confirmed by Equation 6.11: The MTTRS 
should satisfy the maintainability and availability performance requirements: 
    𝑆  
∑ (
 
     ∏   𝑗
4
𝑗  
 
 
     ∏   𝑗
 
𝑗  
)  = 
∑ (
 
     ∏   𝑗
4
𝑗  
)  = 
                                                     (    ) 
Where,  
      = MTTR of the entire system to design. 
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6.3.4 Design RAMS Performance Definition Phase 
This phase is a process that defines the RAMS performance design and acceptance criteria of 
the physical design architecture (components) comprising the system to design. It is started 
with identifying the design solution alternatives and developing the models and/or prototypes 
coherent to the alternatives of the design solutions. The models and prototypes are tested, 
analysed, fixed and retested repeatedly until the achievement of RAMS requirements and the 
test results are evaluated to verify the achievement of the RAMS acceptance performance 
criteria as shown in Figure 6.5. Therefore, RAMS design verification is an important activity 
in this process phase. The RAMS design verification is conducted to: (1) predict the RAMS 
performance for warranty costs and products, (2) compare the performances of functionally 
similar systems and (3) verify the compliance with specified RAMS requirements. The 
RAMS design verification is implemented by the growth assessment and demonstration of 
reliability performance as shown in Figure 6.9 (BS IEC 61124, 2006).  
Predicted
(inherent) 
RAMS
Specified
RAMS
RAMS 
Demonstration
RAMS of
 initial Design
RAMS in hours
Start of 
RAMS Design
Prototype 
Development
RAMS 
Demonstration
Production Time
RAMS of
 initial 
Prototype
 
Figure 6.9 RAMS Growth Assessment and Verification Procedure 
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6.3.4.1 Reliability Performance Growth Assessment 
Reliability growth assessment (RGA) is applied for the improvement of reliability 
performance through the systematic and permanent removal of the failure mechanism. The 
RGA aims to assess reliability performance over total time through design changes of the 
system. The RGA is accomplished through implementation of the test-analysis-fix-test cycle 
for system prototypes or modelling. It is intended for the improvement of reliability 
performance over test time to eliminate or minimise the deficiencies of the system design. The 
reliability growth is determined by the accumulated failure frequency over test time through 
design changes. The Duane model uses a deterministic approach to assess the reliability 
growth such that the system MTBF versus operating time represents an approximate straight 
line if applied on log-log paper. It is useful to plan the point of the reliability verification 
(Rooney et al., 2001; Ebeling, 2010; MIL-HDBK-189C, 2011). 
As long as reliability improvement is implemented continuously, the Duane model can be 
mathematically expressed by Equation 6.12: 
     
 
 ( )
                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                 (    )  
Where,   
   = the total system test time;  
  ( ) = the accumulated failures for T; 
   = the cumulative MTBF at T=1, and; 
   = the typical growth rate. 
Take the logarithms in Equation 6.12 to form the straight line as shown in Equation 6.13: 
  (    )                                                                                                    (    ) 
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When MTBF is plotted against ‘T’ on log/log paper, the points will form a straight line 
having a slope  . The angle of the slope ‘ ’ means the growing degree of the reliability 
performance.  
6.3.4.2   Reliability Performance Demonstration 
There are many demonstration methods for reliability assessment of system design, but the 
truncated sequential test evaluation (TSTE) can generally be applied for the system design 
verification at the system concept design phase. The TSTE is a reliability demonstration 
technique that has been used to identify the achievement of reliability requirements, the 
reliability prediction for the design results and the provision of reliability acceptance criteria. 
The TSTE uses a designed evaluation graph to assess the achievement of reliability 
requirements as shown in Figure 6.10. Therefore, the design of the evaluation graph is very 
important to determine the reliability acceptance criteria. Thus, this section presents the 
method to design an evaluation graph as shown in Figure 6.10.  
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Figure 6.10 Truncated Sequential Test Evaluation Graph 
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The TSTE is based on the Poisson and Exponential distribution (Ebeling, 2010). “If the 
failure distribution of a system is Poisson distribution, the failure rate will be constant, and the 
failure frequency is independent of those of any other interval.” that is, during the test interval 
(t), the failure frequency (r) to occur will be observed continuously. Accordingly, “the 
probability, P(r), that the failure frequency (r) to occur will be observed over a test interval (t)” 
can be expressed as Equation 6.14 (BS EN 61124, 2006; MIL-HDBK-388B, 1984; David et 
al., 1952): 
 ( )  (
𝑡
 
)
 
(
 
  
   ⁄
)                                                                                              (    ) 
If the unknown MTBF
23
 (m) is equal to the lower limit MTBF (  ), Equation 6.14 can be 
represented as Equation 6.15 to get the probability (  ( )): 
  ( )  (
𝑡
  
)
     (−𝑡   ⁄ )
  
                                                                                   (    ) 
If the “MTBF (m)” is equal to the upper limit    (  ), Equation 6.14 can be replaced by 
Equation 6.16 to get the probability (  ( )): 
  ( )  (
𝑡
  
)
     (−𝑡   ⁄ )
  
                                                                                   (    ) 
The probability ratio (  ( )) between the two probabilities (  ( )       ( )) of Equations 
6.15 and 6.16 is expressed by Equation 6.17 as follow: 
  ( )  
  ( )
  ( )
                                                                                                               (    ) 
If Equations 6.15 and 6.16 are applied to Equation 6.17, the result becomes Equation 6.18: 
                                                          
23. MTBF which will be evaluated by the test  
- 173 - 
 
  ( )  
  ( )
  ( )
 (
  
  
)
 
    [− (
 
  
−
 
  
)  𝑡]                                                  (    ) 
To continue the truncated sequential test, Equation 6.18 should be between the two constant 
values, A and B, as shown below: 
    ( )                                                                                                                  (    ) 
During this test, the probability ratio (  ( )) is evaluated and continuously compared to the 
two constant predetermined values, A and B. It should be satisfied according to the following 
decision rules: 
• If   ( )   , accept and stop testing; 
• If   ( ) ≥  , reject and stop testing, and; 
• If   <   ( ) <  , continue testing. 
The constant values, A and B, of Equation 6.19 can be obtained by the risk of producer and 
customer and discrimination ratio as shown in Equations 6.20 and 6.21:  
  
( −  )
 
 
(   )
   
                                                                                                (    ) 
  
 
( −  )
                                                                                                                  (    ) 
Where: 
  = Producer’s risk; 
  = Customer’s risk, and; 
D = Discrimination ratio. 
- 174 - 
 
In Equation 6.20, the equation, [(   ) (   ) ⁄  is a correction factor to better fulfil the 
nominal risks. The discrimination ratio (D) can be found by Equation 6.22 (BS EN 61124, 
2006): 
  
  
  
 
  
  
                                                                                                                 (    ) 
By the result of Equation 6.22, Equation 6.18 can be expressed as Equation 6.23: 
  ( )  
  ( )
  ( )
       [−(
 
  
−
 
  
)  𝑡]                                                        (    ) 
Again, Equation 6.19 is applied to Equation 6.23 to get the constant A and B as shown below:  
  <       [−(
 
  
−
 
  
)  𝑡] <                                                                       (    ) 
Equation 6.24 can take ‘natural logarithms’ as Equation 6.25 to produce a straight line and 
facilitate the evaluation of the test results: 
  ( ) <     ( ) − (
 
  
−
 
  
) 𝑡 <   ( )                                                          (    ) 
If Equation 6.25 is divided by “ln (D) - (
 
  
−
 
  
)  𝑡”, the result becomes Equation 6.26 as 
shown below: 
  ( )
   ( )
 
(
 
  
−
 
  
)
   ( )
 𝑡 <  <
  ( )
   ( )
 
(
 
  
−
 
  
)
   ( )
 𝑡                                     (    ) 
Equation 6.26 can be simply replaced by Equation 6.27 as follows: 
𝑎  𝑏𝑡 <  < 𝑐  𝑏𝑡                                                                                                    (    ) 
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Where, 
          “𝑎  𝑏𝑡” expresses the accept line of Figure 6.10 and; 
          “𝑐  𝑏𝑡” expresses the reject line of Figure 6.10. 
The constants: a, b and c in Equation 6.27 are expressed as shown below: 
𝑎  
   ( )
   ( )
                                                                                                                     (    ) 
𝑐  
   ( )
   ( )
                                                                                                                      (    ) 
𝑏  
(
 
  
−
 
  
)
   ( )
 
 −  
      ( )
                                                                                 (    ) 
The appropriate value of failure frequency (r) should be the smallest integer that can be used. 
Therefore, Equation 6.31 can be represented as follows: 
 (   )    
 
      
 ≥
  
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                   (    ) 
Where  (   )    
  and       
  are chi-square variables with a 2r
24
 degree of freedom; these two 
values are identified by the ( −  ) and   probabilities of the chi-square tables, until the ratio 
of the variables is equal to or greater than “  ⁄ ”. After this point is identified, the degrees of 
freedom are set as equal to 2r. The value of r is rounded to the next highest integer. This value 
is   
25
. From this value, the truncation time (  ) is calculated as Equation 6.32 (MIL-HDBK-
388B, 1984): 
                                                          
24. r: observed number of failures during the test 
25. r0: truncated test failure number for sequential tests 
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   (   )    
 
 
                                                                                                         (    ) 
The minimum test time (     ) for acceptance without a test failure is: 
      −
𝑎
𝑏
                                                                                                                  (    ) 
An Example for Truncated Test Plan:  
The following gives an example to implement a truncated sequential test plan that assesses the 
reliability performance acceptance of the system design. The given data in the example is 
producer’s risk ( ), customer’s risk ( ), lower limit (  ) and upper limit (  ) as below: 
                                                                                                                               (    )   
                                                                                                                               (    )  
                                                                                                                      (    )  
                                                                                                                      (    )  
For the above given data, the values for designing a test evaluation graph: i.e., the 
discrimination ratio, accept-reject criteria, truncation points, and the scope and ordinate 
intercepts of the test plan can be determined:  
The solution derived is given below: 
  
  
  
 
   
   
                                                                                                        (    ) 
  
(   )( −  )
 𝑎 
 
(   )( −     )
 ( )(    )
                                                   (    ) 
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                                                                                   (    ) 
Equation 6.41 can find at 29 degrees of freedom at the chi-square table. Therefore, Equation 
6.41 can be represented as Equation 6.42: 
       
 
       
  
      
      
                                                                                                 (    ) 
Therefore: 
2r = 29 
r = 14.5 
             s 
In addition, the total truncated test time is as shown below: 
   
   (   )   
 
 
 
     
   (    )
 
 
                                                                                                                         (    ) 
By the above results, the test can be predicted that the failure frequency does not excess 15 
failures and the test time does not last longer than 2060 hours. 
To determine the slope and ordinate intercepts of the two parallel straight lines: 
𝑎  
   
   (
  
  
)
  
       
   
 
−     
     
 −                                                            (    ) 
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Therefore, the following evaluation graph is obtained for TSTE: 
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Figure 6.11 Planed Truncated Sequential Test Evaluation Graph 
6.4   Summary 
This chapter has presented the method that develops railway RAMS performance 
specification appropriate to RAMS requirements and operational applications to provide 
RAMS design solutions and their acceptance performance criteria for the implementation of 
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the systems design efforts and/or contract. It has also discussed a RAMS performance 
specification process to ensure the high feasibility of railway RAMS design solutions in the 
system operation and maintenance phase.       
This chapter firstly presented a framework that specifies RAMS requirements and operational 
contexts. The framework provided five specification factors: (1) the establishment of railway 
service objectives, (2) the definition of the railway RAMS concept, (3) the establishment of 
RAMS performance specification principle, (4) the selection of RAMS measures and (5) the 
development of the RAMS performance specification process. These are essential factors for 
the development of the RAMS performance specification. 
This chapter secondly provided a process model that specifies the RAMS requirements and 
operational applications. The process consisted of an input and three process phases based on 
the systems engineering process. The operational definition phase provided the detailed 
process activities and techniques as a basis for the overall specification process. However, 
each process phase has specific process activities. Thus, this chapter focused on the specific 
process activities and techniques such as operational behaviour assessment, RAMS allocation, 
RAMS performance verification etc.  
In conclusion, RAMS performance specification is an essential RAMS management effort to 
be conducted at the system concept design phase in order to facilitate the system design 
efforts and ensure the feasibility of the system design in the operational phase. Accordingly, 
the proposed framework and process will effectively support the development of railway 
RAMS performance specification.   
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Chapter 7 
CASE STUDY  
7.1   Introduction 
Case study is a practical research method to find the effective solutions of the research issues 
derived from the research subjects. The case study can also expand the range of knowledge, 
experience and know-how related to the research, and the results achieved from the case study 
can improve or update the results that have already been acquired. Therefore, this chapter 
provides a case study for the application of the risk assessment to rail vehicle pneumatic 
braking unit (RAPBU). It aims to demonstrate the application of the proposed FMEA-FTA 
based risk assessment method and to investigate the reliability performance, the failure events, 
and their failure causes related to RAPBU. 
The braking equipment takes the roles of stopping the rail vehicle at the station to provide the 
rail traffic service, reducing the running speed of the rail vehicle whenever required by the 
signalling or driver’s master controller; and keeping the rail vehicle at a specific place for 
maintenance or parking. There are different kinds of rail vehicle brakes, for example, 
mechanical, thermal, pneumatic, electrical brake etc., depending on the type of the rail vehicle. 
The pneumatic brake has a basic and back up function for the other braking and it also has an 
braking function for response to the emergency situations. Therefore, RAPBU is one of the 
safety critical equipment of a rail vehicle system and its risk level is a key decision making 
factor for RAMS management in the system design and development phase (Ting et al., 2011). 
This chapter consists of five sections to provide a case study for risk assessment of RAPBU. 
Section 7.2 describes the system structure and function of the RAPBU. The risk assessment 
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based on FMEA and FTA techniques is performed in Section 7.3 and the results of the risk 
assessment are discussed in Section 7.4. This chapter finally provides a brief summary in 
Section 7.5. 
7.2   Rail Vehicle Pneumatic Braking 
7.2.1   Pneumatic Braking Description 
The brake operation of rail vehicle is a very complex process specific to rail vehicles; it is a 
important safety function which takes charge of controlling the operating speed of a rail 
vehicle and stopping it at the fixed position of a station for passenger or freight service. 
During the brake operation of the braking equipment, the different kinds of braking functions, 
such as mechanical, thermal, pneumatic, electrical etc., can take place together. The 
pneumatic braking always takes place at various points as a basic, back up or emergency 
function whenever required from signalling or driver (Zang et al., 2010; Cha, 2010). 
The major objectives of the pneumatic braking function are to perform the followings:  
•  Perform the controlled reduction in speed of the rail vehicle;  
• Reach a certain lower operating speed as soon as possible;  
• Stop at a fixed point, or;  
• Suddenly stop at any point in an emergency situation of the rail vehicle or the rail 
track.  
7.2.2   Pneumatic Braking Structure 
Figure 7.1 shows the simplified structure related to the rail vehicle pneumatic braking, which 
is located under the car body to control the braking air pressure of the braking cylinder. The 
pneumatic braking assembly consists of five components as shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2: (1) 
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air filter (AF), (2) braking control unit (BCU) assembly, (3) oil separator (OS), (4) automatic 
drain valve (ADV) and (5) dump valve (DV).  
Rail Vehicle
Door System Braking System •  •  • Bogie System
Air Filters Oil Separator
BCU (M car) BCU (T car)
PSU
ECU
LV
EPV
PSU
ECU
LV
EPV
Dump Valve
Automatic Drain 
Valve
 
Figure 7.1 Pneumatic Braking Structures 
 
The AF takes the role of filtering impurities included in the braking air provided from the 
main air reservoir. The BCU assembly has a function that controls the amount of braking air 
as a main assembly of the pneumatic braking unit. The ADV separates water or oil involved 
in the braking air and the DV instantaneously controls the air brake force to prevent the train 
wheels skidding and flatted wheels, to always keep the same braking distance and to maintain 
the passenger safety. The information below briefly gives the overall functions of the 
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pneumatic braking unit. Figure 7.1 briefly describes the train brake structure related to the 
PBU and Table 7.1 provides a functional description of the PBU. 
Table 7.1 Function Description of Pneumatic Braking Unit 
No Subsystem Function description 
01 Air filter (AF) To filter impurities, such as dust, from the main air reservoir 
02 
Electrical Control 
Unit (ECU) 
To control the braking force of a rail vehicle which is 
commanded by the operator or ATC computer, including the 
passenger load and braking pattern. It aims to keep a constant 
braking distance, irrespective of the rail vehicle’s operating 
speed.  
03 
Electric - Pneumatic 
Change Relay Valve 
(EPV) 
To control the air pressure of the braking cylinder. It is 
controlled by two magnet control flow valves. The EPV 
controls service braking and emergency braking. 
04 Load Valve (LV) 
To sense the passenger load weight of the rail vehicle needed 
to control the braking force of the rail vehicle.  
05 
Pressure Sensing Unit 
(PSU) 
To calculate the passenger load of the rail vehicle, and senses 
the air pressure of the braking cylinder.  
06 Oil Separator (OS) 
The OS takes the role of separating water and oil from the air 
used in braking. 
07 
Automatic Drain 
Valve (ADV) 
To separate water and oil from the main air reservoir when 
the air compressor is stopped 
08 Dump Valve (DV) 
To prevent a flat wear of the rail vehicle’s steel wheel and the 
increase of the braking distance due to the wheel skid of the 
rail vehicle 
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Figure 7.2 Pneumatic Braking Pictures and Drawing  
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7.2.3   Pneumatic Braking Function  
Figure 7.3 shows the functional block diagram (FBD) that describes the overall pneumatic 
braking function associated with the PBU, which is comprised of three parts: (1) Central 
Braking Control (CBC), (2) Pneumatic Braking Control (PBC) and (3) Pneumatic Braking 
Operation (PBO). The CBC plays the role of the central braking force control of the entire 
train system and it consists of four control units: Master Controller (MC), Automation Train 
Control (ATC), Train Computer (TC) and Car Computer (CC), as shown in Figure 7.3.  
The ATC implements the automatic braking/releasing command, depending on the allowed 
speed signalling detected from the rail track signal system. The TC calculates the brake force 
pressure needed for the brake operation of the whole train and it also controls the brake force 
pressure for each train car. The CC is the central braking control unit of a train car and it 
calculates the air brake force pressure that controls the pneumatic braking unit.  
The PBC is the central braking control unit as the PBU of a train car; it is equipped in every 
train car to control the braking air pressure according to the braking or releasing command of 
the car computer. As seen in Figure 7.3, PBC also controls the amount of brake air of the 
brake cylinder for the generation of the air brake force pressure, which is balanced through 
checking of the air brake force pressure, the passenger load, the cross blending and the jerk 
control for passenger safety. The dump valve helps the safe braking function of the PBC 
through controlling the working time of the air brake force pressure to keep the same braking 
distance. The air spring signalling, which indicates the number of passengers (total passenger 
weight) boarded in the rail vehicle, is an important force in determining the air brake force 
pressure.  
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Figure 7.3 Pneumatic Braking Functional Block Diagram 
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7.3   Risk Assessment of Pneumatic Braking Unit 
7.3.1 Data Collection and Data Analysis 
The failure data stored in the failure collection system over a specific period are assembled to 
determine the necessary inputs which carry out the RAMS risk assessment of the pneumatic 
braking unit. This failure data has been reviewed from the system descriptions of rail vehicle 
as presented by Kim (2008). The failure causes were further examined to identify the minimal 
cut sets and the risk level. Table 7.2 describes the failure/operation data collected from 
railway field. 
Table 7.2 Collected PBU Failure/Operation Data 
Failure 
Code 
Subsystem Component Failure Mode 
Failure 
Frequency 
Operation Distance 
(km) 
P-1 
AF 
Air filter leakage 10 4,546,307.4 
P-2 
Automatic drain valve 
failed 
16 8,957,986 
P-3 
LV 
LV pressure change 16 8,178,184.8 
P-4 LV short 4 1,830,344.9 
P-5 
PSU 
PSU sensing error 67 22,451,193.9 
P-6 PSU short 22 7,875,822.1 
P-7 
ECU 
ECU in/output fail 1 438,907.9 
P-8 Communication error 197 43,126,168.4 
P-9 Power supply error 25 10,932,356.2 
P-2 
EPV 
Automatic drain valve 
failed 
16 8,957,986 
P-10 Pressure sensing error 49 8,499,257.5 
P-8 Communication error 197 43,126,168.4 
P-11 EPV 
function 
error 
EPV leakage 5 1,237,982.5 
P-12 Dreg in EPV 88 16,349,332.0 
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7.3.2   Definition of Risk Assessment Parameter and Evaluation Matrix 
To assess the risk level of the PBU, three risk evaluation factors are defined: (1) the failure 
severity and the failure frequency parameters to evaluate the failure consequence; (2) risk 
level parameter to determine the risk control and (3) a risk evaluation matrix to determine the 
risk level. The descriptions of the risk evaluation factors to evaluate the railway vehicle risks 
are altered from Table 5.1 to 5.2 of Chapter 5, as described in Table 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5. Table 
7.6 describes the risk evaluation matrix to determine the risk level of PBU.  
Table 7.3   Failure Severity Parameters  
Risk 
Category 
Consequence to Service Level 
Catastrophic 
Multiple vehicles delay for extended period due to the loss of 
many major systems. 4 
Critical 
Single vehicle delays for extended period. The vehicle was 
removed from service or sections of track missed/by passed due 
to the loss of a major system. 
3 
Marginal 
Single or multi-vehicles delayed for short time period (possible 
catch up mode) due to severe system (s) damage. 2 
Insignificant  System delays less than minutes due to minor system damage. 1 
 
Table 7.4 Risk Level Parameters 
Risk 
classification 
Risk Level Risk Reduction/Control 
Intolerable 4 Risk shall be eliminated. 
Undesirable  3 
Risk shall only be accepted when risk reduction is 
impracticable and with agreement. 
Tolerable 2 Risk is acceptable with adequate control and agreement. 
Negligible 1 Acceptable without any agreement. 
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Table 7.5   Failure Frequency Parameters  
Frequency 
Classification 
Description Frequency  Level 
F1 Frequent 
It is likely to occur frequently and will 
be continually experienced. 
≥10-3 6 
F2 Probable 
It will occur several times and can be 
expected to occur often. 
10-4< to ≤  10-3 5 
F3 Occasional 
It is likely to occur several times and 
can be expected to occur several times. 
10-6< to ≤  10-4 4 
F4 Remote 
It is likely to occur sometime in the 
system life cycle and can reasonably be 
expected to occur. 
10-8< to ≤  10-6 3 
F5 Impossible 
It is unlikely to occur but is possible 
and it can be assumed that it may 
exceptionally occur. 
10-9< to ≤  10-8 2 
F6 Incredible 
It extremely unlikely to occur and it 
can be assumed that it may not occur. 
≤10-9 1 
 
Table 7.6 Risk Evaluation Matrix 
Frequency Level Risk Level 
Frequent 6 Undesirable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable 
Probable 5 Tolerable Undesirable Intolerable Intolerable 
Occasional 4 Tolerable Undesirable Undesirable Intolerable 
Remote 3 Negligible Tolerable Undesirable Undesirable 
Improbable 2 Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable 
Incredible 1 Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic 
  Severity Level of Failure Consequence 
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7.3.3   Failure Consequence Analysis 
Failure consequence analysis (FCA) is performed through analysing the failure modes of the 
PBU components and it determines the failure severity level of all possible failure 
consequences. Table 7.7 describes the failure consequence analysis to determine the failure 
severity level of the PBU.  
Table 7.7 Failure Consequence Analysis of PBU 
Failure 
Code 
Sub-
system 
Component 
Failure mode 
Failure Consequence 
Failure 
Severity 
Component Subsystem System 
P-1 
AF 
Air filter leakage function loss 
function 
reduction 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-2 
Automatic drain valve 
fail 
function loss function loss 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-3 
LV 
LV pressure change function loss function loss 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-4 LV short function loss function loss 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-5 
PSU 
PSU sensing error function loss function loss 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-6 PSU short function loss function loss 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-7 
ECU 
ECU in/output fail function loss function loss function loss 3 
P-8 Communication error function loss function loss function loss 3 
P-9 Power supply error function loss function loss function loss 3 
P-2 
EPV 
Automatic drain valve 
failed 
function loss 
function 
reduced 
function 
reduction 
2 
P-10 Pressure sensing error function loss 
function 
reduced 
function 
reduced 
2 
P-8 Communication error function loss function loss function loss 3 
P-11 EPV 
function 
error 
EPV 
leakage 
function loss function loss function loss 3 
P-12 
Dreg in 
EPV 
function loss function loss function loss 3 
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7.3.4   Failure Frequency Analysis 
7.3.4.1   Fault Tree Construction 
Fault tree is the most critical aspect in the failure frequency analysis and it is a prerequisite for 
the risk assessment. The fault tree is required for the quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
the failure frequency. Table 7.8 shows the relationship between the component failure modes 
and their basic events given from the failure analysis of the FMEA. The subsystem failure 
modes are the failure causes of a top event that causes “full service braking error of rail 
vehicle” and the component failure modes are the failure causes that lead to the subsystem 
failure. Figure 7.8 describes the failure cause scenario model for the component failure modes. 
Table 7.8   Basic Event Definition for PBU Failure Modes  
Subsystem 
Failure Mode 
Component Failure Mode Failure rate  
Basic 
Event 
AF function 
loss (A1) 
Air filter leakage  F(X1) X1 
Automatic drain valve fail  F(X2) X2 
LV sensing 
error (A2) 
LV pressure change  F(X3) X3 
LV short  F(X4) X4 
PSU sensing 
error (A3) 
PSU sensing error  F(X5) X5 
PSU short  F(X6) X6 
ECU function 
error (A4) 
ECU in/output fail  F(X7) X7 
Communication error  F(X8) X8 
Power supply error  F(X9) X9 
EPV function 
error (A5) 
Automatic drain valve fail  F(X2) X2 
Pressure sensing error  F(X10) X10 
Communication error  F(X8) X8 
EPV function error (A6) 
Dregs in EPV F(X11) X11 
EPV leakage F(X12) X12 
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Figure 7.4 Fault Tree of Pneumatic Braking Unit 
The top event “full - service braking operation error of rail vehicle” (T) can occur whenever 
any subsystem among five failure events (A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5) is failed. Therefore, the top 
event (T) is connected by the ‘OR’ gate (G1) from the lower failure events. The AF function 
error (A1) has two failure causes (X1, X2) and it is not operated by only one failure cause (X1 
or X2). So the A1 is connected by the ‘OR’ gate (G2) from the two failure causes (X1, X2). The 
LV sensing error (A2) is brought about by the two failure causes (X3, X4) and it does not work 
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when the two failure causes (X3 and X4) occur at the same time. Accordingly, the A2 is 
connected by the ‘AND’ gate (G3) as shown in Figure 7.4. 
The PSU sensing error (A3) has two failure causes (X5, X6) and it does not work when the two 
failures (X5 and X6) occur simultaneously. Thus, the A3 has the ‘AND’ gate (G4). The ECU 
function error failure event (A4) occurs due to the three failure causes (X7, X8, and X9) and it 
does not function if any failure cause (X7, X8, or X9) occurs. Therefore, the A4 has the ‘OR’ 
gate (G5) for the three failure causes.   
The EPV function error (A5) has three root failure causes (X2, X8 or X10) and an intermediate 
event (A6). It does not work when four failures (X2, X8, X10 or A6) occur simultaneously. 
Accordingly, the A5 has ‘OR’ gate (G6). The intermediate event (A6) of the EPV function 
error is brought about by two failure causes (X11 , X12) and the failure event occurs through 
the two failure causes, so the A6 is connected by ‘AND’ gate (G7) as shown in Figure 7.4. 
7.3.4.2   Qualitative Fault Tree Analysis 
The qualitative fault tree analysis is an iterative procedure that determines the minimal cut 
sets (MCSs) using the Boolean algebra rules. The fault tree of Figure 7.4 can be represented 
by Equation 7.1 as blow: 
            4                                                                                    (7.1) 
                                                                                                                         (   ) 
       4                                                                                                                   (   ) 
                                                                                                                           (   ) 
 4                                                                                                                 (   ) 
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                                                                                                          (   ) 
                                                                                                                          (   )   
Equation 7.1 can be replaced by Equations 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7; as a result, the 
minimal cut sets of Figure 7.4 can be obtained by the Boolean algebra rules as Equation 7.8: 
   (     )  (    4)  (     )  (        )  {(         )    } 
           4                                   
    (     )      4           (     )                 
 (     )  (    4)  (     )  (        )  {    (       )}  (   ) 
The minimal cut sets for the fault tree of Figure 7.4 can be simply expressed as described in 
Figure 7.5. As seen in Figure 7.5 and Equation 7.8, the top event “full - service braking 
operation error of rail vehicle” can be represented by nine minimal cut sets. The top event has 
six single point failures and three double point failures. The six single failures directly affect 
the top event. Table 7.9 shows the minimal cut sets of the pneumatic braking unit. 
 
Table 7.9 Minimal Cut Sets of PBU 
Category Minimal Cut Sets Set 
1 MCS for basic event (X1), (X2), (X7), (X8), (X9), (X10) 6 
2 MCS for basic event (X3, X4), (X5, X6), (X11, X12) 3 
Total MCS  9 
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Figure 7.5   Fault Tree Simplified from Figure 7.4 
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7.3.4.3   Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis 
Equation 7.8 simplified by the Boolean algebra rules can be quantified by the probability law 
or failure rate. Table 7.10 shows the failure data for the basic events (component failure 
modes) analysed from field data. 
Table 7.10   Failure Rate of Failure Causes 
 
Subsystem  
Failure Mode 
Component Failure Mode Failure rate Basic Event 
AF function loss 
(A1) 
Air filter leakage  2.2 ×10-6 X1 
Automatic drain valve 
fail 
 1.8 ×10-6 X2 
LV sensing error 
(A2) 
LV pressure change  2.0 ×10-6 X3 
LV short  2.2 ×10-6 X4 
PSU sensing error 
(A3) 
PSU sensing error  3.0 ×10-6 X5 
PSU short  2.8 ×10-6 X6 
ECU function 
error (A4) 
ECU in/output fail  2.3 ×10-6 X7 
Communication error  4.6 ×10-6 X8 
Power supply error  2.3 ×10-6 X9 
EPV function 
error (A5) 
Automatic drain valve 
failed 
 1.8 ×10-6 X2 
Pressure sensing error  5.8 ×10-6 X10 
Communication error  4.6 ×10-6 X8 
EPV operation error  
(A6) 
Dregs in EPV 4.0 ×10-6 X11 
EPV leakage 5.4 ×10-6 X12 
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(1) Top Event (System Level):  
 ( )   − { −  (  )}  { −  (  )}  { −  (  )}  { −  ( 4)} 
               { −  (  )}                                                                                                     (   ) 
           − { −  ×     } × { −    ×      } × { −    ×      } 
              × { −    ×   − }   { −     ×   − }                                                
             ×         
(2) Intermediate event (Subsystem Level) 
 (  )   − { −  (  )}  { −  (  )}                                                                 (    ) 
             − { −    ×     }  { −    ×     }         
                ×        
 (  )   (  )   ( 4)                                                                                               (    ) 
               ×     ×    ×      
                ×       
 (  )   (  )   (  )                                                                                               (    ) 
               ×     ×    ×      
                ×          
 ( 4)   − { −  (  )}  { −  (  )}  { −  (  )}                                              (    ) 
             − { −    ×     } × { −    ×     } × { −    ×     } 
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                ×         
 (  )   − { −  (   )}  { −  (  )}                                                               (    ) 
           − { −    ×     } × { −     ×      } 
                ×        
 (  )   (   )   (   )                                                                                            (    ) 
               ×     ×    ×      
                ×        
Table 7.11 shows the quantitative analysis results of the minimal cut sets. 
 
Table 7.11   Failure Rate of Pneumatic Braking Unit  
Failure Event 
Frequency Level 
Remark 
Failure Rate 
System Level F(T) 1.90 Х 10-05  
Subsystem Level 
F(A1) 4.00  Х 10
-06
  
F(A2) 4.40  Х 10
-12
  
F(A3) 8.40  Х 10
-12
  
F(A4) 9.20  Х 10
-06
  
F(A5) 5.08  Х 10
-06
  
F(A6) 2.16  Х 10
-11
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7.3.5   Risk Evaluation 
This step evaluates the level of the failure severity and frequency of failure consequence by 
FMEA and FTA analysis, and then it determines the risk level. Table 7.12 describes the risk 
level of the component level of PBU.  
Table 7.12   Risk Level of PBU Components 
 
Failure Code 
Component 
Failure Rate 
Failure Frequency 
Level 
Failure Severity 
Level 
Risk Level 
P-1 2.2 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-2 1.8 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-3 2.0 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-4 2.2 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-5 3.0 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-6 2.8 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-7 2.3 ×10
-6
 3 3 3 
P-8 4.6 ×10
-6
 3 3 3 
P-9 2.3 ×10
-6
 3 3 3 
P-10 4.0 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-11 2.2 ×10
-6
 3 2 2 
P-12 1.8 ×10
-6
 3 3 3 
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7. 4   Analysed Results 
7.4.1   Risk Assessment 
By the definition of railway risk, FMEA-FTA based risk assessment was used for two 
parameters: failure severity of failure consequence and its frequency. In this work, the failure 
severity levels were estimated by the engineering judgement for FMEA analysis results and 
the failure frequency levels were evaluated by FTA using Boolean algebra rule and the failure 
rate of the data collected from the field.  
The risk assessment results of the PBU components produced by FMEA-FTA are enumerated 
in Table 7.12. In this table, the risk level values have been computed by the combination of 
the failure severity and its frequency level. The failure frequency level of all components 
revealed level 3 (remote level) although they are different values to each other. The failure 
severity was evaluated as level 2 or 3. The failure consequences related to AF, LV and PSU 
were evaluated as level 2 (marginal level) because they affect the functional reduction of PBU. 
The failure consequences of ECU and EPV were evaluated as level 3 (critical level) which 
causes the complete functional loss. Accordingly, the overall risk level of the PBU 
components is revealed as level 2. 
Table 7.13 represents the risk level of the PBU subsystems. The FMEA-FTA risk assessment 
method can obtain the risk level simply. In the table, the failure frequency of LV and PSU is 
evaluated as Level 1 by very low failure rate, and their failure severities are estimated as level 
2. Therefore, the risk level of the LV and PSU are estimated as Level 1. The ECU and EPV 
are revealed the level 3 in the frequency and severity; accordingly, the risk level of ECU and 
EPV is estimated as level 3. Finally, the risk level of AF is evaluated as Level 2. Therefore, 
the overall risk level of PBU subsystems is revealed as Level 2. 
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Table 7.14 represents the risk level of PBU in the system level, which represents level 2 by 
the failure frequency of Level 2 and the failure severity of Level 3. Therefore, it can be 
confirmed that the PBU was designed within a tolerable level.  
Table 7.13   Risk Level of PBU Subsystems 
 
Failure Code Failure Rate 
Failure Frequency 
Level 
Failure Severity 
Level 
Risk Level 
AF 4.00  Х 10-06 3 2 2 
LV 4.40  Х 10-12 1 2 1 
PSU 8.40  Х 10-12 1 2 1 
ECU 9.20  Х 10-06 3 3 3 
EPV 5.08  Х 10-06 3 3 3 
 
Table 7.14   Risk Level of PBU 
 
Failure Code Failure Rate 
Failure Frequency 
Level 
Failure Severity 
Level 
Risk Level 
PBU 1.90 Х 10-05 2 3 2 
  
7.4.2 Reliability Performance Assessment 
In this case study, the operational reliability performance of PBU was identified as shown in 
Table 7.15. The reliability performance, mean time between failures (MTBF), can be 
identified by Equation 7.16. Table 7.15 includes the result of this case study. In this analysis, 
the operational reliability performance was evaluated as about 52,632 km (1,754 hours) and it 
was confirmed as an excellent performance, compared with that of a similar system, shown in 
Table 7.16: 
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Table 7.15   Reliability Performance of PBU 
Subsystem MTBF (hours) MKBF (km) Failure Rate Remark 
Braking System 1,754 52,632 0.000019  
 
Table 7.16   Reliability performance of Similar PBU  
Subsystem MTBF (hours) MKBF (km) Remark 
Braking System 898 26,940  
 
7.4.3 Failure Analysis  
The major failure causes and failure rate of PBU were identified in this case study. The 
failures of the system level had five different failure modes, which were generated by 12 
different failure causes as described in Table 7.7. Failure rate of the components level was 
investigated as the range of  10
-6
 as described in Table 7.10 and it was the ‘remote level’ that 
was likely to occur sometimes in the life cycle. The failure rate of the subsystem level was 
recorded in the range of 10
-12< to ≤ 10-6 as described in Table 7.11 and it was the ‘remote or 
impossible level’ that was likely to occur sometimes in the life cycle or it is unlikely to occur. 
The failure rate of the system level was investigated as the range of 10
-5 
as described in Table 
7.11 and it was the ‘occasional level’ that was likely to occur several times.  
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In the fault tree analysis, all subsystems of the PBU were connected by OR gate. Accordingly, 
any failure amongst all subsystems directly affects the function of PBU. The PBU has six 
single point failures that directly affect the top event as shown in Table 7.17. These single 
point events also require specific maintenance actions to keep their functions. 
Table 7.17 Single Point Failures of PBU 
Category Minimal Cut Sets Set 
1 MCS for basic event (X1), (X2), (X7), (X8), (X9), (X10) 6 
  
In conclusion, the case study has been applied to a very small safety unit due to the lack of 
system description, information and data available and experience, but the risk level, failure 
rate and single point failures are effectively identified. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has performed the risk assessment of the existing pneumatic braking unit of 
railway vehicle as a case study, which is conducted to demonstrate how the proposed risk 
assessment methods based on FMEA-FTA technique can be used to analyse and evaluate their 
risk level, and confirm the reliability performance level. The FMEA-FTA risk assessment 
offers a great potential in the systems design analysis and their risk assessment, especially in 
assessing the uncertainty level of railway systems related to high safety.  
Railway risk assessment using FMEA-FTA techniques allows the flexibility for the 
information and data available and the systems design phase applied, by the application of 
qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative risk assessment and top-down and bottom-up 
approach. In addition, the flexibility encourages the use of information and data from various 
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sources such as qualitative descriptions, engineering judgement and the various combinations 
of typical risk techniques such as ETA, HAZOP and fishbone diagram etc.  
 
However, this case study was used for the product design phase without the design 
performance criteria. In the case assessment, the risk level of all system levels were assessed 
as the acceptance level, but the data and information management appropriate to risk 
assessment is required to introduce RAMS management effectively.  
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1   Conclusions 
This research project has achieved the objectives which were planned to achieve the 
successful integration of RAMS management into railway systems engineering by developing 
several models and processes, and providing possible techniques that are applicable to RAMS 
management. This research has proved that the proposed management models, processes and 
techniques can help railway organisations establish and implement RAMS management at the 
system concept design phase. The major achievements of the research can be summarised as 
follows:  
This research has firstly achieved the objective of establishing the theoretical engineering 
background associated with systems RAMS management. The systems RAMS management 
is a branch management discipline of systems engineering. Thus, this research defined the 
concepts of systems engineering to provide a fundamental basis for the overall functions and 
life cycle activities of RAMS management. This research established the concept of systems 
RAMS management in three aspects: (1) the definition of RAMS characteristics appropriate 
to the operational requirements, (2) the provision of the means to prevent railway RAMS risks, 
and (3) the assessment and control of all potential hazards threatening the operational 
requirements. This research established risk assessment methods in the two aspects: (1) top-
down and bottom-up approach and (2) qualitative, quantitative, and/or combined semi-
approach. The typical risk assessment techniques, such as PHA, FMEA, FTA etc., were 
briefly investigated for their objectives, advantages, disadvantages, etc. to consider their 
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application for the railway risk assessment process. These outcomes have been achieved 
through an extensive review of diverse literature. Through these literature reviews, three 
approaches for the railway RAMS management were established: risk based RAMS 
management, systems based RAMS management and life cycle based RAMS management. 
Recent global railway projects have required the implementation of RAMS management to 
achieve a railway traffic service safely within the defined time and limited cost. Thus, it 
becomes a key issue to think of integrating RAMS management into railway systems 
engineering. Accordingly, this research has secondly achieved the objective of developing the 
systematic approach method of RAMS management for railway systems engineering to 
integrate the RAMS management into railway systems engineering effectively. This research 
proposed railway RAMS management systems approach for the successful integration of the 
RAMS management. This research established railway systems engineering process and its 
process activities through several process models to provide a fundamental basis of the 
process, functions, activities and techniques related to RAMS management. This research also 
established the risk based railway RAMS management process to focus the RAMS 
management on assessing and controlling all railway RAMS risks. The proposed RAMS 
management systems, railway systems engineering process and risk based RAMS 
management process will be essential elements to implement RAMS management in the 
railway engineering project.    
Railway risks have a great potential to cause injury and/or loss of the life of staffs or 
passengers, the environmental degradation, damage to property and adverse impact in the 
railway operational contexts. Thus, the assessment and control of railway risks is the major 
focus of railway RAMS management. Accordingly, this research has thirdly achieved the 
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objective of developing the methods that assess all railway hazards affecting the railway 
traffic service, based on the combination of FMEA-FTA technique. This research provided 
FMEA-FTA based railway risks assessment models that are applicable to each system 
engineering design phase: the top-down approach model for the risk assessment of the 
functional architecture, and the bottom-up approach model for the risk assessment of the 
design architecture. This research provided FMEA-FTA based railway risk assessment 
process model that can be applied to all system design phases. The risk assessment process 
includes the development of risk scenario through FMEA, fishbone diagram, ETA and FTA; 
the qualitative assessment of the failure cause scenario through the minimal cuts analysis and 
Boolean algebra rules; and the quantitative assessment of the risk scenarios through the failure 
probability or failure rate. The proposed FMEA-FTA risk assessment technique has a great 
potential to assess safety, availability, reliability and maintainability. Accordingly, the 
FMEA-FTA combination models are very useful to the risk assessment of the railway system 
as well as the mission and safety critical system. 
Specifying RAMS requirements and operational contexts is a fundamental basis of RAMS 
management to provide the RAMS design solutions and their acceptance performance criteria. 
Thus, it requires the systematic and quantitative RAMS requirements to the customers and it 
also requires the successful RAMS performance specification process activities to the 
suppliers. Accordingly, this research has fourthly achieved the objective of developing the 
methods that specify RAMS requirements and operational contexts to provide RAMS design 
solutions and their acceptance performance criteria and to facilitate the system design efforts 
and contract. For this purpose, this research provides a framework that implements railway 
RAMS performance specification. The framework provides several methods such as the 
establishment of the railway service objectives, the definition of railway RAMS concept, the 
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definition of RAMS performance specification principle, and the selection of RAMS 
measures needed. This research provides a RAMS performance specification process that is 
applicable to all different design phases. The specification process provides the process 
activities and techniques such as the determination of railway service performance and 
measures; the determination of operational RAMS effectiveness; the assessment of 
operational behaviours; the RAMS performance trade-off/control; RAMS performance 
allocation; and RAMS performance verification.  
This research has finally achieved the objective of conducting a case study on the proposed 
railway risk assessment to demonstrate the proposed FMEA-FTA based risk assessment 
method and to confirm the RAMS performance level and major failures of the existing 
pneumatic braking unit. In the case study, the detailed structural and functional descriptions 
for pneumatic braking unit were described to analyse all possible failures. The analysed 
failures were compared with the failure data collected from the field to determine the failure 
consequences. The risk parameters, risk levels and risk evaluation matrix were established 
through the analysis results of the field data. The major failure consequences that affect the 
full service braking function were analysed for their severity and the causes of the failure 
consequences were also analysed by the fault tree construction, and minimal cut set analysis 
by using the Boolean algebra rule.  
The proposed RAMS models, processes, and techniques have attracted the high levels of 
interest from the railway industry. These research results will be a cornerstone for the 
introduction of railway RAMS management and they have a significant influence on the 
introduction of RAMS management to many railway organisations.  
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8.2   Recommendations for further work 
The proposed models, processes and techniques have been designed and developed to provide 
the systematic approach of RAMS management for railway systems engineering. They will 
facilitate and encourage railway organisations in establishing and introducing RAMS 
management. However, as for any other research, it is necessary to provide recommendations 
for further improvement and upgrade of the proposed models, processes, and techniques 
associated with railway RAMS management, in order to allow the introduction and 
continuous improvement of the application of RAMS management to railway organisations.  
The results of this research project will be a solid cornerstone for further development and 
modification of the models, processes, and techniques related to railway RAMS management, 
so that they are applicable to many railway fields more efficiently and effectively. More 
efforts should be undertaken to enhance the awareness of RAMS management in the railway 
industry to integrate RAMS management into railway systems engineering, and more 
engineering techniques should be developed to support railway systems engineering 
effectively. 
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The purpose of railway rolling stock RAM (reliability, availability, and maintainability) 
analysis is to set up targets in order to improve service performance of rolling stock to the 
required level, for example, quality of service, performance of reliability and safety, and 
availability of equipment etc. Therefore, the quantitative targets of rolling stock RAM have to 
take service performance requirement into consideration and the performance of rolling stock 
achieved must precisely demonstrated the objective evidences that consist with service 
performance objectives. Although some work has been conducted in this field, no formal 
methodologies have been and applied to a stable environment in the railway industry. This 
paper presents a methodology for setting the quantitative RAM targets based on Service 
performance objectives, i.e. reliability, availability and maintainability of rolling stock, 
service pattern and maintenance resource. This paper also discusses the methods of the 
implementation of RAM target setting up.  
INTRODUCTION 
As rolling stock engineering field, reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) are 
relatively new. The application of RAM engineering to rolling stocks has been motivated by 
several factors such as the complexity of the system, the advance in technology, the increase 
of the system life cycle cost, and the change of railway management environments. RAM 
engineering into rolling stock is becoming a decision making factor in railway business 
environment because it takes a great influence on system life cycle cost and system 
effectiveness. Therefore, a dependable rolling stock is achieved as a result of the application 
of RAM engineering.  
From system effectiveness perspective, RAM engineering deals with the availability 
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performance of a rolling stock as part of system engineering and its factors affecting RAM: 
reliability and maintainability. The Reliability directly affects the length of a system 
operation. On the other hand, the maintainability is interested in decreasing the length of the 
system maintenance. From the cost perspective, RAM engineering has to be evaluated over 
the life cycle period of a system, not only initial acquisition. RAM approach for rolling stock 
engineering increases the cost effectiveness with the increase of the system performance.  
However, when turns our rolling stock industries, many problems caused may be from the 
result that does not apply system engineering as well as RAM engineering. The overall system 
requirements for a rolling stock have been not specified from the beginning concept and 
design phase. The specification process of the customer requirements are relatively very short 
and in many cases the approach for system is firstly to finish the specification and design 
phase as soon as possible and the to fix it when it failed. 
This paper focuses on the process and activities for specifying the established system 
characteristics included RAM characteristics appropriate to the operational objectives of a 
rolling stock. For this, the first discusses the definition of system characteristics based on 
system approach through the analysis of customer requirements. The next emphasises on the 
process activities for specifying RAM performance characteristics suitable to system 
objective and shows the examples specifying for RAM characteristics.     
SPECIFICATION OF ROLLING STOCK  
In rolling stock engineering, there are a set of engineering activities through the life cycle of 
the system. The specification of rolling stock is defined, as part of system engineering, as 
specification process activities that translate the operational objectives of a rolling stock into 
the system characteristics and a system configuration throughout the process of system 
specification; allocation; and synthesis to optimise the system design and integrate RAM 
characteristics into the system functions (MIL-STD-499B, 1992; MIL-HDBK-388B, 1998; 
Blanchard et al. 2006; EN 60300-4, 2008). 
The specification of the rolling stock needs to identify in general: such as (1) the fundamental 
distinction of a system; (2) the system elements and the system location within the system 
hierarchy; (3) technology for the design of a system; (4) system complexity and scope, and 
the requirements; and (5) the range of system specification process; (6) system classification; 
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(7) RAM characteristic specification (Blanchard et al. 2006). The system specification is 
essential for specifying RAM characteristics. The discussion for the definition of system 
characteristics and influencing conditions with the definition for RAM characteristics needs.  
DEFINITION OF SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
Customers require rolling stocks with characteristics that their system requirements are 
sufficiently applied. The requirements are technically characterised by the system 
specification process using a system approach. The process includes the definition of system 
characteristics into the functions needed in achieving operational objectives of the system. 
The outcome of the process involves the methods of system design and the demonstration 
criteria for the system acceptance (BS EN 60300-4, 2008). A system has a purpose and 
objectives to provide a focus for definition of the system characteristics. 
A rolling stock is, in general, designed for a specific purpose to accomplish the operational 
objectives of the system. The system has general or specific objectives needed to effectively 
deliver the purpose which is for achievement of a defined level of rail traffic safely with 
railway infrastructures. The former objective includes the perception of the customer for the 
system quality, availability, and safety in the system perspective. The latter objective is related 
to the dedicated tasks, included a sequence of tasks. Accordingly, the purpose and objectives 
of a system becomes a framework in defining a system technically for the requirements of the 
customers. Defining a system is a key prerequisite to achieve the characteristics of the system 
(BS EN ISO 9000, 2005; Blanchard et al. 2006; BS EN 62347, 2007). System properties of a 
system are the features or attributes inherent of the system. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a rolling stock has a set of system properties, which are selected or 
assigned into the system characteristics in order for implementation of the operational 
objectives of the system as discussed above. These properties are used to develop the major 
functions needed in carrying out the tasks of the system. The specific features or attributes of 
a system are represented by these properties. They are categorised into property groups as 
shown in Figure 1. A property group has a set of system characteristics relevant to and 
dominant in that group.  
 As mentioned above, the functions of the system needed in performing the operational tasks 
of a rolling stock are originated from these system properties by dint of the interaction of the 
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system elements which constitute the system. The system elements are developed to represent 
system characteristics to enable the functions of the system and to deliver the tasks. The 
system characteristics can express by quantitative or qualitative value, and they can be 
measured through several technical methods (Blanchard et al. 2006; BS EN 62347, 2007; 
Rausand, 2008). A system RAM can select as a specific system property which includes its 
characteristics.  
 
Figure 1 Examples of System Properties and Characteristics 
Rolling stock RAM is the collective term for explanation of the availability performance of a 
rolling stock with both reliability and maintainability performance characteristics which have 
an influence on the availability performance. In recent rolling stock industries, these RAM 
characteristics have recognised as the major system performance characteristics because they 
take a great influence on the system effectiveness and life cycle cost. They are related to time 
dependent performance characteristics of the functions of the system. The availability 
performance represents the effectiveness of system operation, the reliability performance 
means the lasting of system operation without any failure; and the maintainability 
performance expresses the ease access for maintenance action (BS EN 60300-1, 2003; BS EN 
62347, 2007).  
CONDITIONS INFLUENCING SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS 
A rolling stock, itself, cannot meet its system characteristics which enable the functions 
appropriate to achieving the operational objectives of the system. The system characteristics 
rely on the conditions such as mission profile, utilisation environments, life cycle, and 
maintenance concept that the system will be confronted throughout the implementation of the 
tasks. Therefore, it is essential to define and specify the conditions influencing prior to the 
System properties 
Functionality 
• Capability 
• Capacity 
• Coverage 
• Configurability 
• Programmability 
• Expandability 
Performance Operability RAM Supportability Application 
specifics 
• Adequacy 
• Precision 
• Response time 
• Repeatability 
• Access 
• Interface 
• Simplicity 
• Robustness 
• User friendliness 
• Availability 
• Reliability 
• Maintainability 
• Serviceability 
• Upgradeability 
• Disposability 
• Security 
• Immunity  
• Safety 
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definition of the system characteristics (BS EN 62347, 2007; BS EN 50126-1, 1999). The 
specification of affecting the conditions of a system is a process that identifies and selects the 
system properties and its related characteristics of the system. 
The relationship between the system properties of a system and the conditions that affects 
them helps in identifying the conditions which influence the functions of the system. The 
influencing conditions are utilised to select specific system properties and related 
characteristics. As illustrate in Figure 2, the system characteristics selected are determined by 
the iterative process of the evaluation and trade-off analysis, which ultimately determine the 
system configuration and boundaries and form the basis for specifying the system 
characteristics. Each influencing conditions may be influenced by various factors: for 
example, the task of the system is affected by the factors such as nature, scope, duration, 
sequence of the task, mode of operation, operation scenario, and the system environments is 
influenced by the temperature and humidity (BS EN 62347, 2007; BS EN 50126-1, 1999).  
 
ROLLING STOCK RAM SPECIFICATION PROCESS 
  The specification of a rolling stock can be efficiently achieved in terms of the use of a 
process through a system approach (BS EN ISO 9000, 2005). The process iteratively executes 
numerous linked specification activities to transform operational objectives into a complete 
system configuration under the on-going control. Accordingly, Rolling stock RAM needs the 
application of an integrated process approach for specifying their performance characteristics. 
The process aims to: (1) establish the purpose and objectives of the application of RAM; (2) 
determine the RAM requirements and the method for achievement of them; (3) allocate the 
RAM requirements towards lower systems; and (4) model and predict the RAM results 
performed; and make decision on the RAM results. System specification process assists in 
promoting the specification of RAM characteristics effectively. 
ROLLING STOCK SPECIFICATION PROCESS 
As mentioned above, the system specification process forms a framework for the broad 
application of engineering activities for RAM characteristics. It provides guidance on the 
RAM specification during the design phase of the system life cycle. Figure 2 describes a 
framework model for specifying system characteristics. The development of a process 
appropriate to system characteristics is necessary. The process shall focus on how to define 
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and specify the system characteristics of a system. For the purpose of this, it deals with 
techniques to handle such specification activities (MIL-STD-499B, 1992(Draft); Blanchard et 
al. 2006; BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007; BS EN 62347, 2007).  
 
Figure 2 Rolling Stock Specification Process 
As shown in Figure 2, the system identification is a preparing activity for the identification of 
information relevant to a system to be developed like a set of requirements of customer. The 
information may include the following factors: (1) technical objectives with rationale; (2) 
system effectiveness factors and acceptance criteria; (3) the critical technical performance 
measures; and (4) mission. The technical objectives generally become a basis for the 
specification of the system and trade-off analysis when it difficult to establish requirement 
due to the insufficient data (MIL-STD-499B (draft), 1992). 
 The first process activity is to establish functional and performance requirements for the 
primary functions of a system throughout the analyses of information given from customers. 
Of course, prior to the establishment of the requirements, the context of influencing 
conditions and evaluation criteria (i.e. effectiveness factors and technical performance 
measures) are refined in details. The performance requirements shall be established for all 
identified functional requirements. They are characterised by the success and acceptance 
criteria (BS EN 62347, 2007). The functional and performance requirements established are 
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allocated into the lower system level. 
The continuing process activity is to allocate the functional and performance requirements 
established by the previous activity through analyses in order to integrate a functional 
architecture successively. The functional analysis is performed throughout functional flow 
diagram (Blanchard et al. 2006) to determine the lower level functions needed. Therefore, it 
shall be the logical sequence. The functional allocation is to establish performance 
requirements for each functional requirement. Time requirements are also determined and 
allocated in the process of functional analysis. The resultant requirements shall be 
quantitatively defined to use design and acceptance criteria. The established requirements are 
synthesised into the system configuration functionally and physically. 
The third is a process activity for designing the solutions of established functional and 
performance requirement into a functional architecture, and integrating them into a physical 
architecture. In this process activity, a complete requirement is established for design; the 
significant system performance measures are determined; the solutions for the system design, 
system configuration; and the system characteristics are defined. The functional and physical 
architecture are transformed into work breakdown structure. The outputs of the process 
activities are analysed and controlled repeatedly. 
 
Figure 3 A Specification Process for Rolling Stock RAM Characteristics 
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The final process activity, system analysis and control, is on balancing the results produced in 
each process activities by means of the measurement of process progression, the evaluation of 
alternatives, the selection of preferred alternative and the documentation of data and decision 
making. The system analysis conducts trade-off studies, effectiveness analysis and 
assessments, and design analyses. Whereas, the control mechanisms execute managements 
(risk, configuration, data), measurements (performance based progress, technical 
performance), and technical review.  
ROLLING STOCK RAM SPECIFICATION PROCESS 
The specification of the system characteristics of a rolling stock aims to realise the functions 
relevant to the tasks of the system during the system life cycle. Equally, RAM specification 
process is to determine the performance level of RAM characteristics under system 
specification process. The specification of RAM requirements determined is commenced after 
the completion of the functional architecture (BS EN 62347, 2007). RAM specification 
process is consisted of four process activities. 
RAM requirements determination 
The RAM requirements of a rolling stock are specified with other system requirements of the 
system. They include a number of performance measures for RAM characteristics, generally 
three headings: availability, reliability, and maintenance performance. The selection of the 
measures is relevant to the nature and type of the system, mission profile, and the application 
environmental and the criticality of the needed functions of the system (BS EN 50126-1, 
1999; BS EN 50126-3, 2006; BS EN 60300-3-4, 2008; Ebling, 2010). 
The availability requirements are especially specified in terms of the downtime during the 
system operation. The reliability requirements are specified for the success of mission without 
failure. The Maintainability requirements are particularly considered in that it is the great 
contribution to life cycle cost. The RAM requirements and goals in the specification process 
are definitely different as shown in Figure 4. The requirements are part of the results of the 
specification process and the goals are an aspiration of the customers before the specification 
progresses.  
Figure 3 represents the process procedure for determination of RAM requirement. As 
mentioned above, the availability and reliability goals are determined by the operational 
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objective (e.g. schedule adherence rate or train operation rate of peak period) as mentioned 
above and then, reliability and maintainability gaols may be trade-off by the availability. The 
bellows discuss the activities for the RAM requirements. 
 
Figure 4 RAM Specification Process Activities for Determination RAM Requirement 
 
Availability performance requirements 
For rolling stock, availability is a prime system performance characteristic as described in the 
procedure above. It is applied at the system level throughout the definition of the down time 
by Equation 1.1. The downtime is defined because of the high relationship between revenue 
and service loss of the system, personnel injury due to the system. The downtime of a rolling 
stock is generally used by the peak periods (e.g. during a day, a weekend, a special holiday (s) 
etc.) or the maximum delay times of mission profile of the system. The availability is required 
one or two among defined availabilities: such as steady state availability (or general 
availability); instantaneous availability; mean availability; and operational availability in 
order to keep the balance of up time and down time operationally. However, if the failure rate 
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or repair rate of a system are constant, the steady state availability, A, is identical for a first 
estimate of the availability. The equation 1.1 is the general view that:   
  
  𝑡𝑖  
  𝑡𝑖     𝑤 𝑡𝑖  
                                                                      (   ) 
  To predict the availability of a system in the specification process, the failure and repair 
probability of the system applied must be considered because it depends on reliability and 
maintainability as shown in Equation 1.2~1.4. It is possible for the steady state availability of 
Equation 1.1 to form three different availabilities according to the definitions of uptime and 
downtime. The first form is inherent availability (Ai) as illustrated in Equation 1.2. It only 
considers mean time to failure (MTBF) and mean repair time (MTTR) and is used as a design 
parameter and RAM trade-off interpretation.  
   
    
         
                                                                    (   ) 
The second form is achieved availability, Aa, is defined as described in Equation 1.3. It is 
applied on the mean maintenance interval (MTBM) and mean maintenance time ( ̅). 
   
    
      ̅
                                                                          (   ) 
The final form is operational availability, Ao, is defined as Equation 1.4. It takes account into 
mean restore time (MTR) included MTTR, mean delay time for maintenance (MDT), mean 
delay time for supply (SDT). This availability measure is very useful in effectively managing 
a system in the operating phase, but it is complex. 
   
    
        
                                                                   (   ) 
Reliability performance Requirements 
  For rolling stock, reliability, or service reliability, is directly applied from availability or 
railway service performance targets (schedule adherence rate or peak periods). Reliability is 
the ability of implementation for required function of a system. It represents the probability in 
terms of planned operating conditions and time interval for constant failure rate () as 
presented in Equation 1.5:  
    𝜆                                                                                    (   ) 
Where the reliability, the goal of R, is derived from availability or service performance targets 
as stated above and then the failure rate () is determined by the task interval. In general, 
reliability measures are defined by alternative measures with the confidence of success in the 
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demonstration: i.e. MTBF or mean kilometre between service failure (MKBSF) and can be 
obtained from Equation 1.6 and 1.7:  
     
 

                                                                                 (   ) 
 𝐾          𝑉                                                                     (   ) 
 Where, V is the mean speed (km/h) for a mission profile. 
Prior to defining rolling stock, the failure conditions that are likely to be suffered from the 
system shall be considered in the early phase. It is defined by the consequence of failure. As 
mentioned above, failure conditions are derived from the down time of availability equation. 
BS EN 50126-1 (1999) and 50126-3 (2006) define in details for the functional failure in terms 
of the failure consequences. In addition, the redundancy is another consideration in the 
determination of reliability measures. The listed blows are the considerations when 
determining reliability measures: 
 Mission profile; 
 Failure conditions (or failure definition); 
 Operating and environmental conditions; 
 Demonstration methods for system acceptance 
Maintainability performance requirements 
  Maintainability affects the cost of the maintenance and availability. It defines as the ability 
of a corrective and preventive maintenance action from the failed function of the system. The 
maintainability therefore is focused on the reduction of a non-operation state due to 
maintenance. The maintenance time shall be specified by the proper measures as mean repair 
time or delay time, even maintenance cost. It considers the following lists: operational 
conditions, maintenance personnel, maintenance policy, maintenance tools, spare part, and 
demonstration methods. Maintenance goal is derived from availability goal and MTTR of 
maintenance organisation. Equation 1.8 is a formula for the determination of maintainability 
goal of constant repair rate.    
 (𝑡)   −    /𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅                                                                    (   ) 
  The corrective maintenance is carried out for unexpected failures of a system. It focuses on 
the operation restoration as soon as possible. Therefore, the maximum interest is the reduction 
of the maintenance time at the system level. The mean corrective maintenance time (MTTR 
or ̅ ̅̅ 𝑐 ) is expressed by the mean repair time ( 𝑐 𝑖) and failure rate (  ) of the individual 
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lower system as Equation 1.9: 
 ̅𝑐   
∑     𝑐 𝑖
∑  
                                                                   (   ) 
  The preventive maintenance is a maintenance method to postpone the wear-out 
characteristics of a system. It includes the activities to retain a system performance at a 
system level and functions such as inspection tuning, calibration, time/cycle replacement, and 
overhaul. Therefore, the maximum interest is the reduction of the maintenance time at the 
system level. The mean preventive maintenance time ( ̅ ̅̅ 𝑝 ) is expressed by the mean elapsed 
time ( 𝑝 𝑖) and frequency of the i
th preventive maintenance task in actions per system 
operating hour as Equation 1.10: 
 ̅𝑝   
∑ 𝑝 𝑖  𝑓𝑝 𝑖
∑𝑓𝑝 𝑖
                                                              (    ) 
RAM Allocation 
The process activity that successively allocates the system level RAM requirements of a 
system into the lower levels of the system is defined as RAM allocation, which is also a 
technique for partitioning and mapping the RAM performance characteristics onto the system 
architectures. The purpose of which is to find the most effective system architecture to 
achieve the RAMS requirements. The allocation techniques consider the criticality of the 
system functions as well as operating profile and environmental conditions. The complexity 
of the system for allocation is determined by the system failure rate or the system life. The 
suitability of such allocation is recognised by trade-off as Figure 3 (BS EN 60300-2, 2004; BS 
EN 60706-2, 2006; Ebeling, 2010). 
 
  Reliability allocation starts with the completion of reliability block diagram (RBD), which is 
the extension of functional analysis. MIL-HDBK-388B (1998) presents four reliability 
allocation methods: (1) Equal Apportionment Technique (EAT); (2) ARINIC Apportionment 
Technique (ARINIC); (3) Feasibility of objectives Technique; and (4) Minimization of Effort 
Algorithm. The allocation of system reliability follows the Equation 1.11 and EAT and 
ARINIC methods are general in the specification process. 
∏  (𝑡)
 
 = 
 ≥    (𝑡)                                                                 (    ) 
  Equal Apportionment Technique (or exponential case) is used for the absence of definitive 
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information on the systems allocated. The equation is that: 
∏  𝜆 
 
 = 
≥   (𝑡)                                                                  (    ) 
∑  
 
 = 
       
  ARINIC Apportionment Technique is used under the assumption of constant failure rate (  ), 
such that any subsystem failure causes system failure and that the mission time of both system 
and subsystem are equal. It applies weight factors (Wi) which are considered of failure rate 
(  ) of the each subsystem. Availability is allocated as the same way of reliability allocation. 
   𝑊  
                                                                      (    ) 
𝑊  
  
∑   
 
 = 
 
  Maintainability is mainly conducted for corrective maintenance requirements. It needs the 
knowledge of system architecture and the RAM performance of the allocated system 
elements. The maintainability allocation process is generally implemented by two steps as 
described in Equation 1.14. The first is to separate MTTR ( 𝑐 ) from availability and then 
allocates the MTTR ( 𝑐 ) into the lower level MTTR ( ̅𝑐 ) by the failure rate () and number 
(N) of the system elements constituted (Blanchard et al. 2006; MIL-HDBK-470A, 1997).  
 𝑐  
    ( −   )
  
                                                                                 
 ̅𝑐  
∑𝑁     𝑐 
∑𝑁   
                                                                      (    ) 
RAM Prediction 
RAM prediction aims to assess the results of RAM allocation, and find out the weak points 
thereby. It becomes a basis of the determination of RAM specification and it provides design 
methods. Therefore, RAM prediction is done after RAM specification. Reliability prediction 
is applied by the methods throughout: (1) the analysis of similar system; (2) an estimate of 
active system elements; (3) the count of the number of system parts; (4) the analysis of system 
stress factors; and (5) the analysis of failure mechanism (BS EN 60706-2, 2006; MLL-
HDBK-388B, 1998; MIL-HDBK-470B). 
Maintainability prediction includes the estimation of maintenance elapsed time factors, 
maintenance labour hour factors, maintenance frequency factors and maintenance cost factors. 
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However, generally the mean corrective maintenance ( ̅𝑐 ) is predicted by Equation 1.15 and 
the mean preventive maintenance ( ̅𝑝 ) are predicted by Equation 1.16. 
 ̅𝑐  
∑𝑁     𝑐 𝑖
∑𝑁   
                                                                 (    ) 
 Where, failure rate (), quantities of parts (N) and 𝑐 𝑖 of a part are applied. 
 ̅𝑝  
∑(𝑓 𝑡 )(𝑁)   𝑝 𝑖
∑(𝑓 𝑡 )(𝑁)
                                                            (    ) 
Where, the task frequency (𝑓 𝑡 )(N) and the mean task time ( 𝑝 𝑖) are considered. 
RAM Trade-Off  
  RAM trade-off is a decision-making technique for the evaluation of design alternatives 
possible. The alternatives are specified by the functional allocation process. RAM trade-off 
may are used for all specification activities by the problem of the RAM evaluation. The RAM 
trade-off is concerned for reliability and maintainability which is focused on availability and 
life cycle cost. When an availability requirements are specified, there, if needed, requires 
trade-off between reliability and maintainability. However, in steady-state, availability in 
trade-off depends on the ratio of MTTR ( 𝜇⁄ )and MTBF (
 
 ⁄ )or maintenance time ratio (). 
In case series subsystems, availability can calculate by Equation 1.17 (BS EN 60300-2, 2004; 
BS EN 60706-2, 2006; MIL-HDBK-388B, 1998). 
  
    
    
 
 
𝜇
 
  
 
(   )
  (   )                                                      (    ) 
HIGH SPEED TRAIN APPROACH 
The high-speed train approach is focusing on the application of proposed RAM process 
activities (Figure 3 and 4) when specifying the RAM characteristic. The objective of high-
speed train is to safely carry passengers like the service quality and journey time of domestic 
airlines. Therefore, operational service performance target is very high as described in the 
following below. It is generally derived from the passenger carter, which is performed in 
many counties. 
• Over 95% of all trains shall be arrived within five minutes for published timetable. 
It is assumed that the contents of Table 1 are train operating profiles for RAM application: 
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Table 1 Operational Requirements 
NO Mission profile New system Similar system 
1 Route length 400 Km 400 Km 
2  ourney time 2 hours 2 hours 15 minutes 
3 Train operation per each day 3 rounds 2 rounds 
4 Service frequency per direction 6 trains 6 trains 
5 Non-revenue hours during day 6 hours 6 hours 
6 Expected life 25 years 25 years 
 
TARGETS SETTING UP OF RAM CHARACTERISTICS 
Determination of RAM Goals and Targets 
As shown in the first task of RAM specification process, the assignment of RAM goals are 
derived from the railway service performance such as schedule adherence and the peak period 
may be applied. From the service performance target, first of all, availability and reliability 
goal can be determined from Equation 1.1 and 1.5. The maximum delay time allowed is used 
by the downtime of the availability and the failure definition of the reliability. The reliability 
goal is allocated from the schedule adherence rate. And then the failure conditions of a rolling 
stock are considered prior to determination. Reliability measures are set up by the reliability 
goal and mission time in terms of Equation 15-17. The maintainability goals are determined 
by the availability goals and maintenance time possible. 
Figure 5 represents the range of reliability goal possible. Reliability targets are established 
throughout consideration of the data of similar existing system and trade-off technique. As 
stated in graph, the reliability targets can be applied from over 50000 km (MTBF), but 
existing system (KTX) which is similar in the operation conditions was applied over 121000 
km. Therefore, RAM targets at level of rolling stock can be established as Table 1. The value 
determined is especially considered the operating trip rounds (similar system: two rounds per 
day). For RAM targets for main systems is also determined together with the overall RAM 
targets. It is established by the information of similar system.  
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Table 1 Determined RAM Targets at Rolling Stock Level 
Measures 
Availability 
(%) 
Reliability 
(%) 
Maintainability 
(%) 
 
MTBF 
(hour) 
MTTR 
(hour) 
MKSBF 
(km) 
LIFE 
(year) 
Similar 95.7 99.67 90 0.00165 605 26.7 121000  26 
NEW 95.8 99.75 95 0.00125 779 32 159800  25 
 
 
Figure 5 MKBSF for Reliability Probability 
Table 2 RAM Targets of Main Systems 
Category 
 MTBF MTTR 
Similar NEW 
Similar 
Hour (year) 
NEW 
Hour (year) 
Similar 
(h) 
NEW 
(h) 
Car Body system 1.30E-05 9.92E-06 77016 (26) 100854 (25) 2.2 2.38 
Side door system 3.68E-05 2.81E-05 27189 (9.1) 35605 (8.9) 4.0 4.60 
High voltage system 1.77E-05 1.36E-04 5634 (1.9) 7378 (1.8) 2.6 2.85 
Traction system 2.55E-04 1.95E-04 3915 (1.3) 5127 (1.3) 5.0 5.94 
Bogie system 2.39E-04 1.82E-04 4192 (1.4) 5490 (1.4) 3.4 3.83 
Braking system 3.52E-05 2.69E-05 28371 (9.5) 37152 (9.3) 2.3 2.50 
Cooler/Heating system 4.10E-05 3.13E-05 24384 (8.1) 31931 (8.0) 5.0 5.94 
Auxiliary system 2.06E-04 1.57E-04 4863 (1.6) 6368 (1.6) 1.7 1.81 
Train control system 6.49E-04 4.96E-04 1540(0.5) 2017 (0.5) 0.5 2.85 
RAM Modelling and RAM Target Allocation 
  Herein, we discuss the methods of modelling and allocating RAM characteristic targets of 
the propulsion system into the lower level system as illustrated in Figure 7. The propulsion is 
a main subsystem of a rolling stock that supplies the electrical power of catenary into the 
traction system. It can be divided by three main functional parts: (1) pantograph equipment 
that receive the electrical power from catenary and control it (e.g. Pantograph (PAN), 
Potential transformer (PT), Voltage Circuit breaker (VCB)); (2) Electrical transformer 
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equipment that supply the steady power into the motor block and traction device, (e.g. Roof 
Equipment (RE), Main Transformer (MT)), and traction system that translate electrical power 
into movement energy, (e.g. Motor Block (MB), and Traction Motor (TM)). Figure 7 shows 
their functional block diagram. 
 
Figure 7 Functional Block Diagram of Propulsion System 
 This propulsion system is allocated from the rolling stock RAM targets as described in Table 
2. It is structured by the combination of the series, parallel and 3 out of 4 structures as shown 
in Figure 8. For RAM allocation, this system shall be modelled by the series structure. 
Therefore, this functional structure is modelled by the three groups as mentioned above. The 
RAM allocation is performed by the ARINIC technique of Equation 1.13 and the weight 
factor is obtained by the collected data of similar systems. The results are in Table 2.  
 
Figure 8 Reliability Block Diagram of Propulsion System 
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Table 1 RAM Targets of Propulsion System 
Population 
system 
 MTBF MKSBF MTTR 
3.28E-04 3050 610000 4 
 
Table 2 RAM Targets of Subsystem Allocated 
Category  MTBF MKBSF (Km) MTTR 
A Group 0.000328 7114 1422800 1.7 
B Group 4.69E-05 21300 4260000 0.6 
C Group 0.000328 7114 1422800 1.7 
 
RAM allocation of A Group 
A group needs two steps which are simplified for allocation. One allocates after making a 
modelling of a parallel structure by the use of Equation 2.1 and then making model as two 
series configuration and allocate within them (Equation 2.2). The equation is like:  
   − ( −  𝐴 )( −  𝐴2)                                                                   (2.1) 
 𝑃𝐴𝑁   𝑃𝑇   𝑀𝐶𝐵  ( 𝐴 ) 
 
                                                             (   ) 
R RA1=A2 RPAN1=PT1=VCB1 RPAN2=PT2=VCB2 
99.93 97.44 99.14 99.14 
 
RAM allocation of B Group 
  The group B can be simply allocated because of series. Reliability allocated is 0.999906  
RAM allocation of C Group 
  The group C should be allocated by three steps. The first is made up of by four parallel 
structures and each structure is called C1 to C4 and then is allocated by Equation 2.3, 2.4, and 
2.5. 
 𝐶      4   − √ −  𝐶
4                                                                  (   ) 
 𝐶  ∑ (
 
 
)
4
 = 
 𝐶𝑖
 ( −  𝐶𝑖)
4                                                           (   ) 
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 𝑀𝐵   𝑇𝑀   𝑇𝑀  ( 𝐶) 
 
                                                       (   ) 
R RCi RC RMBi=TMi 
99.934 83.997 87.72 94.353 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Customers require rolling stock with characteristics that are sufficient to their needs and 
requirements, which are specified throughout the system specification process for effective 
design characteristics. The specification of RAM characteristics is implemented in the same 
perspective of system specification process. Therefore, in this paper, we have discussed the 
engineering activities of specifying RAM characteristics for the improvement of the system 
effectiveness and life cycle cost of a system. Firstly, we discuss the specification process for 
defining and specifying system requirements into system architecture throughout the 
definition of system characteristics. Secondly, the lower structures of the system is integrated 
and verified into the higher system level configuration for the conformity of the RAM 
requirements. Finally, RAM performance characteristics are also integrated into the system 
functions. Examples for the implementation of RAM targets are shown for a practical 
application of RAM specification.  
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